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Geopolitical dimensions of the sustainability challenge: 
Introduction 
The need for international responses to global environmental challenges has been 
obvious since this topic emerged. The first important, globally acknowledged steps towards 
revealing the sustainability threat of the Earth began with the launch of Man and Biosphere 
programme of UNESCO in 1970, then the first world environmental protection congress of the 
United Nations in Stockholm (1972), and the activity of the Club of Rome, which made it clear 
for the entire global arena that environmental challenges do not respect borders and states. The 
most influential (also most debated) output of the latter was the report titled ’The Limit to 
Growth’ in 1972, by MEADOWS and his fellows, which alarmed the wider audience for quick 
joint international actions at global level. Looking at the several multilateral - and often 
typically with global ambitions - agreements on issues related environmental themes, we can 
say that sustainability has become an elementary issue of international relations. However, its 
relation to geopolitics – which is in a sort of renaissance period – is less visible and described 
yet.   
The global challenge of the Earth’s sustainability would need a global governance. Angus 
FORBES (2019) in his popular movement argued for a global planet authority to save the 
biosphere, and claimed that the globalised citizens connected with each other via internet could 
voluntarily elect such a global government in a direct way. However, as even the UN has 
limited possibilities, it could achieve only setting up goals (see the 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals of 2015), generate negotiations and initte cooperation of states, but lacking real power, 
the responses to global challenges and the possibilities of global coordination depend and 
probably will depend on the governments of countries; countries which have specific cultural 
settings, political interests, physical and socio-economic resources depending on their specific 
territories and their own histories with their own geographies. The increase of importance of 
the geographic location of countries and their territory-specific resources are drawing the 
attention to the role of geopolitics. The emerging field of geopolitics – according to the classical 
definition – is the study of the effects of Earth's geography (human and physical) on politics 
and international relations (DEVETAK et al. 2017). Although the elements of the 
environmental system operate in a geographic logic, the spatial understanding of politics of 
sustainable development is less revealed yet. This volume intends to enlighten and reflect on 
that dimension too. 
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Jean-Charles HOURCADE in his work of 2008 argued that certain alerts on global 
environmental challenges provided stakes of geopolitics of sustainable development. Between 
1970 and 2001 he identified the emergence of four alerts on environmental challenges, which 
resulted in significant negotiations among countries, as well as some international multilateral 
agreements with geopolitical significance. On his list we can find the nuclear alert, the forest 
dieback alert (mainly in relation with acid rains), the ozone alert which is considered probably 
the most successful global solution so far; and the climate change alert. In his view, since 2001 
the serious conflict is between the interest of the developed countries – which seem to be very 
active in greening production and consumption patterns – and the developing countries which 
request possibilities of economic growth and catching up. These conflicts can be detected in 
the North-South dichotomy of the world.  Looking at the diverse position of countries regarding 
the importance of “green policies” (which can sometimes radically change over time within the 
same country) there is no doubt that tackling with the responsibilities of global environmental 
issues holds serious conflicts among various countries. The different interests can be rooted in 
their development paths, different cultures and in the specific economic (typically short term) 
interests of the countries. 
Drawing a comprehensive understanding of the various possible aspects of the 
relationship between geopolitics and the global sustainability challenge obviously cannot be 
the ambition of such a short introduction. However, it is worth mentioning some key 
challenging processes of our age, which could be understood more deeply by applying 
geopolitical approach in some key issues. 
In our age we are experiencing a strengthening competition for environmental resources, 
which are typically specific to certain geographic areas. The increasing scarcity of agricultural 
products, food and water, the restructuring demand energy sources – both traditional and green 
energies –, the green environment and many other geography-specific conditions and their 
changes due to climate change can more and more frequently result in inter- and intra-
governmental tensions, and lead to migration pressure (RAKONCZAI 2021).  
The other geopolitically relevant key issue of sustainable development is the increasing 
inequality and spatial concentration. In 2019, 500 biggest companies1 produced 37,8% of the 
world’s GDP, but they employed only 70 million people. The pure market processes failed to 
balance the huge differences between regions, and this inequality can be experienced in various 
social dimensions too, while the general Western world solutions for capitalism and liberalism 
 
1 Available at: http://fortune.com/global500/list/ (Accessed on 15 Jan 2021) 
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seem to be inadequate in the Global South and also in the Eastern countries, resulting in serious 
lack of common global understanding. While the dominant states try to make accepted the 
Western norms of liberal democracy and value system, other societies with different traditions 
and values request respect for their own culture. The geographically diverse demographic 
trends are probably the most crucial issues for the future of the Earth, bringing serious 
geopolitical tensions. While from the beginning of the 18th century it took 124 years for the 
Earth’s population to grow by 1 billion, since 1975, the world’s population has grown by that 
every 12 years on average.2 The demographic change has completely different patterns in 
different parts of the world, and through the migration pressure it brings serious issues to the 
countries of origin – e.g. the brain drain loss - and the target countries too, see for example 
integration problems and cultural tensions. 
These processes challenging the sustainable development have obviously clear 
geopolitical dimensions, and their understanding needs further explorations in the academic 
world. This volume representing contributions of early career researchers is just one small step 
towards understanding more geopolitical aspects of sustainable development. This volume is 
one of the results of the rising story of the Doctoral School of International Relations and 
Political Science in a strong collaboration with the Institute of International, Political and 
Regional Studies. The Doctoral School launched a new PhD programme in 2017 focusing on 
geopolitical research, which was complemented by the issue of sustainable development. This 
topic could attract and motivate the PhD students of the Doctoral School to find connections 
between their own research field and sustainable development. 
The present volume contains 14 articles written by the PhD students of the Doctoral 
School of International Relations and Political Science, coming from six different countries 
from Bangladesh to Morocco etc. There are 4 thematic chapters in the book (Social inequalities 
and sustainability; Sustainability in political thought; Analysing sustainability issues in 
regional/national economic dimension; International relations in the light of sustainability), 
each consisting of 3-4 articles which have many potential interconnections, and might draw the 
attention of the readers to some new research fields and aspects of the extremely complex 
concept of sustainability. 
Géza Salamin 
Head of Institute of International, Political and Regional Studies of CUB 
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Bottom-Up Protests in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria: A 
Struggle Against “Inherited” Socio-spatial Inequalities 
Hamid AIT EL CAID3 
Abstract 
In the last five years, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco experienced a new wave of protests from the most 
under-developed or often “marginalised” regions within each country. “Thirsty” protests in Morocco’s Zagora 
region in 2017, unemployment protests in Tunisia’s Tataouine region since 2017, and anti-marginalization 
protests in Algeria’s Tin-Zaouatine region in 2020 are all examples of bottom-up activism against continued 
socio-spatial inequalities in the Maghreb. This paper aims to examine the role of popular protests in reducing 
regional disparities in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, which could be described as “inherited” or “sustained” 
social patterns. To meet this aim, cross-case analysis will be carried out. Results of the comparative study reveal 
that bottom-up protests played different roles in each case, where in Morocco’s Zagora region, protesters 
“drove” the government to act, while in Tunisia and Algeria, protesters’ role was-and-remains “ineffective” in 
meeting their demands as demonstrations continue in Tunisia and Algeria. 
Keywords: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Protests, Socio-spatial Inequalities  
1. Introduction 
On December 17th, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on 
fire in protest after police confiscated his merchandise. This action marked the beginning of 
what was to be known as the “Arab Spring” that caused deep socio-political transformations in 
the Middle East and North Africa consequences of which can still be witnessed today. Micro-
level research was carried out using mainstream literature and analytical studies on the “Arab 
Spring” The majority of publications examined socio-political, and often economic 
implications of the “Arab Spring” from both national and cross-national levels. Yet little 
research was conducted on the micro-level aspect of the revolutions in which the most 
“marginalised”, “isolated” and “under-developed” regions can be treated as roots of such 
developments and thus drivers of the wider socio-political changes. 
Bouazizi’s hometown “Sidi Bouzid” lies in central Tunisia and was regarded as the less 
“developed” district of the country by several indices. In 2010, the Sidi Bouzid region topped 
the ranking in the poverty index (32%) and unemployment among tertiary degree holders (41 
%)4. These figures did not change much after the revolution due to statistics from the same 
sources in 2015 displayed that Sidi Bouzid and its neighbouring regions in Central and 
Southern Tunisia did not improve in terms of poverty (the figure remained at 33%) and 
unemployment among tertiary degree holders (even increased to 57%). This unfavourable 
 
3 Corvinus University of Budapest, Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science, PhD student, 
hamid.ait-el-caid@stud.uni-corvinus.hu  
4 Data compiled by Tunisian “National Institute for census”, Ministry of Social affairs, UNICEF, Ministry of 
planning and regional development and Ministry of development, investment and international cooperation.  
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situation triggered further protests in 2017 in “Tataouine”, the largest region, which is oil-rich, 
yet the least developed part of the country. 
Popular protests in Tataouine led to the formation of The Kamour Movement, which 
demanded employment opportunities, regional development as well as equal distribution of oil 
and gas revenues drilled in the region. Under these circumstances, we may therefore conclude 
that there is a huge gap between regions regarding human and socio-development in Tunisia, 
which can be called “socio-spatial inequality”, manifested by disparities in wealth distribution, 
state budget funding and the availability of a better standard of living such as drinkable water, 
electricity, a sewerage treatment system, etc. 
I deliberately started with the case of Tunisia other than the other Maghreb countries – 
Algeria and Morocco – in order to illustrate that the cradle of the “Arab Spring” and its 
consequences were brought about by a desperate man from an underdeveloped region, which 
allows us to highlight the importance of micro-level or in-country studies in the understanding 
of macro-level changes. Algeria and Morocco are no different from Tunisia with regard to 
regional inequality in terms of social development. The wealthiest and most developed regions 
can also be found in Northern and Coastal areas of the two Maghreb countries, whereas in 
Central and Southern regions there was little development, which then led the ignited citizens 
of these regions to protest. 
As selected case studies for this paper, three protest movements were chosen to describe 
the situation in the Maghreb countries. The Kamour Movement protest in Tunsia’s Tataouine 
region (2017- up to 2021), the “Thirsty” protests in Morocco’s region of Zagora (2017) and 
anti-oppression protests (2020) in Algeria’s Tin-Zaouatine region. The three case studies share 
a lot of common features allowing us to make sense of the existence of “socio spatial” 
inequalities and explore the role of popular protests in the struggle against injustices and 
inequalities across regions. 
A quick look at the recent history of the three Maghreb countries reveals that the struggle 
against colonial powers, namely France and Spain, was undertaken by people from all regions 
as independence was the sole objective of every person. After decolonization, Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia became sovereign states in the mid-twentieth century and began building 
national institutions. However, power and decision-making were centred in Northern and 
coastal regions, where the capital cities of Rabat, Algiers, and Tunis are located. Since 
independence, centralization of power has brought other regions, especially Central and 
Southern regions, into marginalization and exclusion in terms of socio-economic development, 
political decision- making as well as gaining their share of state budgets. 
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MEDDEB (2020) emphasised that it was in Tunisia’s interior regions where the main 
outbreaks of the revolution had taken place. He argued that former governments had insisted 
on biasing the interests of the more privileged coastal regions, while ignoring inland and border 
areas since the country gained independence in 1956. Morocco on the other hand embarked on 
socio-spatial inequalities during a “protectorate” era as French colonial powers classified the 
country into two parts: the “profitable” and “non- profitable Morocco”. The “Profitable” 
regions were lush and plain areas where major economic and political activities were managed 
(such as Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, and Fes), while the rest of the country (mainly 
mountainous and desert areas) was considered as The “non-profitable”, supplying only raw 
materials and minerals. According to RACHID (2020), the “sad” reality is that the colonial 
policy persisted even in post-1956 Morocco, which made the mountainous and southern 
regions suffer from the division though these areas were rich in minerals, such as gold, silver, 
and copper. Similarly, in Algeria, Hadji (2018) it was affirmed that the regional disparities still 
exist after more than half a century since independence and may have even widened because 
of a failure to create the desired regional balance. 
The concept of “sustainable development” could have an opposite meaning in the 
Maghreb context as the persistence of “inherited” inequalities among regions. This would let 
us relate sustainability to regional inequality, thus we may be talking about sustainable -
underdevelopment” rather than “development”. In this paper, I am shedding light on why the 
other way around for sustainability can be applied to the Maghreb region as long as power 
centralisation, unequal wealth distribution and disparities in the level of human development 
continue. In light of the adverse fact over sustainability of socio-spatial inequalities, popular 
protests emerge as a potential game changer of the status quo. Therefore, the three cases of 
protests in the Maghreb countries will allow us to see how far bottom-up activism can alter the 
opposite significance of “sustainability” into its natural meaning. 
2. Socio spatial inequalities: why does it matter in Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia? 
2.1.  Conceptualizing socio-spatial inequality 
When looking at the term “socio-spatial inequalities”, we can draw our understanding 
according to two contesting schools of thought: 1) neoclassical, and 2) dependency, neo-
Marxism schools. (WEI 2015, p. 1). As early as 1920s, socio-spatial inequality was referred to 
as regional inequality by the neo-classical approach, which is dominated by theories of 
economics, suggesting that regional inequality happens when there is a “disequilibrium” 
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between supply and demand in more developed regions. (WEI 2015, p. 2). In contrast, BORTS 
– STIEN (1964) explained that regional equalities take place when “labour tends to move to 
more developed regions with higher wages, whereas capital tends to move to labour-intensive 
and more profitable sectors in less developed regions”. This pattern therefore equalizes wages 
and the cost of capital and reduces regional income disparities. 
On the other hand, the Neo-Marxism and Dependency schools, as illustrated by 
EMMANUEL (1972) and FRANK (1967), assert that regional inequalities occur when capital 
“spreads to the periphery and creates a dependent core-peripheral structure, which in return 
sustains labour outflow and unequal transfer, exacerbates the stagnation of the periphery” (WEI 
2015, p. 2). This trend to regional inequality brought to light capitalism as an environment 
where gaps in wages, market and capital are inevitable and a pre-condition for a capitalist 
society to occur.  However, those definitions are perceived to examine regional inequalities 
with a short distance between what a more or a less developed region seem to be. In other 
words, space was understood from urban-suburban dichotomy, without referring to the broader 
sense of what a “region” stands for. 
It is worth pointing out the fact that social inequalities across regions also attracted 
researchers in geography. Traditional social science literature on regional inequality puts 
emphasis on socio-economic gaps among individuals and ignores “spatial” factors. For 
example, Alexander von Humboldt (1769 – 1859) was one of the contemporary geographers 
to study human interaction with “spatial differences” (HADJI 2018, p. 119). Later, space and 
development became a popular axis in geography across the world, including in MENA 
regions. Nevertheless, social science scholars of justice and equality paid little attention to 
regional disparities. John RAWLS (1971), who set the principles of justice, made no indication 
to “space” in a theory of Justice. Therefore, geographers’ expertise in space differences, 
manifested by adverse binaries (e.g., desert area vs lush area, mountainous area vs plain area, 
coastal vs in-land), made them complement what social scientists were missing in defining and 
theorising crucial concepts such as justice and equality. 
2.2.  “The Maghreb”: an example of existing socio-spatial inequalities. 
The socio-economic gap between regions is evident in the three Maghreb countries: 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. These countries share the same regional composition both in 
terms of geography and social disparities. Northern regions monopolise political and economic 
powers which in turn affect the social level of citizens residing in those regions, whereas central 
and Southern regions, are mostly barren, mountainous, and desert lands covering almost 70% 
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of the total national territory. Thus, regardless of the little population density of the central and 
southern regions, due to harsh climate conditions (too cold in mountainous areas, and too hot 
in desert areas), the socio-economic development still lags behind compared to the rest of the 
regions, in plain, lush lands, and near the coasts. 
The most efficient way to discover socio-spatial inequalities is by measuring the level of 
poverty by region. For this purpose, there are government agencies which provide statistics in 
Tunisia (National Institute of Statistics), Morocco (High Commissioner for Planning) and 
Algeria (National Office for Statistics), and monitor and compile data on poverty from regional 
and micro-regional levels. But, when searching for data or a poverty map in web-based search 
engines, no data appears on this topic, except for archived maps from 1999 to 2006, and which 
were found in research papers conducted by university researchers. The government allegedly 
refuses to talk about the existence of poverty maps, even if levels of poverty are increasing in 
the central areas, especially in border regions (Eastern, Western and Southern regions). 
According to the poverty map of Tunisia (Figure 1), we can detect that the Southern, 




















Figure 1: Poverty rate (%) in Tunisia by regions in 2010.  






Moreover, those regions are mostly desert and semi-arid lands, but rich in oil and gas 
reserves. For example, the South-eastern region, which borders with Libya, is ranked as the 
second “poorest” region with 25% poverty rate. 
The town of Titaouine, the birthplace of the Kamour Movement in 2017, is situated in 
the middle of the region which explicitly exhibits the struggle of its citizens for local socio-
economic development. Similarly, the town of Sidi Bouzid, which is situated in Middle 
Western Tunisia, as illustrated in Figure 1, was ranked as “the poorest” of the country’s regions 
with 32.2 %. This unfavourable social condition is what drove Mohamed Bouazizi to set 
himself on fire, which later prompted nationwide protests and escalated into what was then 
known as The Arab Spring sweeping other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
 
Figure 2: Monetary poverty rate (%) in Morocco by administrative regions in 2014.  
Source: High Commissioner for Planning of Morocco 2014. 
 
The popular protests, that swept Morocco in 2011 as part of The Arab Spring 
Revolutions, pushed the state to introduce new administrative regions in an attempt to promote 
decentralization and give the new regions autonomous governance. However, rationale for 











developed regions merged, while certain under-developed provinces (sub-regions) got 
integrated into each other in one region. This is clearly the case with the Draa-Tafilalet region, 
as it topped the “monetary poverty” rate by 14,5% in 2014 (see Figure 2). The Draa-Tafilalet 
region is situated in South-Eastern Morocco. The region sits at the foot of the High and Middle 
Atlas Mountains and covers large barren lands as part of the Sahara Desert. Its inhabitants 
depend on tourism and agriculture as the main economic activities, but those activities are 
subject to frequent crises due to desertification and unpredicted circumstances affecting tourist 
arrivals in Morocco, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. 
The “Thirsty” revolution took place in 2017 in the Zagora province of the Draa Tafilalet 
region, where residents protested against the shortage of water. Besides, local citizens of the 
village of Imider (see Figure 2) have since 1986, protested against unemployment and the 
State’s exploitation of a silver mine near the village. Both cases from the Draa-Region of 
Morocco demonstrate the persistence of colonial policy dividing the country into two 
territories: “profitable” and “non-profitable”. 
 
 
Figure 3: Poverty index per family (from 0 to 1) in Algeria by regions in 2005,  
Source: Data based on the National Investigation on livelihood and poverty in Algeria. 
 
The situation with socio-spatial inequalities in Algeria is no different from that of 
Morocco and Tunisia. Despite the lack of up-to-date data on poverty across the regions in 
Algeria, the 2020 protests in Tinzaouatine at the Malian border (see Figure 3) demonstrate that 
there is a huge gap between the northern and southern regions in terms of human development 
and access to social benefits. Figure 3 shows the village of Tinzaouatine in the Southern Wilaya 
(district) of Adrar and where the “poorest families” live by 0.31 together with neighbouring 
 




Wilayas in the south and by the borders. The region marked in “red” is an extension of the 
Atlas Mountains in Algeria which includes 4 Wilayas: Tiaret, Ghelizan, Tissmesilt, and Chlef. 
However, regions in white indicate an absence of data. 
3. “Sustainability” and the other way around: how socio-spatial 
inequalities remain unchanged? 
In the United Nations glossary, we find that sustainability is always connected to the 17 
global development goals aimed at making the world a better place by 2030. Among these 17 
goals is “reduced inequality” within and among countries. Though the UN definition of 
“inequality” relies on “income gap”, it implicitly includes the regional or spatial “inequality”. 
Nevertheless, as soon as the year 2030 approaches, there will not be much change concerning 
inequality as long as capitalism insists on it, and crises deepen it. For instance, several analyses 
and studies suggest that the Covid-19 pandemic crisis has affected middle-class people 
prompting therefore an increase in poverty and maintenance of wealth by the upper-class elites. 
Past pandemics proved a significant relationship between crises and inequalities. (FURCERI 
et al. 2020). This reality drove us to reconsider the concept of sustainability from its positive 
attribution to development to the opposite direction, which would lead us to propose a new 
concept of “sustainable under-development” considering the evidenced reality.  
The Maghreb context with socio-spatial inequalities is a significant example of the 
opposite semantics of the term “sustainability” where certain regions have remained more 
privileged than others for over 60 years since the independence of the Maghreb states. 
However, there may be a period when “sustainable socio-spatial inequalities” will be reversed 
into the United Nations seeking “socio-spatial equalities” if changes occur at the levels of 
political systems, public policies, or governance.  
In some democratic regimes, the fight against inequalities may take participatory 
paradigms. Citizens have opportunities to raise their voices through different channels of 
participatory governance allowing them to directly express their exclusion or marginalization 
to the policy and decision makers. But, in the non-democratic context, such practices may exist, 
but they do not help make a real-world impact.  In the context of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, 
citizens from the less-developed regions within each country went out onto the streets to protest 
for their basic social rights, such as employment and access to public services. 
To understand the role that popular protests could play in the struggle against socio-
spatial inequalities, I studied one protest movement from each Maghreb state. These were the 
“Thirsty” protests in Morocco’s Zagora region in 2017, anti-marginalization protests in Tin-
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Zaouatine of Algeria in 2020 and the “Kamour” Movement in Tunisia since 2017. The study 
involves quantitative and qualitative data of the main characteristics of each protest 
movement/activity, and its aftermath public and political reactions. 
a. Protests in Zagora (Morocco), 24th September – 8th October 2017 
• Number of participants (approximately): 200-300 persons per each demonstration.5 
• Protest substance: shortage of water, solidarity with detainee protesters. 
• Main slogans (personal translation from Arabic to English): “there is no health care, 
no education in Zagora “6, “oh Zagora citizen, it’s time to speak up for your rights!”7 
• Forms of protests and tools for communication: Spontaneous gathering, Sit-ins, 
Marches, Holding empty bottles of water. 
➢ Public and political reaction: 21 protesters arrested, most of whom were minors. 
Government formed a special committee to drill for water in the region. Minister of 
water Charafat Afailal visited Zagora and pledged to solve the water crisis. 
Construction of a new mega well completed in 2019. 
b. Protests in Tin-Zaouatine (Algeria), 15th – 17th June 2020 
• Number of participants (approximately): 40-100 people.8 
• Protest substance: Authorities built a fence on the border preventing the town’s citizens 
from having access to the river, solidarity with a protester allegedly died after being 
shot by Army forces. 
• Main slogans (personal translation from Arabic to English): “What a shame! The fence 
plus bullets”, “oh The Wali (district governor) leave office now !”9 
• Forms of protests and tools for communication: Spontaneous gatherings, Marches, 
Demonstrations, sit-ins. 
➢ Public and policy reaction: Ministry of defence denied accusation of shooting the 
protester. Ministry of defence conducted investigation on the death of the protester. 
c. Protests in Tataouine (Tunisia), 23rd April 2017 – continues up to 2021: 
• Number of participants (approximately): 500-1000 participants in the early days of the 
protest movement. 
 
5 Based on my estimation in the video footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PnkPt1SCQ80&t=250s  
6 Video footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PnkPt1SCQ80&t=250s  
7 Video footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSqdphP-v5M  
8 Based on my estimation in the footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0j_lvrmDRk  
9 Video footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ALKJpkoLtQ  
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• Protest substance: Employment in oil and gas companies. 
• Main slogans (personal translation from Arabic to English): Chanting revolutionary 
poems and phrases such as “by our soul and blood, Tataouine will prevail!” 10 
• Forms of protests and tools for communication: Use of social media (official Facebook 
page11 ) Sit in in tents around Kamour oil facility, demonstrations. 
➢ Public and policy reaction: Agreement between the movement and government ends 
the sit in, which promised to recruit 4500 persons from the region, arrest of the 
movement’s spokesperson in 2018., another agreement signed in 2020 to execute the 
provisions of the previous agreement. 
4. Conclusion 
Analysis of the three protest movements in the Maghreb countries reveals different roles 
in the struggle against “inherited” inequalities. A thorough observation of the quantitative 
indicators of the protests including its temporal-spatial span shows that popular protests 
influenced policy and decision makers in different ways. 
In Morocco, the government’s reaction was responsive and attempted to quickly absorb 
further civil unrest thus avoiding escalation into nationwide protests. Two weeks after the last 
demonstration in Zagora, Water minister Charafat Afailal visited the region and set up a plan 
to supply the citizens with non-stop potable water. After almost a year of negotiations with 
multiple stakeholders, a water drilling well was constructed which eventually supplied 
drinkable water to the majority neighbourhoods of the city, although some quarters on the 
outskirts still lack a water supply due to the absence of legal housing licenses or perhaps 
because of the reluctance by local authorities.12 
The situation with the Tin-Zaouatine protests in Algeria is not much different from that 
of Zagora in Morocco since both events were driven by a shortage of water. However, 
Algerian’s government failed to some extent to accommodate the protest demands and simply 
denied its responsibility in the revolt. This explains how other towns in the Southern regions 
saw marches in solidarity with Tin-Zaouatine. The reason for the state’s ignorance of the Tin-
Zaouatine protesters’ demands, according to researchers and opposition politicians, lies in the 
unilateral security approach which the state adopts over communities living along the borders 
with Mali, Niger, and Libya, as part of efforts to halt smugglers and terrorist groups from 
 
10 Video footage:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFHVyNzKyEw  
11 The “Kamour” movement official Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/elkamour/?ref=page_internal  
12 Personal observation of the situation in the town. 
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crossing the borders.  Besides, Tin-Zaouatine is the most underdeveloped of all the other towns 
in the Sahara and Sahel region, and perhaps in the world, asserted Hussain HOWAM (2020). 
It should be noted that the Tin-Zaouatin protests happen under on-going political transition 
following mass demonstrations across the country since 2019. 
The “Kamour Movement” in Tunisia’s Tataouine region distinguishes itself from the 
other popular protests in Algeria and Morocco in several aspects. First, the movement has since 
its foundation in 2017 continued sit-ins around the Kamour oil facility demanding the 
government to implement its promises for employment. Moreover, the legacy of the Tunisian 
revolution during the Arab Spring in 2011 is utilized in the movement to advocate for the 
protesters’ rights. The use of revolutionist poems and social media as a tool of communication 
between its members shows how well institutionalised the movement is compared to other 
protest movements in the less developed regions in Morocco and Algeria. Another particular 
feature of the movement is that coordination of activities across the Tataouine region is 
managed by ten protest leaders, allowing a balanced leadership structure rather than a 
“hierarchal” one which would facilitate repression by the authorities” (MEDDEB 2021). 
Upon analysis of the different popular protests from the less developed regions in 
Maghreb countries, we can find that popular protests in the Zagora region of Morocco 
demonstrated a sufficient degree of “actorness” which pushed the government to react and seek 
solutions for basic issues affecting the region. In Algeria’s Tin-Zaoautine case, protests were 
met with the State’s “defensive” discourses and promises for inclusion amid political transition 
and constant mood for nationwide uprising. Whereas the Kamour Movement in Tunisia 
succeeded in bringing the government into negotiations but ended up with no concrete results, 
allowing protesters to continue their sit- ins around the oil facility. 
As a conclusion, bottom-up protests in the Maghreb can address socio-spatial inequalities 
by “triggering” central governments about the regional disparities, but absence of inclusive 
policy approaches manifested by high levels of corruption and persistence of capitalism would 
further widens the gap between regions and turns “sustainable” development into 
“underdevelopment”. Indeed, history is full of examples of resistance against the monopoly of 
power, resources, repression imposed by oligarchs, but fulfilling just and equal societies is not 
a matter of nation states alone, but rather a challenge for the global community at large, 
especially when the dichotomy of “developed countries” and “third world countries” remained 
a factual narrative. Human sacrifice through consolidated collective activism can thus break 
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Measuring inequalities in access to water and 
sanitation: 




Research students who are interested in the topic of inequalities in water and sanitation are often interested 
in getting familiar with the most recent methods applied in empirical research. To address this need, this study 
aims to provide an overview of contemporary quantitative measures by synthesising the most recent empirical 
studies conducted on inequalities in access to water and sanitation across and within countries over time. The 
study aims to cover neither comprehensive nor exhaustive statistical details of the measures. Rather, it asks what 
measures were used recently in which type of studies and why. To this end, the paper adopted a content analysis 
technique framed by the three classifications of inequalities to review the selected empirical academic papers that 
were published in peer-reviewed, Scopus-indexed journals in 2015-2020 in the English language and were 
accessible by the author. Findings revealed that geographic, economic, and individual- and group-related 
inequalities in access to water and sanitation have been studied by applying the simple and sophisticated measures 
in both absolute and relative terms. However, their techniques were varied. In the end, the review suggests two 
possible directions for further research.  
 
Keywords: inequality, water, sanitation, measurement, quantitative technique. 
1. Introduction 
In July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly declared that equitable access to 
water and sanitation is a human right, and that as such, ensuring such access to everyone plays 
an important role in the realisation of all human rights (UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2010). 
Furthermore, it plays an important role in public health by preventing people from catching 
infectious diseases (LOCAL BURDEN OF DISEASE WASH COLLABORATORS 2020). 
However, inequalities in access to water and sanitation continue to face a great deal of 
challenges, particularly in developing countries (WWAP UNESCO 2019). Lacking access to 
these services makes people even more vulnerable during the current COVID-19 pandemic, as 
hand hygiene is the first line-defence in fighting against this infectious disease, which is 
potentially fatal and has no cure presently proven to be effective (VIJAYVARGIYA et al. 
2020). 
In tackling the problem of inequality, UN-led global efforts have been made since the 
1990s and have escalated since the 2000s through major programmes including the Millennium 
Development Goals (2000-2015) and Sustainable Development Goals (2016-2030). To 
measure progress towards the targets, scientific research plays an important role by providing 
 




policymakers relevant evidence to inform related decisions at both national and multilateral 
levels. The same is true in the case of water and sanitation. For those who are interested in 
applied research within the UN framework, particularly focusing on the SDG 6 (WWAP 
UNESCO 2019), knowing practical methodologies being applied in the practice is extremely 
important. 
In attempting to address this need, I chose the period 2015-2020 to review what measures 
are being used in research tackling various types of inequalities in access to water and 
sanitation. Since comparative study is of interest, the chapter discusses the quantitative studies 
due to their methodological rigour. However, this review is neither a comprehensive summary 
nor does it provide exhaustive statistical details of these measures. Building on the three 
classifications of income inequality that pertain to the conditions of ‘within-countries’, 
‘between-countries’ and ‘global inequality among peoples’ (UNDP 2003), I look at the 
measures being applied to the selected studies. 
Findings revealed that geographic and economic inequalities in access to water and 
sanitation have mostly been estimated by a quantitative method based on cross-sectional and 
panel designs covering the sub-national, national, regional14 and global scales rather than the 
individual and group related inequalities that may still have an important policy relevance. 
These studies have applied both simple and sophisticated measures adapted to inequalities in 
access to water and sanitation in both absolute15 and relative terms16. The further details can be 
found in section 3. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the following section, the methods and 
materials used in this analysis will be briefly introduced, and then section 3 directs you to the 
main findings. Finally, the paper will be concluded. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Data 
This paper asks what measures were used for quantifying what type of inequalities in 
water and sanitation between 2015 and 2020, and why. To answer this question, I reviewed the 
recent relevant literatures. I first surveyed the selected papers for the review and then analysed 
 
14 Regional scale refers to the studies that analyzed the issue under analysis at the regional level such as Latin 
America. It is worth noting that some studies used data disaggregated into the regions (such as East, West…) at 
the sub-national level such as western or eastern regions within a country. Therefore, these two should not be 
mixed and misunderstood. 
15 In terms of absolute measures: the variance. 
16 In terms of relative measures: the Gini coefficient, Lorenz curve, Theil coefficient, Slop index etc. 
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its content by mapping the inequality measures as to the three classification of inequalities 
(UNDP 2003) as informed by GREIG et al. (2007). Then I looked in detail how the different 
types of inequalities have been studied with respect to applied measures, scales, data, whether 
a causality was established. Lastly, I drew my conclusions. 
The Scopus database was used to identify the relevant literatures in English language, available 
to date under the term described (inequality OR inequalities AND “water and sanitation”). Data 
was collected between September 20 – October 16. 2020. Taking the reliability and 
replicability of the sources relevant to the issue under scrutiny into consideration, the Scopus 
database was selected. CRESWELL (2003, p. 8) highlighted that considering standards of 
validity and reliability is crucial when it comes to quantitative research. Furthermore, there are 
systematic reviews using only Scopus database among the high-quality studies published in 
top-ranking journals such as Policy Sciences17, for example: DERWORT and his colleagues 
(2019) published such a work. I therefore consider that using Scopus database is sufficient for 
this paper. For making sure the sample size, the pool of 5 years old papers was checked against 
the pool of 10 years old papers in the same category in the same database. The result showed 
that the initially selected data pool weighs 78 per cent of the total published papers over the 
past decade. Therefore, it is assumed to be sufficient. 
2.2. Study selection 
I coded all the papers extracted (n=125) from the Scopus following the keyword search18 
under the search term previously described. They are classified by the sub-categories that can 
reflect the inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
In surveying the literature, I followed the three-stages screening strategy (keyword 
search, title and abstract level analysis, and in-depth review) and included the articles, if that 
qualifies the inclusion criteria. The process of selection and the number of the articles were 
illustrated by Figure 4. Firstly, the screening was conducted by applying the following 
inclusion criteria (1, 2), which left 67 studies for further screening and excluded 58 studies due 
to the type and date of publication (1, 2). Then, the title and abstract level analysis used to 
narrow the 67 articles into 14 for the final stage by applying the inclusion (3, 4, 5) and exclusion 
 
17 Policy Sciences is a journal which was ranked at the Q1 in 2019 by Scimago Journal Ranking. Retrieved from 
https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?area=3300&min=0&min_type=cd  (09.25.2020). 
18 Database used: https://www.scopus.com/search/form.uri?display=basic; keywords used in search: (TITLE-




criteria (1, 2, 3). At this stage, 53 articles were excluded with the reasons. Finally, the papers 
selected (n=14) were reviewed in-depth. 
2.3. Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The inclusion criteria were the following: 
1. Peer-reviewed journal articles (not the review articles) 
2. Published between January 2015 and October 2020  
3. If a paper addressed any type of inequalities in access to water and sanitation, 
regardless causality was established in its scope 
4. If a quantitative method was applied to an empirical study 
5. Whether the paper (full text) is accessible by the author. 
 The exclusion criteria were the following: 
1. Review articles published in peer-reviewed journals 
2. Published before 2015 
3. If the scope of study did not cover an issue of inequalities in access to “water and 
sanitation" at one point, 
4. If qualitative methods were applied, 
5. If a full text of the paper is not available to the author. 
3. Results 
This chapter seeks to understand what type of summary measures being applied in recent 
international research in measuring what type of inequalities in access to water and sanitation 
by reviewing the relevant literature. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of these 
measures under their categories were discussed. 
The review immediately illustrates three types of inequalities in access to those services 
such as geographic inequalities (1), economic inequalities (2) and individual and group related 
inequalities (3). Among these, geographic and economic inequalities have been more widely 
studied in a quantitative fashion than that of the individual and group-related inequalities such 
as health condition and race. In particular, spatial inequalities and wealth or income-based 
inequalities have been dominant because the data is the strongest in this particular direction 
(ODI 2017). 
These studies, in general, have evaluated the progress towards realisation of the global 
water and sanitation goals in the framework of MDGs and SDGs in the different scales using 
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various measures in order to highlight the gaps in access to water and sanitation facilities 
between the different groups by rural and urban areas, by wealth, by regions, by the groups 
such as health status and race with the different resolutions depending on the basic unit of data 
that were used in the analyses. 
 
Figure 4: Flow diagram of the selection process of the papers 
Note: Adapted from the PRISMA flow diagram 
Source: http://prisma-statement.org/PRISMAStatement/FlowDiagram.aspx 
 
All studies under review estimated various types of inequalities in access to water and 
sanitation using various techniques in the different scales. Most of these studies further 
established some sort of causality in which the various estimates of inequalities in an issue of 
interest were considered either a dependent or an independent variable. For example, CHA and 
the colleagues (2017) analysed the impact of official development assistance on the inequalities 
in access to water and sanitation across developing countries by applying simple linear 
regression, on the basis of multiple international datasets. In this study the inequalities were 
estimated by the simple disaggregation (Table 1, No. 8).  
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A few methodological discussions were found that sought to propose alternative methods 
(QUEIROZ et al. 2020) or look for a better measure that can be adapted to inequalities in access 
to water research (CETRULO et al. 2020). These studies shared a common rationale with 
respect to seeking that the principles of non-discrimination and equality19 to be better imbedded 
in the measurement – which lack in the current dominant JMP method20,21 in terms of equity 
perspective. However, it should be noted that the JMP method still provides valuable 
understanding on wealth-based inequalities through JMP wealth quintile approach22 (ODI 
2017, p. 14), and the JMP wealth quintile datasets (see BAYU et al. 2020) were still utilised in 
recent research published. 
QUEIROZ and colleagues (2020, p. 3) elaborated on this issue in terms of their suggested 
approach. They stated that there is lack of necessary data available to feed the explanatory 
variables in their suggested approach which goes beyond access related inequalities. This point 
addresses an intersection of inequalities in water and sanitation. It may explain why it is rare 
to observe quantitative studies that explore individual and group related inequalities in access 
to water and sanitation in comparison to the quantitative studies ODI (2017). This suggests a 
new opportunity for research if one can solve the associated data gap. However, it is worth 
noting that having comparable data on the multiple countries for this purpose will require an 
immense amount of resources and capacity, an obstacle which is extremely hard to tackle. 
A number of different summary measurement techniques were used in the literature 
under review, with several of them repeatedly used in the same estimation. These are 
summarised under (Table 1). 
 
19 Which is the basis of SDG 6 - access to water and sanitation for all. 
20 It is important to note that the JMP is not a focus of our study and not dominantly used in the studies under this 
review, although it has been a dominant global monitoring strategy. However, some of the studies that addressed 
its limitations were discussed in this literature review. 
21 JMP method is the UN global monitoring strategy that is used to monitor progress on water, sanitation, and 
hygiene. To measure inequalities in access to water and sanitation facilities, it disaggregates household data by 
rural and urban areas (1), and by wealth status (2). This, the simple disaggregation method, allows both spatial 
inequalities between rural and urban areas, while the JMP wealth quintile analysis provides valuable 
understanding on the differential access among the groups based on their economic status. The further details can 
be consulted in the latest version of the methodology document available at 
https://washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2018-04/JMP-2017-update-methodology.pdf. 
22 The JMP Wealth Quintile Analysis is a widely used approach in accounting geographic and economic 


































































































x   Brazil D 
Comparison of 5 measures made: simple 
disaggregation, Concentration coefficient and 
concentration curve, Dissimilarity index, Generalised 
Entropy measure and Atkinson´s index. 
Census, NSO Brazil CETRULO et al. (2020) 
2 
individual and group-
related inequalities (race) 





x   
Ethiopia, 
Wukro 
C Pearson´s Chi-squares, Logistic regression Primary data 










C Simple linear regression Census IPUMS project QUEIROZ et al. (2020) 
5 geographical (temporal) x x  
Developing 
countries 
C Non-linear trajectory 
DHS, MICS, nationally representative 
household survey - JMP data 
FULLER et al. (2016) 
6 geographical (spatial) x   India D 
5 different measures: simple disaggregation, adapted 
Gini coefficient, Dissimilarity index, Spatial 
correlation, Analysis of agglomerative hierarchical 
clusters 
Census, India 





x   India C 
Gini coefficient, Spatial correlation, Percentage point 
difference, a composite index developed was used to 
measure the effect. 
Census, India 





 x  
Developing 
countries 
C Simple disaggregations, Simple linear regression 
WHO coverage data, OECD CRC 
database 




 x  
Developing 
countries 
C Adapted Gini-coefficient, Multivariate regression 
JMP wealth quintile data, WGI-World 
Bank 








Concentration index, frequency ratios, percentage 
point differences 
MICS, DHS ROCHE et al. (2017) 
11 geographical (spatial) x   Indonesia D 
WHO-the mean difference from mean (MDM), 
WHO-the weighted index of disparity (IDIS – W) 
SUSENAS, Indonesia AFIFAH et al. (2018) 
12 geographical (spatial) x   Ethiopia D 
WHO-the mean difference from mean (MDM), 
WHO-the weighted index of disparity (IDIS – W) 
EDHS, Ethiopia CSA, nationally, 
regionally representative 
AZAGE et al. (2020) 
13 geographical (spatial) x   Nepal C 
Complex survey design method, Pearson´s Chi-
squares, Simple regression 
DHS Nepal survey WANG et al. (2019) 






Adapted Gini-coefficient, Bayesian geostatistical 
model, ordinal regression, 
MICS, DHS and other household 
surveys, census 
Local Burden of Disease 
WaSH Collaborators 
(2020) 
Table 1: List of inequality measures in access to water and sanitation applied to the studies under review 
Source: Edited by the author.  
Note: These studies were published between 2015 and 2020. 
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The studies under review estimated inequalities in access to water and sanitation at the 
sub-national, national, regional, and global levels23. Global and regional scale studies mostly 
looked at inequalities ‘within countries’ and ‘between countries’ based on the country level 
data and sub-national data in which they were disaggregated by rural and urban areas (CHA et 
al. 2017; BAYU et al. 2020; FULLER et al. 2016; QUEIROZ et al. 2020; ROCHE et al. 2017; 
LOCAL BURDEN OF DISEASE WASH COLLABORATORS 2020). 
Among these, recently published study conducted by the Local Burden of Disease WaSH 
Collaborators (2020) managed to disaggregate geographical inequalities globally by the first 
and second local administrative units – which is a high-resolution geospatial estimate24. This 
study, notably, was funded by the Gates Foundation among others and conducted in 
collaboration with hundreds of international researchers. 
Moving on a country level analysis, 8 papers were identified in this category that covered 
both developed and developing countries. It is notable to reveal that the inequalities in access 
to water and sanitation are not only existing in the countries that are economically weak 
(CETRULO et al. 2020; AZAGE et al. 2020; AFIFAH et al. 2018; CHAUDHURI et al. 2017; 
CHAUDHURI et al. 2020; JIMENEZ-REDAL et al. 2018; WANG et al. 2019) but also in an 
advanced economy such as the United States of America (GASTEYER et al. 2016). 
Why are these measures? What are the advantages/disadvantages of these measures? 
Some of these measures were adapted from the other research areas such income and 
health inequalities, which has a relatively longer tradition than that of water and sanitation 
research. For example, adapted Gini coefficient, Concentration Index and summary measures 
of inequalities in relative and absolute terms (ODI 2017). In general, summary measures of 
inequalities in access to water and sanitation that were reviewed in this chapter can be grouped 
into three categories: simple measures (1), regression-based measures (2) and complex 
measures (3) as most of them overlap what were used in the literatures in health inequalities 
(LKHAGVASUREN 2018). 
In their work of 1997, MACKENBACH and KUNST (pp. 759-760) noted that the simple 
measures such as rate difference and rate ratio, have advantages of easier calculation, straight 
 
23 Those scales of analysis – the sub-national, national, regional and global levels – have no special correlation on 
selection of the measures. On the contrary, which have a strong relevance to the level of disaggregation and 
coverage of the data. 
24 For more information, see: GeoNetwork The Global Administrative Unit Layers (GAUL). 




forward interpretation, having less restriction to justify the data to be used in analyses, and 
measurement of the independent variables can be on ordinal or nominal scales. They also have 
disadvantages of misinforming parts of available information in data. On the contrary, although 
the regression-based measures can better address the problem of miscommunicating already 
available information in data, these measures still face disadvantages of more complexity in 
calculation and the restrictions on the data to be used in analysis. Furthermore, a regression-
based index would need the variables on an interval scale – that can cause an additional burden. 
As LKHAGVASUREN explained in her work (2018, p. 58) the regression-based 
measures are used to analyse the association between the dependent and independent variables 
of interest, while complex measures such as concentration index, Atkinson´s index and Thiel 
Index reflect socioeconomic dimension to health inequalities. These measures were also 
compared in CETRULO and colleagues’ work (2020) in searching for a better measure for 
estimating inequalities in access to water within the SDG 6 framework as an alternative to the 
JMP method. 
Furthermore, more than a half of the studies (n=9/14) under review further established a 
causality, thus they used the different types of regression-based analysis that include linear 
regression, non-linear trajectory, OLS linear regression, logistic regression and multivariate 
regression (GASTEYER et al. 2016; JIMENEZ-REDAL et al. 2018; QUEIROZ et al. 2020; 
FULLER et al. 2016; CHA et al. 2017; BAYU et al. 2020; WANG et al. 2019; and LOCAL 
BURDEN OF DISEASE WASH COLLABORATORS 2020), while one study developed and 
applied a specific index to measure the effect (CHAUDHURI et al. 2020). The selection of the 
type of measure reflects the number of variables and the design of the study. For example, 
linear regression was used to test an association between a dependent variable and an 
independent variable, while logistic regression was used when there is a binary variable. 
Therefore, I found no single measure but a variety of techniques which are consistent with the 
context and design of the study. 
This is also worth mentioning the types of data and database. These studies utilised 
mostly were cross-sectional and panel datasets. Which were obtained from the open-access 
datasets (i) that are maintained and stored by the international organisations such as the WHO, 
UN, USAID and OECD (FULLER et al. 2016; CHA et al. 2017; BAYU et al. 2020; ROCHE 
et al. 2017; WANG et al. 2019) or an international project such as IPUMS (QUEIROZ et al. 
2020); data from the national statistical offices (ii) (CETRULO et al. 2020; AFIFAH et al. 
2018; GASTEYER et al. 2016; CHAUDHURI et al. 2020; CHAUDHURI et al. 2017; AZAGE 
et al. 2020) or combination of all (LOCAL BURDEN OF DISEASE WASH 
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COLLABORATORS 2020). These were all secondary data utilised in these studies. However, 
only one study used primary data by collecting it during the research (JIMENEZ-REDAL et 
al. 2018). 
4. Conclusion 
 The chapter presents an overview of the recent quantitative measures applied in research 
on inequalities in access to water and sanitation based on the synthesis of the most relevant 
empirical literature. The advantages and disadvantages of these measures were briefly 
discussed. Findings revealed that the multiple techniques framed by the statistical models were 
utilised to report the progress towards tackling inequalities in access to water and sanitation 
and analysing a causality established.  Both simple and sophisticated measures were used in 
relative and absolute terms for the studies covering different regions, scales, and the types of 
inequalities. A few papers offered alternative methods and a possibility to adapt a better 
measurement technique that may address some of the limitations of the JMP method. The data 
gap is one of the major challenges involved in addressing such a problem. This information is 
hopefully helpful to the research students and professionals who are interested in the water and 
sanitation topic and being in the stage of designing their projects. As a recommendation for 
further research, I would suggest two directions. First, group and individual related inequalities 
have rarely been quantified, partly because of the data gap and partly because of the 
methodological challenges. Second, there is certainly a need for a methodological contribution 
to measuring different types of inequalities in access to water and sanitation that takes account 
of the principle of non-discrimination and inequality, which is consistent with working towards 
achieving universal access. 
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The multidimensional poverty measurement in Latin 
America: A short introduction 
Ágnes DEÁK25 26 
Abstract 
Latin America, despite being a middle-income region, continues to face a number of social and economic 
problems, including poverty. The paper focuses on offering a panorama about the new forms of multidimensional 
poverty measurement introduced recently in Latin America. The main questions are the following: What traditions 
are the current methods based on? What are the peculiarities of the new indexes and their process of elaboration?  
The article explores the origins and some improvements which led to the currently used concept and measurement 
of multidimensional poverty in several Latin-American countries. Analyzing academic and official government 
expert documents it reviews and synthetizes the historical evolution of the methodology, the development of the 
new methods and the ways of how these can contribute to improve public policy decisions to effectively address 
the elimination of various forms of deprivation. It also offers a comparative study of different national 
measurements. The analysis shows that the process of elaboration of the new methods does not have a single 
scenario throughout Latin America. Although the participation process was far from complete, various spheres 
of the society were included. It is also documented that the new measurements took into account new dimensions 
and indicators of poverty that have not been considered so far. 
 
Keywords: multidimensional poverty, poverty measurements, capability approach, Latin America  
1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, the international community has made significant achievements 
in eradicating global poverty. In parallel its attention gradually shifted towards the phenomenon 
of inequality which became one of the most current topics at the center of academic and public 
debates (ATKINSON 2015; MILANOVIC 2016). Nevertheless the fact that there are still 
millions living in unacceptable conditions makes the need to address the persisting problems 
of poverty a moral obligation for national and multinational institutions.27 The current Covid-
19 pandemic made the confrontation with the sudden and drastic rupture of economic, health 
and institutional systems in many countries around the world, hence the current health crisis 
has drawn special attention to the results achieved so far and the possibility of their rapid 
erosion (WORLD BANK 2020). At the international political level the UN-adopted Agenda 
for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in which the first goal is to end poverty in all its 
forms shows the global community is committed to its ethical duty (UN 2015). Interpreting the 
main objectives set out in SDG 1: “1.1 eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere 
and 1.2 reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in 
poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions" means that it does not provide 
 
25 Corvinus University of Budapest, Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Sciences, PhD 
student agnesdeak@yahoo.com  
26 I wish to thank Judit Ricz for her suggestions and insightful comments. 
27 It is important to note that the concepts of relative poverty and inequality are often confused. This may result 
from the fact that relative poverty is a definition that compares the situations of different social groups. Although 
poverty and inequality are interlinked, they are not synonymous and represent different phenomena. 
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a uniform and unanimously accepted definition of what exactly is meant by multidimensional 
poverty, (apart articulating some expectations which should be accomplished such as 1.3 ”have 
equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, etc.”) (UN 2015). Hence, 
each member state must define the dimensions and indicators to develop a methodology to 
measure them in order to be capable of implementing proper policies to achieve these 
objectives.  
Academic research in recent decades has focused on three challenging sets of questions: 
1. Reconsidering the conceptual framework of poverty beyond the monetary approach that was 
widely applied to international institutions. 2. Elaboration of more appropriate methods to 
measure multidimensional poverty. 3. Improving a complex public policy package relying on 
the integrated approach that focuses on people and enhancing their living conditions. It has 
become widely accepted (among the majority of scholars and also the public spheres) that 
poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and that human deprivation takes many forms. As 
Amartya Sen states it: “the role of income and wealth... has to be integrated into a broader and 
fuller picture of success and deprivation” (SEN 1999, p. 37). This paper focuses on the second 
aspect. Recent changes and innovations have especially affected methodological issues, 
therefore the aim of this study is to explore, summarize and synthetize related changes. By 
focusing on new poverty measurement methodology introduced in the region over the last 
decade, the study aims to reveal the differences and the novelties between the original and more 
recent methodologies. Furthermore, it aims to provide a regional overview, revealing some 
aspects and difficulties of the elaboration of the current methodology, with special regard to 
the process of defining the different dimensions of poverty measurement. The problem of 
measuring development, poverty and quality of life has long been present in social science 
research, especially since the second half of the last century. However, the scientific debate 
and practice on this issue has gained new impulses in recent decades with the promising process 
of economic thinking that began to unfold as a result of the 2008-09 global crisis. An important 
milestone of the new renaissance was the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report28, which clearly drew 
attention to the fact that both technocratic and also political decisions (with regard to economic 
 
28 The Commission led by acknowledged social scientists Joseph Stiglitz (President of the Commission), Amartya 
Sen (Advisor) and Jean Paul Fitoussi (Coordinator) later called “The Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress” (CMEPSP) was created as the request of the 
then President of the French Republic, Nicholas Sarkozy in 2008. The aim of The Commission was to enhance 
the formulation of a new methodological tool with more appropriate indicators that not only measures economic 
welfare such as GDP, but also people's quality of life and the social achievements. To complement GDP with a 
broader set of indicators that would reflect properly the distribution of well-being and its sustainability across its 
social, economic and environmental aspects in the society. 
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policies) have been predominantly based on the overly one-sided and narrow concept and 
measures of development, most notably on GDP and related measures. The report made it clear 
that a new approach (including new statistical methods and data) is required to appropriately 
map socio-economic processes and thus to provide adequate information to decision-makers to 
elaborate proper public policies. As the report puts it “What you measure affects what you do; 
and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted” (STIGLITZ et al. 2009, p. 7). 
Reflecting the report and its main insight, namely that the importance of statistical data and 
indices have become decisive recently not only with regard the management of the economy, 
but also in terms of planning public policies to enhance social progress, new initiatives were 
launched, such as Global Multidimensional Poverty Index of OPHI and OECD Better Lives 
Initiative among others.  
The Latin American region serves as a particularly interesting case study in terms of 
examining the evolution of multidimensional poverty measurement for various reasons: 1. The 
negative socioeconomic effects of former neoliberal policies, which have added up to inherited 
development challenges, such as permanent high levels of informality and lack of access to 
services. 2. Latin America was the pioneering region where multidimensional measurement of 
poverty was first introduced in a form that took into account both income and unsatisfied basic 
needs indicators (BOLTVINIK 2013). 3. Following this long-standing tradition, several 
countries in the region have paid particular attention to developing their own new 
multidimensional poverty measurement. 4. Research about trends of global poverty show the 
geographical distribution of the poor has changed significantly over the last two decades, with 
the result that the majority of them now live in middle-income countries (KANBUR - 
SUMNER 2012). Latin America is a middle-income region, thus its countries’ experiences can 
be especially valuable and provide some lessons for other countries with similar endowments. 
5. In many Latin American countries national strategies to reduce poverty (as part of national 
development plans) were elaborated based on information revealed by multidimensional 
poverty measurements (on the characteristics of poverty at local and regional levels). The 
method’s public policy relevance has also been highlighted during the localization and 
targeting of the conditional cash transfer programs’29 beneficiaries. 
This study aims to provide a critical review of academic literature and expert 
documentation. For the historical review, the documents were selected primarily from the 
 
29 The conditional cash transfer program was an innovative antipoverty strategy originating from Mexico in the 
1990’s and later, its various forms were introduced in many Latin-American countries and other regions (García 
and Moore, 2012). 
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ECLAC30 archives, focusing on the most significant milestones as well as on the work of some 
ECLAC experts. The analysis of the individual countries of the region is based on official 
expert and ministerial, governmental studies and publications documenting the advancement 
of the country specific methods, which provided also the opportunity to have a deep insight 
into the decision-making process. In addition, statistical data and publications reviewing 
changes of earlier decades were also analysed. 
The paper includes three parts in addition to this introduction. The first provides an 
overview of the history of poverty measurement in the Latin American region. The following 
part presents the different forms of the multidimensional poverty measurements currently used 
by countries in the region. The final part concludes. 
2. The origins of the multidimensional poverty measurement in Latin 
America 
2.1. The Unsatisfied Basic Needs Approach 
The origins of the basic needs approach (BNA) are linked to a field research of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in the 1970s under the World Employment Program 
(WEP) which revealed the precarious working and living conditions of significant part of 
societies in the then developing countries. In addition, by that time household-based surveys 
had not yet been developed and thus could not measure monetary poverty. The approach31, 
which ultimately did not take root globally only in the Latin American region, was first used 
in Chile in 1975. As a pioneering attempt it aimed to classify poverty within the BNA 
framework on the basis of living standards (household equipment, education, overcrowding) 
and, at the same time to document the geographical location of people living in extreme poverty 
(KAST - MOLINA 1975). 
The next milestone of regional importance was the poverty survey conducted in 
Argentina by the Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) with the assistance of ECLAC in 
1984. The ECLAC survey based on the questionnaire of a census already used in Argentina 
with information of income and non-monetary indicators, included the Unsatisfied Basic Needs 
(UBN) indicators: overcrowding, deficiencies in house equipment, lack of toilet, lack of school 
attendance and economic capacity (SANTOS 2014). 
 
30 Founded in 1948, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC, or CEPAL by its initials in Spanish) 
is one branch of the economic commission of the United Nations. See: https://www.cepal.org/en/about 
31 The idea was officially first published in a study as a document prepared for the ILO at the World Employment 




As the goal in most Latin American countries was to map poverty by geographical 
location, so-called poverty maps were produced relying on data that originated from population 
and housing censuses in which UBN indicators were included. The four most typical out of 
these were: (1) Access to housing (2) Access to sanitary conditions (3) Access to education (4) 
Economic capacity. The basis of the UBN method, called the "counting approach", is the 
aggregation of the data collected on the population and household surveys, to determine who 
is poor by creating a composite index of UBN – which is called in most Latin-American 
countries as the "Index of Unsatisfied Basic Needs ” (INBI Índice de Necesidades Básicas 
Insatisfechas).32 The method is simple, households that are classified in any (even one) 
dimension as having an unsatisfied need are considered poor, while those which are not 
represented in any category, are considered not poor (FERES  - MANCERO 2001). The results 
were appropriate to diagnose the incidence of poverty and determine their geographical 
location, so these could serve as a basis for various policy decisions, especially in 
geographically targeting transfer programs introduced in the 90s throughout the Latin 
American region (COADY et al. 2004). However, it is important to note at least one 
disadvantage of the simplicity of this method: the INBI does not contain any information on 
the extent (and characteristics) of poverty. Hence it had no added value when elaborating 
comprehensive poverty eradication programs. 
2.2. The Integrated Method and the “Improved” Integrated Method 
Under the auspices of international institutions such as the World Bank, ILO and due to 
the availability of increasingly reliable statistics and the growing prevalence of population and 
household surveys, addressing and measuring poverty became an important task in the region. 
Oscar Altimir in collaboration with ECLAC identified absolute poverty in ten countries and 
across the region based on country-specific poverty lines representing minimum acceptable 
levels of private consumption, drawn according to the food-based method (ALTIMIR 1978). 
The study’s normative definition of absolute poverty comprised of international expert 
 
32 UBN were measured in different dimensions and those in various variables: e.g. 1) a) quality of housing: 
variable: material of construction b) overcrowding variables: number of persons and number of rooms. It is 
important to note that economic capacity, as there were no or no reliable data on income, was basically measured 
by two variables: the level of education of the head of the family (given in years) and the number of those who 
were financially dependent on it. 
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opinions and lifestyle opportunities for low-income families projected by regional development 
aspects.33 
In the 80s a more complex approach emerged from research where the income and the 
UBN poverty measurement methods were combined in the so-called “Integrated Method” 
(BECCARIA - MINUJIN 1985; KATZMAN 1989). It was highlighted that significant 
difference might exist between the results of the two methods deriving from changes in long- 
and short-term living conditions or from income fluctuations which depend on the 
macroeconomic circumstances of the country.34 Regarding Katzman’s integrated method’s 
classification, people living in poverty can be grouped into four distinct groups35: 
1. Chronically poor: this group is characterized by at least one, but typically more UBN were 
not satisfied with the persistently insufficient income; job insecurity and social 
marginalization.  
2. Inertial deprivation: households in this group typically show insufficiency in one indicator 
related to one basic needs, their incomes are above the poverty line, and their deprivation 
is a consequence of past prolonged poverty situation. 
3. Recently poor: includes households where per capita income is lower than the poverty line 
but do not have a UBN deficit, these homes are less at risk of perpetuating poverty. 
4. Socially integrated: these are households whose income is sufficient for basic consumption 
needs and they have no unsatisfied indicator in any dimensions defined by the UBN 
method. 
Empirical evidence showed that the two method complement each other and can be used 
to describe distinct subgroups of the population suffering from different forms deprivations in 
depth and breadth of poverty. 
However, criticisms have been raised regarding the measurement and the conceptual 
overlaps in the integrated method (BOLTVINIK 1992). Accordingly, a new method was 
proposed, which significantly modified earlier ones and built upon their combination when 
elaborating the “Improved Integrated Method to Measure Poverty”. The most important 
novelties were: 1. the addition of several new elements to the UNB indicators, e.g.: access to 
electricity, to phone, which were related to public expenditure, cumulative household 
investment; 2. the creation of a much more comprehensive consumer basket (not just food, also 
 
33 The study evaluated that the 40 percent of Latin American households were poor at the beginning of the 1970s, 
with the incidence of poverty 26 percent in urban areas and 60 percent in rural areas. (ALTIMIR 1978) 
34 Beccaria and Minujin note that collecting income data is specifically cumbersome due to subdeclaration or to 
uncertainty in the size of the family. 
35 Katzman classification based on his empirical research conducted in Montevideo, Uruguay during the 80s. 
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e.g. clothing, recreation); 3. the measurement of the depth of deprivation and the deprivation 
gap; 4. the alternative weights of the indicators; and 5. the time as a dimension was also 
considered in order to operationalize time poverty. Despite these improvements this method 
was introduced only in Mexico and it was not applied elsewhere in the region. 
3. Contemporary measurements of multidimensional poverty in Latin 
America 
3.1. The new wave of multidimensional measurements  
The basic problem remained whether a single metric can be used to describe 
development, poverty and quality of life. This intention manifested in the fact that economic 
performance measures the value of goods and services acquired in the market, in which the 
prices are reflected in monetary terms. Those who consider that poverty and quality of life can 
be measured in this way use the poverty line method, which takes into account only household 
income and/or expenditure, on purchasing power. The poverty line is the most common 
measurement method in the developed world and it is also applied by the World Bank. In 
contrast, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) applies the Human 
Development Index (HDI) in its annual reports since 1990.  
The HDI is already a multi-component (yet composite) index, and its creation reflected 
the goal of including several aspects of progress in one measure, according to the human 
development paradigm36 (STANTON 2007). 
International development organizations have continued to be determined development 
and poverty primarily on monetary basis, while poverty eradication projects are essentially 
concentrating on human capital, and thus require other forms of data and measurement. As 
Boltvinik has put it, all the alternative ideas, which start from the fact that there is no single 
measurement indicator of development form a set of multidimensional approaches 
(BOLTVINIK 2013). 
In multidimensional poverty measurement, there is a dividing line between two basic 
approaches to determining threshold or cut-off. One is the so-called union approach, according 
to which a person is considered poor if he or she is deprived in at least one dimension, while 
in the intersection approach one is considered poor when he or she is deprived in all 
 
36 The human development paradigm originated in development economics research of the 70s and 80s, especially 
in the theoretical and practical work of Mahbub ul Haq (1995). It provides a people-centred perspective and 
represents an approach that takes into account the possibilities that enable a fulfilled human life. It has gained 
significance in the spread of UNDP development programs and by the creation of the Human Development Index. 
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dimensions. Both approaches are extreme ideal types, so in most cases the reality is somewhere 
in between (ATKINSON 2003). 
The primary field for the application of the results of academic research on development, 
such as the related new statistical methods and indices, are international institutions, where the 
innovations appear in competition with each other to enter the canon of applied methods of an 
organization. The global multidimensional poverty index (MPI) created by Oxford Poverty and 
Human Development Initiative (OPHI) has achieved one of the most successful careers in this 
competition 37. The MPI, which complements money-based measures by considering multiple 
deprivations and their overlaps, was originally presented in the UNDP annual report 2010, The 
Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development, claiming that poverty – like 
development – is multidimensional, yet this is traditionally ignored by headline figures 
(KLUGMAN 2010). 
The global MPI was elaborated with the Alkire and Foster method (AF), and has become 
particularly recognized and applied during the last decade both globally, and also in Latin 
America the majority of countries adopted it. 
The AF method is a synthetic method based essentially on the axiomatic tradition 
(ALKIRE  ̶ FOSTER 2011) and the counting approach. The essence of the method is to 
measure the different dimensions of poverty based on indicators. The method allows for 
flexibility and adaptability, as when defining dimensions, indicators, weights or cut-offs the 
different contextual factors of the given country or situation can be taken into account. It offers 
measures to determine the incidence of poverty (the percentage of the population who is poor), 
the intensity of poverty (the percentage of deprivations suffered by each person or household 
on average); adjusted poverty gap (the measure reflects the incidence, intensity and depth of 
poverty), adjusted squared poverty gap, (the measure reflects the incidence, intensity, and depth 
of poverty, as well as inequality among the poor). A further advantage of the AF method is that 
it can be broken down by population groups, either by geographical location, by ethnic group 
or by dimensions/indicators (ALKIRE et al. 2015; ALKIRE - FOSTER 2011). The theoretical 
and conceptual basis of the AF method is the capability approach, based originally upon the 
work of Amartya Sen.38 The capability approach “is an intellectual discipline that gives a 
central role to the evaluation of a person's achievements and freedoms in terms of his or her 
 
37 The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) is an economic research and policy centre 
within the Oxford department of International Development at the University of Oxford. 
https://ophi.org.uk/about/. 
38 Amartya Sen received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998 for his contributions to economic welfare and 
development economics research. 
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actual ability to do the different things a person has reason to value doing or being” (SEN 2009, 
p. 16). Furthermore, Sen defines “…poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities, rather than 
merely as low income. Deprivation of elementary capabilities can be reflected in premature 
mortality, significant undernourishment…” (SEN 1999, p. 37). 
3.2. The new wave arrives in Latin America 
In the last decade, multidimensional poverty measurements have been included in many 
Latin American countries as part of their official statistics. The first two countries that 
elaborated the methodology were Mexico and Colombia with introduction in 2009 and 2011, 
respectively. In the following years, several other countries published their similar poverty 
index: El Salvador in 2015, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Honduras in 2016, the Dominican 
Republic and Panama in 2017, and Guatemala in 2019. At the same time ECLAC as a regional 
institution has introduced significant initiatives over the years to develop a “general” 
multidimensional poverty index with the aim to enable detailed regional comparative analysis 
covering the Latin American region (CEPAL 2014; SANTOS 2014; SANTOS - VILLATORO 
2018). 
Although there is emerging consensus within academia and among experts of 
international institutions that a broader interpretation of poverty should be applied, there is still 
much debate about the appropriate approach, regarding the dimensions, and about the most 
appropriate measurement method. At the global level MPI serves not only for measuring 
poverty across regions and 100 countries worldwide, documenting its changes over time, but 
also to explore the different characteristics of deprivation. This latter information is essential 
for policymakers (OPHI and UNDP, 2019). At the national level governments aim to design a 
method which serves as a basis for more complex government social programs and targeted 
social projects. Considering all these assumptions a number of normative questions arise, that 
have to be answered during the further elaboration of measurement methodologies either at 
national or regional or global levels. Which should be the selected dimensions, which indicators 
determine a given dimension, what should be the deprivation criterion, should all the indicators 
and dimensions have unified into composite index or not? As in most cases, including Latin 
American countries, the result of the procedure is an index, it is also necessary to determine 
the weight of certain indicators and dimensions in the aggregation and to define the threshold 
identifying who is considered as poor in multidimensional sense. A related significant dilemma 
arises with regard who will determine and decide about all of these factors? The central agents 
shall come from the academia, or those in decision-making positions, who will use this tool to 
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make public policy decisions, or on a more participatory manner should the opinion of the 
population of a given country taken in consideration, or only those living in poverty should be 
included? In addition, a number of feasibility issues need to be accounted for, which leads to 
different options for countries regarding their capacities: what is the institutional background 
for implementing the planned measurements, collecting and analysing the necessary data? Is 
there a long-term political will, a commitment to operate data collection? Answering these 
questions is a complex, multi-year process for each country, involving many actors. 
Due to the short scope of the present study, it is not possible to explain and examine all 
aspects, whereas most Latin-American countries have introduced the multidimensional 
measurement method, in the following a more detailed observation is offered about the 
selection of dimensions and thresholds in some countries. The two forerunners of the region 
are highlighted: the Mexican method is unique, as it is not based on the AF method; whereas 
the Colombian case stands out, as its multidimensional measurement has been actively used 
for determining public policy goals. 
As a starting point researchers or decision-makers need to explain very specifically why 
and how they have chosen certain dimensions (ROBEYNS 2005). Just as the capability 
approach emphasizes the extension of freedoms that people value, methodological definitions 
must also take into account what people value and have reason to value (ALKIRE 2007a). The 
principles most commonly accepted by researchers in the capability approach in selecting the 
dimensions of poverty are the following points: access to reliable data; continuous participatory 
and deliberative discussions about components of good life and wellbeing; constitutional 
foundations and/or national development plans of each countries; values expressed in universal 
documents of the international canon such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well 
as postulates on concepts of the theory of justice, human good and wellbeing (ALKIRE et al. 
2015). One of the most cited pioneering examples of global research based on the participatory 
research model is the Voices of the Poor (NARAYAN et al. 2000) study, which was valuable 
source of information about living conditions, problems of the vulnerable groups around the 
world. However, a number of questions arises about the feasibility, the reliability and the 
geographical limitation of this kind of data collection. This research also provided a more 
detailed picture of dimensions previously not represented by the measurements, which at the 
same time are decisive in the lives of the participants, especially noteworthy in the Latin 
American context the pervasive violence or social isolation.  In many cases, the results of 
qualitative surveys have been considered in the elaboration of country-specific measurements. 
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In Mexico, the process of introducing multidimensional poverty measurement was 
prepared by the General Law of Social Development adopted in 2004. Subsequently, the 
National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) was set up to 
formulate the proper measurement. During the years of preparation, a number of debates took 
place, which included professionals, economists, statisticians, national and international 
experts in poverty research, but at the same time there was little role for public debate and 
consultation to include the most affected, the vulnerable groups of the population. The most 
decisive element on decision among some of the proposals, which were also discussed with the 
involvement of international experts from OPHI and ECLAC, was based on accordance with 
the Law and the Constitution. The methodology has two pillars: one, which measures economic 
welfare through the income indicator, and the other, which includes non-monetary social rights 
in six dimensions (see Appendix). The method also differs from the measurements accepted in 
the region in that it did not apply the aggregation and identification used by the AF method. 
According to this combined methodology, a person is considered poor if he or she is deprived 
in both non-monetary dimensions related to social rights and income measures (CONEVAL 
2014). Mexico became the first country in the world to introduce multidimensional poverty 
measurement and established an independent state institution over the past decade to measure 
poverty and continuously evaluate social programs. In addition to the national level, the 
measurement of poverty also extends to the level of federal states and municipalities, so the 
most extensive data collection has been implemented at the territorial level so far in recent 
decades. Furthermore, regular measurements and transparent mechanisms make it possible to 
design public policy goals and strategies, such as the implementation of the National Strategy 
of Inclusion, National Policy of Social Development or infrastructural, housing project and 
food programs with targeted beneficiaries at local levels. 
In Colombia, poverty reduction has been identified as one of the key objectives of the 
2010 National Development Plan presented by President Juan Manuel Santos. To achieve this, 
new measurement methods were introduced in 2011: not only a completely new 
multidimensional poverty measurement has been elaborated by the National Planning 
Department, but also a new income poverty measurement was put forward. 
A number of expert groups were involved in the process, including members of 
academia, the government and the private sector. Furthermore, it was explicitly aimed that the 
measurement should have characteristics that are appropriate for consistent analysis, change in 
public policy decisions, and a reflection of the current living conditions of Colombians. 
Preliminary proposals were then discussed with international experts, in particular with the 
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internationally most recognized ones from OPHI (ANGULO 2016). The final version of the 
measurement consists of five dimensions (see Appendix), each defined by five indicators, 
whose data source is the Living Standards Measurements Survey. All indicators together 
determine the multidimensional poverty index using the AF method. The index assigns the 
same weight to each dimension (20%) and the poverty line is considered at one-third of the 
weighted dimensions. 
In setting the threshold, the subjective judgment of those who considered themselves 
deprived based on household surveys was taken into consideration (ANGULO et al. 2011). It 
is important to mention that this is the only measurement in the Latin American region which 
has put exceptional emphasis on a special dimension, namely the living conditions of children 
and young people. It is an important innovation which reflects the demographic conditions of 
the country. However, a significant shortcoming is that the dimension of violence and physical 
security was not included in this measurement. This happened despite the fact that number of 
acts of violence have particularly accompanied the modern history of the country (not just prior 
to the peace agreement with the FARC in 2016) and which made Colombia the second most 
affected country in the world by internal migration (WMR 2020). Furthermore, empirical 
research conducted by the participatory approach also revealed that for the poor living in 
Colombia, in addition to livelihood and education, the most significant deprivation is the 
persistent presence of violence and physical vulnerability (ARBOLEDA et al. 2004). The 
significance of the new method is shown by the fact that, as an indicator, it is a determining 
element of a number of important national social policies, such as the poverty and inequality 
reduction programs (e.g. early childhood care and food security programs) and also the 
geographical targeting of the conditional cash transfer program, called Más Familias en 
Acción. 
The relevance of the method depends not only on its statistical elaboration, but also on the 
commitment of policy makers to public policy goals delineated on normative choices, the 
precise definition of the purpose of measurement, and the provision of an appropriate 
institutional background (ANGULO 2016). 
It is important to note a special feature of the process of measurements developed in El 
Salvador and Ecuador. In both countries, the technical committees and the academic 
community that managed the process of selecting dimensions worked on a number of 
theoretical approaches. In the former case the process was complemented with a participative 
process based on focus group discussions organized for people living in poverty. In addition to 
the capability approach and human rights perspective, in both countries emphasis was placed 
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on the Buen Vivir39 approach. Buen Vivir is one of the most important school of thoughts 
which gained high importance in reconsidering ideas of the development for Latin America 
over the last two decades. It is a complex concept, which has many cultural foundations, as 
well as relation with the cosmo-visions of the indigenous ethnic groups of the Andean and the 
Amazon territories. Three major versions are distinguished within the notion the indigenist, the 
statist and the post-developmentalist with their diverse intellectual origins, interrelationships, 
criticisms of each other (CARBONNIER et al. 2017). Its core ideology is living in harmony 
with the community and nature questioning and rejecting results of the classical theory and 
practices of economic development. The concept became a defining element of the most recent 
constitutions adopted in 2008 and 2009 in Ecuador and Bolivia. In the former, it also defines 
the framework of regularization and implementation for the social rights, which regulate access 
to education and housing among others and thus determine public policy. 
A significant part of the dimensions and indicators used in the new methods also appeared 
regularly in the old UBN measurements, such as housing and home conditions, education 
(school years) or overcrowding. The new methods have broadened the dimensions used in the 
measurements not only in number but also operationalized through several indicators, thus 
allowing to document real and important aspects of the lifestyles of vulnerable groups of the 
population to emerge. Comparing the dimensions and indicators in the indices, we can see 
overlaps in many cases, but there are also unique components. The Appendix shows the 
dimensions of the indices compared to the global MPI and the previously used ones in UBN 
approach. Contrasted to the missing dimensions identified in the OPHI document such as 
quality of work, empowerment, physical security, shameless living, subjective and 
psychological well-being (ALKIRE 2007b) a number of advances can be observed e.g.: Chile, 
Costa Rica and Panama put emphasis on a labor rights and conditions, meanwhile physical 
security appears important for El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, the most violent 
region in the world according to homicide rate (CEPAL 2019).40 Indices for Chile, El Salvador, 
the Dominican Republic and Panama already include environmental indicators reflecting the 
exposure to effects of climate change and extractive industries.  As to the weights of each 
dimension and indicator, with the exception of Mexico and Chile, nested weighting applies to 
all methods, according to which the weighting of dimensions and indicators (within a given 
 
39 In English: Good Living concept (see GUDYNAS and ACOSTA 2011). 
40 The Latin American homicide rate is 5 times higher than the world average. 22.1 homicides and 4.4 homicides 
per 100,000 people, respectively (CEPAL 2019, p. 47). 
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dimension) is uniform. The case of Mexico is exceptional because the lack of any indicator 
there means dimensional deprivation. In Chile as a result of a modification the accepted version 
was modified under the pressure of civil groups. As a result, the dimension of social cohesion 
and networks was included into the original 4 dimensions, which also caused a change in the 
weighting ratio. The multidimensional poverty line varies between 20 and 35% of the weighted 
indicators (again with exception of Mexico) (see Appendix)41. 
4. Conclusion 
Analyzing the design process of multidimensional measurements applied across Latin 
America, it can be stated that these were implemented along different approaches, not 
according to a unified protocol. The construction of measures in most countries involved 
different spheres of society, in which expert committees such as members of the academia, 
policy makers from different levels and researchers from international organizations were 
given a prominent role. Although complete participation process was not achieved, civil society 
actors and vulnerable groups themselves were included in several cases. One of the obstacles 
to the development of multidimensional measurement methods is the lack of relevant data 
(ALKIRE 2007). Although most Latin American countries regularly collect data through their 
own household surveys, in order to include new dimensions and indicators in the 
measurements, the introduction of new set of questions in the questionnaires is required. 
Despite the fact that some steps in the development of multidimensional measurements, such 
as ensuring broad social participation or determining the dimensions, indicators and thresholds, 
etc. are subjects to ongoing debates among scholars, there is no doubt regarding the importance 
of creating and introducing them so far. There is a clear tendency for a multidimensional 
interpretation of poverty to emerge and gain weight alongside the use of monetary poverty. 
The territorial approach, which goes back to the tradition of poverty maps applied in the 
region, has a number of benefits. As global poverty research confirms (KANBUR  ̶ SUMNER 
2012) there is an increasing emphasis on subnational concerns to address poverty challenges 
within a country as a result of the highly territorial feature of poverty distribution. Measurement 
methods that take this into account will make it possible to develop more efficient local policies 
including well-defined specific targets. 
The first aim of the SDG agenda, which is to significantly reduce poverty in its all forms, 
has reinforced the wider efforts to measure the phenomenon with a new approach at national 
 
41 The table in the Appendix does not include the indicators of measurements, only the dimensions. 
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level. Latin American countries were particularly motivated and proactive, as the creation and 
implementation of new methodologies began there even before the global agenda was set. On 
the one hand, this is due to the practice of elaboration of poverty maps in several countries in 
the region in previous decades, on the other hand, due to openness to a new interpretation of 
poverty based upon the capability approach and to the acceptance of experience of international 
institutions. The new methods, which not only expanded the number of dimensions used in the 
conventional measurements, but also operationalized it through several new dimensions, 
allowed to take into account real and important aspects of the lifestyles of vulnerable groups 
of the population. This change in approach might allow public policy decisions to be made that 
can provide more effective solutions for those concerned. 
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Abstract 
 The international political order witnessed the emergence of non-state actors from the 1970s which 
brought about an increased activity for women’s rights representatives and civil societies and led to the 
organization of women’s rights conferences. Among them, the Beijing Conference in 1995 is considered to be the 
most remarkable event in terms of women’s empowerment. Gender mainstreaming became a significant strategy 
for decision-makers and achieving gender equality is displayed as one of the main goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. Embedded into the framework of transnationalism, the research analyses the direction 
of the relationship between non-state actors and decision-makers by the application of a matrix, while also taking 
into account the different historical, political and economic circumstances of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. 
Besides applying quantitative data related to the clarification of basic concepts (e.g. family code) the paper 
focuses on the implementation of the basic goals in favor of women empowerment by each country. In this regard, 
the research examines whether greater efforts made by the relevant governments were the result of a top-down 
pressure or significant steps had already existed before the 1980’s. The analysis states that despite the 
implementation of significant reforms towards women’s empowerment, the presence of traditional practices in 
these countries, namely in the countryside, is seen as a major constraint in front of achieving gender equality.  
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1. Introduction 
The gaining of independence from the French colonial power in Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Algeria between 1956 and 1962 brought about an increased capacity for women’s rights 
organizations and activists which resulted in an active discourse on women’s empowerment. 
The transformation of the international order starting from the 1980s had a great impact on the 
grassroots movements and thus also shaped the political direction of the decision-makers. As 
a result of this process, achieving gender equality became one of the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNITED 
NATIONS n.d.) and not only global, but regional formations also appeared, from which 
Collectif 95-Maghreb Égalité, the biggest network of feminist NGOs established in 1992 
emerges (MAHFOUDH 2014). An important event regarding women’s empowerment was the 
Beijing Conference organized in 1995 the outcome of which was the adoption of the Beijing 
Platform for Action that identified twelve areas (including equal conditions in the labour 
market, in education, access to healthcare as well as in decision-making) where significant 
steps must be made to eliminate gender inequality (UN WOMEN 2015). Although the growing 
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presence of non-state actors challenged the state-centric view, nobody can contest the fact that 
states still remain the most important players of the international political arena. The paper 
focuses on the analysis of the interaction between subnational actors and governments of the 
North African countries by evoking KEOHANE and NYE’s concept of transnationalism and 
the results and impact of transnational interactions (NYE – KEOHANE 1971) on the respective 
governments.  
In order to understand the creation of women’s rights organizations in the French 
Maghreb, it is indispensable to note that in the analysed region the appearance of these 
formations can be traced back long before the processes of the 1980s and are strictly interlocked 
with the aforementioned countries’ struggle for independence as well as their own political, 
historical, social and cultural characteristics. On the one hand, the international initiatives 
served as a dive for the coming into being of such notions as discrimination made on the basis 
of sex, violence against women or gender mainstreaming. On the other hand, the patriarchal 
system and the discriminatory family laws (BARSKA 2019) posed a serious obstacle before 
achieving gender equality, namely in Morocco and Algeria. In this regard, Tunisia followed a 
unique path in terms of women’s rights that made it stand out from the two other countries also 
analysed in the paper. The North African Country’s Western type modernization process relied 
primarily on the diversification of its economy and the enhancement of its human capital with 
a special focus on women’s empowerment (BALIAMOUNE – LUTZ 2009). Above all, in 1956 
Le Code du Statut Personnel (Personal Status Code, henceforward referred to as CSP) 
abolished polygamy, provided women the right to divorce and to child custody, and set a 
minimum age for marriage (CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL 2012). In 1958 Bourguiba 
introduced compulsory education for young women and people living in rural areas 
(CHABCHOUB 2014).   
Starting from the period of decolonization and touching upon the changes brought by the 
processes of the Arab Spring the paper aims to provide an overview of the situation of women 
in each country concerned by the analysis. Moreover, with a special focus on the rigid social 
structures and traditions (e.g. family codes) of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as constraints in 
achieving gender equality the essay examines whether positive initiatives regarding women’s 
empowerment were the outcome of the regional and global efforts of the ‘80s or ‘90s or 






2. Transnationalism and its impact on decision-makers 
 
In order to be able to analyse to what extent global and regional efforts contributed to the 
formation of women’s rights movements, thus influencing the activities/initiatives of the 
decision-makers in the three analysed Maghreb countries, the paper applies the work of Joseph 
S. NYE and Robert O. KEOHANE entitled Transnational Relations and World Politics: An 
Introduction issued in 1971. The aforementioned work is crucially important from the point 
that both experts of international relations shed light on the changes in the processes of the 
international political arena starting from the 1970’s and 1980’s and emphasized the 
phenomenon of complex interdependence produced by the appearance of new political actors, 
i.e. sub-state actors and their growing influence on decision-makers.  
In his book published in 1994, MILLER pointed out the more complex features of the 
international political processes and emphasized that the traditional state-centric order was 
replaced by a transnational system as a result of the increasing level of political, economic and 
cultural transactions (MILLER 1994). Thus, the complexity of the new political order also 
evoked the need to solve and set up a discourse on previously marginalized, but crucially 
important subjects (including women’s empowerment, too) the resolution of which required 
active contribution from various non-governmental organizations. With regard to the new 
political actors of the international relations, it is also indispensable to distinguish between 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational or international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). In this regard, only the second category brought into being by sub-state 
actors can be called transnational as the last category was created to delegate on them those 
tasks that governments were unable to cope with. While on the one hand nobody can deny that 
the traditional political order still remains state-centric, on the order hand we cannot contest 
the fact that through their mobilization and monitoring, activists and regional organizations 
also exert a significant influence in certain contexts not only on public opinion, but on the 
measures of governments, too. The question that divides experts of international relations lies 
in the real effectiveness of sub-state actors and what impact they have on their respective 
governments (ATAMAN 2003).   
NYE and KEOHANE also emphasized that states are not the only actors of world 
politics, but in certain cases non-governmental actors have a greater impact on international 
processes than states themselves. In their aforementioned work their research mainly focused 
on the possible impact of the loss of control on governments, whether state-centric analysis can 
still be maintained in IR research, the beneficiaries of the new political order and the challenges 
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and future of international organizations as a result of the process of complex interdependence. 
Concerning the difference between interstate and transnational activities similarly to 
MILLER’s statement NYE and KEOHANE claimed that contrary to interstate activities the 
main characteristics of transnational interactions is that they involve sub-state actors as well. 
With regard to the direct role non-governmental organizations play in influencing the events 
of the international political arena NYE and KEOHANE highlighted that in this sense sub-state 
entities bypass their governments (NYE – KEOHANE 1971). The paper focuses on women’s 
empowerment on the international level to draw conclusions about the process of the adoption 
of the goals of the Beijing Platform for Action in each analysed country. When approaching 
the question of gender mainstreaming it is indispensable to underline that gender equality 
guaranteed on the political, economic, and social levels as also determined by the Beijing 
Platform for Action (UNITED NATIONS 2002) could not be realized without a bottom-up 
approach. In absence of such efforts, measures introduced by decision-makers could result in 
the alienation of the concerned group (MOSER 2005). 
The paper aims to analyse the evolution of women’s rights in the Maghreb through the 
five effects of transnationalism on state behaviour as stated by NYE and KEOHANE. These 
include the following changes: changes in attitude, the emergence of international pluralism, 
limitations on states to manoeuvre as a result of the alteration of the traditional state-centric 
order, an increased ability to influence other governments and a more significant role of sub-
state actors that in some cases tend to overwrite the priorities and policies of governments 
(NYE – KEOHANE 1971). Besides examining the effects of transnationalism in Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia and analysing whether progresses made on the policy of gender and 
development demonstrates a top-down or bottom-up approach, the paper also incorporates the 
main goals of the Beijing Platform for Action to have a look at the performance each state has 
made in terms of achieving gender equality. In order to be able to provide detailed findings the 
paper discusses those twelve areas that representatives of governments and NGOs found 
crucially important on the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.  
 
3. Beijing Platform for Action: gender equality for a sustainable world 
The end of the 1970s – also identified in the previous chapter as the period of the growing 
influence of sub-state actors on the processes of the international political arena – came to 
fruition in 1979 with the adoption of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women) (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNIONa n.d.). The 
Convention not only gives a clear definition about discrimination based on gender but is also 
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considered as a guide for governments to provide gender equality. Also referred to as the 
international bill of rights for women, the recommendations of CEDAW were carried on during 
the subsequent follow-up conferences, from which the Beijing conference in 1995 stands out 
(UNITED NATIONS ENTITY n.d.). Besides elaborating the notion of gender mainstreaming 
as a main strategy for governments to achieve equality between women and men the twelve 
areas where greater efforts must be made to eliminate inequalities include women and poverty, 
education and training for women, women and health, violence against women, women and 
armed conflict, women and the economy, women in power and decision-making, institutional 
mechanisms for the advancement of women, human rights of women, women and the media, 
women and environment and the girl child (UN WOMEN 2015). Concerning the evolution of 
achieving gender equality as also being included in the global 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals adopted by UN member states in 2015 (UNITED NATIONS n.d.), the report issued by 
UN Women on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Beijing Conference shed light on the 
deterioration of women’s rights in certain areas. The report stated that while greater 
opportunities in education and more active participation in the labour force were available for 
the weaker sex, measures proved to be insufficient in other areas and women still face 
discrimination in terms of equal rights. From the point of the major focus of the analysis it is 
also indispensable to underline that the report names ongoing economic and financial crisis, 
volatile food and energy prices and climate change as factors responsible for undermining the 
assurance of equal opportunities for both sexes (UN WOMEN 2015). Regarding the Maghreb 
countries, the political, historical and cultural characteristics that also serve as constraints in 
front of achieving gender equality can also be listed among the aforementioned factors. 
Moreover, the evolution of women’s rights in the Maghreb cannot be separated from the 
insecurities (e. g. civil war in Algeria in the 1990’s, the breakout of the Arab Spring at the end 
of 2010) and the dichotomy of the adherence to the Western model of development on the one 
hand, and to the traditional norms on the other hand. 
When approaching the topic of sustainability from the aspect of women’s empowerment 
it must be highlighted that achieving gender equality is a must to a just and sustainable 
development both in the economic, social and environmental field. Among them, it is mainly 
the social pillar where significant efforts (e.g. equal chances in the labour market) should be 
done in order to ensure sustainability (STEVENS 2010). Another aspect of the topic of 
sustainability would name value change, political economy, adaptive economics and planning 
intervention as crucial perspectives to achieving equality between women and men. It is also 
indispensable to underline that while changes in ideas play an important role in shaping 
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attitudes regarding gender equality, no significant results can take place without pressures 
coming from the society, economy or the environment, which clearly underline that sustainable 
development is rather considered to be a political term (LEE-SMITH ‒ TRUJILLO 1992).  
With reference to the main goals of the Beijing Platform for Action, inequalities in the 
labour market are identified as one of the main obstacles in front of achieving gender equality 
(CORNWALL – EDWARDS 2015). Moreover, the lack of employment opportunities is in 
close relation with other areas of focus of the Platform where further efforts must be made, 
including the eradication of poverty or the protection of equal rights for women. According to 
the Beijing Platform for Action, every government is responsible for ensuring appropriate 
working conditions for women and putting an end to discrimination. The report issued on the 
occasion of the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Platform to revise the major steps that 
have been taken so far stated that the gender gap was globally reduced from 28% to 26%. 
However, regional disparities and the overrepresentation of women in low-paid jobs still 
remain crucial problems that require solution. The Beijing Platform for Action identified the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as being the region affected the most by inequalities in 
terms of participation in the labour force (56%), and the situation in the MENA countries has 
not changed until 2012 when this ratio was 53% (UN WOMEN 2015). 
Concerning the objective of the Platform to ensure wider participation for women in 
decision-making, the report found that while by 2014 the percentage of women in the 
parliament had already demonstrated a steady increase (23% globally contrary to 12% in 1995), 
women are still underrepresented when it comes to high government positions (e.g. speakers 
of parliament and ministers). From the point of the analysis, it must be highlighted that in 1995 
the percentage of women sitting in the national parliaments was the lowest one in the MENA 
countries (only 4%) compared with other regions. By 2005 this percentage doubled, but except 
for South Asia the region of the Middle East and North Africa was still below the global 
average. While by 2014 gender equality in the field of decision-making in the MENA region 
further improved (17% of the representatives of the parliament were women) (UN WOMEN 
2015), women’s participation in the political arena has not achieved the necessary percentage 
determined by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, CEDAW (30%) (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNIONa 
n.d.). When it comes to the significant increase in women’s political participation we cannot 
neglect the events of 2011 (widely known as the “Arab Spring”) which also served as a catalyst 
in terms of women’s empowerment and thus brought about a widespread discourse on women’s 
rights. It is also indispensable to underline that the evolution of gender mainstreaming shows 
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differences even within the same geographical location, not to mention the extension of the 
region of North Africa to the Middle East. Therefore, it must be underlined that generalizations 
cannot be made even within the same cultural scope. According to the up-to-date ranking of 
IPU (as of 1 January, 2021), with 57 female representatives out of the 217 places in the National 
Constituent Assembly (NCA), which means a 26.3% female representation, Tunisia anticipates 
Algeria and Morocco where women make up 26% and 20.5% of the decision-makers in the 
national parliament (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNIONb n.d.). Within the framework of the 
Beijing Platform for Action, states engaged in assuring constitutional and legal reforms and the 
adoption of quotas both on the national as well as on the international level together with the 
involvement of women’s organizations.  
With regard to the third main focus of the Beijing Platform for Action, i.e. ensuring the 
possibility for women to control their lives, the report issued on the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of the Action stated that despite of the implementation of significant reforms to 
improve the marginal position of women discrimination still exists in certain areas, namely in 
the area of family law that is also relevant from the point of the current analysis. The report 
also sheds light on the reservations of some states to the CEDAW and on the lack of its 
universal ratification and implementation as being one of the constraints in front of achieving 
gender equality. For providing equal rights for both sexes, constitutional and legislative 
provisions must be removed. These measures include the reform of family laws, nationality 
laws and laws related to inheritance (UN WOMEN 2015). The comparison between Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia examines the major steps governments of these countries have taken to 
eliminate discriminatory measures in family or personal status laws. Moreover, the essay also 
touches upon whether the analysed Maghreb counties have made some reservations to 
CEDAW and if this is the case whether some developments have been made to lift these 
reservations.  
In evaluating the major goals towards achieving gender equality as also determined in 
the Beijing Platform for Action, the paper highlighted the existence of gap between men and 
women in terms of possibilities offered by the labour market. Participation in decision-making 
was also identified as a crucially important area where further efforts must be made, namely in 
Morocco where the participation of women in the national parliament is relatively low. Finally, 
the presence of restrictive measures embedded in the national laws of each country is also seen 
as a field which requires greater attention, namely the reform of family laws. In the framework 
of the implementation of the major goals of the Beijing Platform for Action the next chapter 
compares the practices of each Maghreb country in terms of ensuring equal gender rights. The 
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analysis of the evolution of women’s empowerment in this region will contribute to 
understanding the framework of the paper, i.e. the direction of the gender policy in Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia and the long-term consequences of the emergence of sub national actors 
of decision-makers.  
 
4. The impact of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action on 
the evolution of women’s rights in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia: towards a 
gender-equal region? 
As it has already been mentioned above, the analysis of women’s rights in the Maghreb 
countries cannot be separated from the particular political, economic, cultural, social, but 
mainly historical processes these states have gone through. On the one hand, the reforms made 
in these countries focused on the modification of the fundamental set of laws that regulate the 
status of women in everyday life, i.e. the family code, which as a consequence resulted in the 
extension of their rights and thus in a greater access to education and political representation, 
notably in Tunisia and Morocco. On the other hand, the presence of some social practices is 
seen as a serious burden in front of achieving gender equality (KIMANI 2008).  
 
4.1. The Tunisian model of ensuring gender equality 
When it comes to the analysis of the evolution of women’s empowerment in the 
Maghreb, there is a widespread agreement among members of the international community 
that Tunisia stands out from other Muslim countries in terms of women’s rights. In Tunisia, 
the centralization of power brought about a strong political leadership with President 
Bourguiba taking this role in 1957. Due to the poor indicators of human development43, 
Bourguiba realized that a modernization process was inevitable to set the country on the path 
of development. The Bourguibist state-building program meant the adoption of a Western 
model of development and therefore a reduced role of women’s rights movements (SADIQI 
2008). 
The most significant measure of Bourguiba was the adoption of Le Code du Statut 
Personnel (Personal Status Code, henceforward referred to as CSP) in 1956 that abolished 
polygamy, provided women the right to divorce and to child custody, and set a minimum age 
for marriage (CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL 2012) . In 1958, Bourguiba introduced 
compulsory education for young women and people living in rural areas (CHABCHOUB 
 




2014). It was due to the introduction of family planning in the 1960s and the legalization of 
abortion in 1973 (JOMIER 2011) that Tunisia anticipated France, where it was only legalized 
in 1975. Bourguiba’s successor, President Ben Ali continued the promotion of the image of 
modern Tunisia from his coming to power in 1987 (ENNAJI 2020), which also meant the 
pursuance of state-controlled feminism under which only those women’s NGOs could operate 
that enjoyed the government’s approval. (The two most dominant women’s rights 
organizations that also posed a challenge to the government were the Union Nationale de la 
Femme Tunisienne (UNFT) (UNFT n.d.) founded in 1956 and the Association Tunisienne des 
Femmes Democrates (ATFD)) (ATFD n.d.). As a result of the repressive measures of President 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali on the freedom of associations and the freedom of expression, the post-
Arab Spring era opened the way for the aforementioned organizations to freely embrace 
previously marginalized topics and thus a widespread discourse started on topics like equal 
inheritance. Concerning the third focus of the Beijing Platform for Action, i.e. the field of 
human rights and the elimination of discrimination, it must be underlined that Tunisia ratified 
the CEDAW in 1985, but with some reservations that were only lifted in 2014. In 2002 the 
citizenship law was amended that enabled women married to foreign nationals to pass their 
citizenship to their children (ENNAJI 2020). Evoking women’s participation in decision-
making is also marked as a key area where further efforts must be made to foster the assurance 
of equal rights to both sexes. In this regard it must be mentioned that according to the October 
2019 ranking of the IPU, with 78 female representatives out of the 217 places in the National 
Constituent Assembly (NCA), meaning a 35.9% representation, Tunisia occupied the 31st place 
worldwide and ranked the highest among other Arab countries. This percentage was only 
26.3% (57 female representatives) according to the latest ranking of 1 January 2021, which 
made Tunisia only the 4th Arab country in the ranking (occupying the 77th place worldwide) 
behind the UAE, Egypt and Iraq (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNIONb n.d.). While 
significant steps have been made by the previous leaders of the country to ensure women’s 
empowerment, the national strategy for the period of 2017–2020 elaborated by the Tunisian 
Ministry of Woman, Family and Childhood to improve the conditions of women and girls 
living in the marginalized regions clearly demonstrates the deficiencies regarding women’s 
equal access to the labour market. According to the Tunisian Bureau of Statistics, in 2014 only 
20% of women living in rural areas disposed of a decent job and in some regions the 
unemployment rate surpassed 40%. In the most marginalized regions 61% of women worked 
in the most vulnerable agricultural sector among whom only 12% had access to medical and 
social services  (MINISTERE DE LA FEMME, DE LA FERTILITE ET DE L’ENFANCE 
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n.d.). These statistical data shed light on the fact that despite of the great achievements of 
decision-makers and the pressures coming from sub-state actors namely following the Arab 
Spring, Tunisia has still a long way to satisfy the economic goals stated in the Beijing Platform 
for Action.  
 
4.2. Women’s rights activism in Algeria 
Compared with Tunisia, the initial position of women’s rights activists in Algeria differed 
from its eastern neighbour as the significant number of women (more than 10 000) involved in 
the country’s eight years’ bloody war of independence contributed to the boosting of women’s 
position in the society (PEPICELLI 2017). Following the country’s independence in 1962 
women were given the right to vote. However, despite these bottom-up initiatives, the question 
of gender equality was treated in the 1960’s and 1970’s as a secondary topic since the state-
building process focused rather on development objectives. To better understand the 
differences between Algeria and Tunisia, it is of crucial importance to see that instead of a 
homogeneous society Algeria is a more patriarchal society made up of conservative tribal 
structures each of them following their own traditions (ENNAJI 2020). Contrary to Tunisia, 
the centralization of power and the monopolization of private domestic sphere based on the 
Western model of development did not take place in Algeria that had serious impacts on the 
evolution of women’s rights in the country. As a result of the conservation of traditional social 
practices and the marginalization of the question of gender equality, Algeria was the last 
country among its neighbors that enacted a family law in 1984 and thus further consolidated 
the subordinated position of women. The disadvantageous position of Algeria is also 
demonstrated by the fact that the amendment of the family code only took place in 2005 
following the pressures coming from the events of the 1990’s and thus a more active role of 
women’s rights organizations from 2005. While the amendment of the family law provided 
greater rights for women regarding divorce and marriage and they could also pass their 
citizenship to their children, the constitutional reform of 2008 which recognized women’s 
political participation are proves that in Algeria a significant fallback regarding women’s 
empowerment does exist compared with Tunisia or Morocco. The contradiction between the 
constitutional guarantees and the constraints of the family code is seen as a major burden in 
front of achieving gender equality. With regard to the elimination of discrimination against 
women as one of the main goals mentioned in the Beijing Platform for Action, it must be 
underlined that compared with Tunisia and Morocco Algeria only ratified the CEDAW in 1996 
and up until today no restrictions were lifted (ENNAJI 2020). Concerning the political 
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participation of women, Algerian women make up 26% of the lower house and 5.7% of the 
upper chamber of the parliament according to the up-to-date ranking of the IPU. While public 
opinion is quite suspicious about women holding high-level government positions, in the field 
of judiciary Algeria did far better than Tunisia or Morocco. According to an article dating back 
to 2008, women made up half of the judges in the country whereas this percentage was only 
27% in Tunisia (KIMANI 2008). While access to up-to-date and reliable statistical data 
regarding women’s participation in the labour market faces serious challenges in the Maghreb, 
and more particularly in Algeria, according to the latest statistics of the Algerian National 
Statistical Office available from May 2019 the percentage of occupation of the female labour 
force was only 17.3% compared with 66.8% among men. Concerning the total unemployment 
rate among men and women between the period of 2009 and 2019 unemployment among 
women was more than two times higher than that of men (20.4% compared with 9.1%), the 
highest one after 2017 (ONS n.d.). These data clearly show that while the country’s labour law 
provides equal access for women to the labour market, the duty of obedience clause of the 
traditional family law might pose serious obstacles in front of women’s equal economic 
participation. 
 
4.3. The evolution of women’s rights in Morocco 
Contrary to Tunisia or even Algeria, the situation of women in Morocco demonstrated 
an inferior position due to the presence of traditional social practices. This was further 
consolidated in the family law of 1957, also called as Mudawwana. However, the growing 
activities of various women’s rights NGOs (from which Association Démocratique des 
Femmes, ADFM and the Union de l’Action Feminine, UAF emerge) starting from the 1960’s 
and their significant influence on decision makers distinguish Morocco from the two other 
Maghreb countries involved in the analysis. In Morocco, both changes in the country’s 
leadership in 1999 (King Hassan II was followed by his son, King Mohamed VI) and the 
regularization of the operation of non-governmental organizations (foreign financial support to 
these formations was allowed) established a favourable environment for sub-state actors to 
successfully propagate their demands. As a result of an active role of women’s rights 
organizations, a new Mudawwana was enacted in 2004 which significantly improved the 
conditions of Moroccan women, though could not be considered as progressive as the CSP of 
Tunisia was in 1956 (e. g. polygamy was not abolished). On one hand, from the point of view 
of the Beijing Platform for Action, Morocco ratified the CEDAW in 1993 and as a pressure of 
women’s rights organizations lifted its reservations in 2011. Moreover, it also revised the work 
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and penal code in 2003 and women could freely practice trade activity from 1995. However, 
on the other hand women could only transfer their citizenship to their children from 2007 
(ENNAJI 2020). Concerning women’s participation in decision-making, as it has already been 
mentioned, out of the three countries analysed in this paper the representation of women in the 
national parliament was the weakest one in Morocco (women occupied only 20.5% of the lower 
house and 11.7% of the upper chamber) according to the latest ranking of IPU. With regard to 
women’s participation in the labour market according to the statistical data of the High 
Commission of Planing (Haut Commisariat au Plan) (HCP n.d.) between the period of 1999 
and 2020, gender inequalities in terms of unemployment started to rise from 2017 (8.8% vs. 
14.7%). However, as it has been previously mentioned, these data still remain low compared 
with Algeria where unemployment between women are more than two times higher than that 




The paper aimed to shed light on the growing significance of non-state actors starting 
from the end of the 1970s and their role in shaping the attitudes of decision-makers. From the 
point of view of sustainability, the analysis reinforced the fact that gender equality is clearly a 
political term, therefore the necessary measures taken in this context to ensure equal chances 
to both sexes and thus contribute to economic growth and increase social conditions strictly 
depend on the policies of decision-makers (OECD 2008). The main focus of the analysis was 
to see to which extent these sub-state actors limited the space for states to manoeuvre through 
the main findings of Nye and Keohane. The paper reinforced the fact that despite of a complex 
interdependence of the international political order, states still remain the most important actors 
of international processes. The realignment of the previous political order opened the way for 
different NGOs to introduce such marginalized topics like gender inequalities to decision-
makers and thus foster and international cooperation in this sense. Embedded into an 
international framework of women’s rights regime, the analysis compared countries of the 
same region. The topic is quite actual since the events of 2011 triggered a widespread debate 
on achieving gender equality in the Maghreb as a result of which positive changes have already 
taken place in Morocco and Tunisia (e.g. lifting the reservations made to CEDAW and ensuring 
higher percentage of seats for women in national parliaments). In fact, the results of the paper 
proved that despite the existence of similarities, the evolution of women’s rights in Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia is strictly linked to the particular political, social, cultural, economic and 
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even historical characteristics of each country. Taking into consideration the 25th anniversary 
of the Beijing Conference and the adoption of its Action Plan, the comparison in the 
aforementioned countries mainly focused on those areas where further efforts must be made 
by states to ensure women’s empowerment (equal participation in the labour market, in 
decision-making and a greater commitment to the reform of restrictive laws). The analysis also 
dealt with the question of the direction of the evolution of women’s rights in the Maghreb 
countries (bottom-up vs. top-down approach). In this regard, the paper involved the work of 
Joseph NYE and Robert KEOHANE on transnationalism to examine to what extent sub-state 
actors influenced the attitudes of decision-makers towards the question of gender equality. In 
Tunisia, which is considered to be the most progressive Arab country in terms of women’s 
rights, the paper stated that the achievements were due to the presence of a strong leader 
(President Bourguiba) who set the country on the path of a Western-type modernization 
following its independence (this top-down approach is also known as state feminism). 
Therefore, the processes at the end of the 1970’s had only limited impact on the activities of 
sub-state actors and their role became vital just following the events of the Arab Spring. 
Contrary to Tunisia, in Algeria the evolution of women’s rights must be seen from a bottom-
up approach which is linked to the history of the country, ie the consequences of the bloody 
war of independence between 1954 and 1962 in which women played a crucial role. While the 
initial positions of women were rather favourable, unlike in Tunisia women’s empowerment 
only occupied a marginal position in the country’s state-building process. Therefore, in Algeria 
the amendment of the family code in 2005 was the result of the pressure of women’s rights 
organizations on the state, indirectly derived from the events of the 1990’s. Finally, in Morocco 
the proliferation of women’s rights organizations from the 1990’s was not only due to the 
country’s favourable political environment, but to the indirect effects of the international efforts 
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can be regarded as a constraint in front of 
realizing gender equality 
Political arena Centralization of power (state-
building process based on the 
Western model of 
development) 
Tribal structure, centralization 
of power was a gradual 
process (gender equality as a 
marginal question in the state-
building process) 
Supremacy of the monarchy → 
centralization 
Women’s participation in the 
labour market 
Fault-line between the northern 
vs. southern regions (rural 
areas: participation in the 
labour market was only 20%, 
unemployment rate was 40%)  
Significant differences between 
men and women (percentage 
of occupation of the female 
labour force was only 17.3% 
vs. 66.8% at men; in 2019 
unemployment rate was more 
than 2 times higher than that of 
men) 
From 2017 gender gap is rising in the 
labour market (unemployment rate of men: 
8.8% vs. unemployment rate of women: 
14.7%). 
Women’s participation in 
decision-making (according to 
IPU’S ranking as of 1 January 
2021) 
The percentage of women 
sitting I the national parliament: 
26.3% 
Women make up 26% of the 
lower house and 5.7% of the 
upper chamber 
Women occupy only 20.5% of the lower 
house and 11.7% of the upper chamber 
Legal background 1956: Personal Status Code 
(CSP)→ considered to be the 
most progressive family law in 
the Arab world; 1985: 
ratification of CEDAW (2014: 
lifting its reservations); 2002: 
amendment of the citizenship 
law 
1984: enactment of the 
Algerian family law 
(subordinated position of 
women) → 2005: amendment 
of the family law (transfer of the 
citizenship of the mother to the 
children) as a result of the 
pressure of women’s rights 
NGOs; 1996: ratification of the 
CEDAW (no reservations were 
lifted); 2008: constitutional 
reform → recognized women’s 
political participation 
1957: family law (subordinated position of 
women) → 2004: new family law 
(mudawwana) was enacted as a result of 
women’s rights NGOs pressure; 1993: 
ratification of the CEDAW (2011: lifting its 
reservations); 1995: women could practice 
trade activity; 2003: revision of the work 
and penal code; 2007: transfer of the 
citizenship of the mother to the children 
 
Table 2: The evolution of women’s rights in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia 
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The role of techno-optimism in environmental 
sustainability narratives 
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Abstract 
Techno-optimism, the belief that technology and technologists are building the future, is the paradigm 
based on which modern societies place faith in narratives of progress and technology eventually overcoming all 
emerging challenges. A techno-optimist view of environmental sustainability is centred around the notion that 
technology will be able to address ecological problems through the use of innovation, growing efficiency and 
(un)expected breakthroughs. The adoption of renewable and eco-friendly innovations is usually seen as the most 
important drivers of sustainability transformations, especially in the case of energy usage and consumption 
patterns. Although in policy narratives, a green technological revolution is often portrayed as the sole driver of 
sustainable change, we have to note that such revolution cannot happen without a societal transformation. 
Replacing two centuries of dominant socio-economic narrative that prizes economic growth above all, based on 
fossil energy and unconstrained use of natural resources might require more than technological innovation as the 
benign deus ex machina. Our aim is to uncover narratives in the public and personal spheres that can advance 
or hinder such sustainable transformation. The study is based on extensive review of related literature and 
secondary sources, and does not contain primary research, therefore it represents the opinion of the author based 
on cited literature. 
Keywords: sustainability, techno-optimism, green growth, environmental narratives 
1. Introduction 
In the 21st century we are facing significant technological changes which have already 
begun shaping our lives. The so-called fourth industrial revolution, similarly to the previous 
ones, fundamentally transforms our lifestyles, our ways of working and our social relationships. 
According to an expert on the topic, Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum, 
the scale, extent, and complexity of this transformation will surpass any of the previous 
industrial revolutions. To support his theory, Schwab cites the impacts of the previous 
industrial revolutions on production: the first industrial revolution used steam power to 
mechanize production, the second created mass production with electric power, and the third 
used electronics and information technology to automate production. Now, the fourth industrial 
revolution, as continuation of the third, will implement the fusion of different technologies 
through digital revolution, blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological areas 
(SCHWAB 2016). As a result of the fusion of technologies, virtually everything can seem like 
a challenge that could be solved via a technological innovation. We rely on technology in our 
homes, in our education system, in health care, in financial services, in property management, 
and even in agriculture. However, the notion that technological innovation can solve any 
problem is not as straightforward as it seems to be at first glance. Unfortunately, for complex 
 




issues, simple solutions barely exist. This paper argues that technology in its current form 
cannot solve all challenges facing us, especially in relation with environmental issues, climate 
change and sustainability. This fundamental argument is supported through a thorough analysis 
of related scientific literature, however as we have no conclusive evidence at hand based on 
primary data, the paper itself is in accordance with the author’s opinion and can be considered 
as a professional interpretation of the topic. 
Techno-optimists tend to believe that, just as the application of technology has been a 
primary cause of environmental and climate issues, it must provide the primary solutions as 
well. Following this argument, it seems like a common understanding, that humanity will be 
able to solve environmental challenges primarily through technological advancement, while 
continuing to focus attention on economic growth. By following this approach, it is widely 
believed that we will be able to eliminate global poverty and raise the standard of living for all, 
without destroying necessary ecosystems that sustain life as we know it (ALEXANDER 2014). 
A broad definition of techno-optimism could be described as a belief that, through scientific 
and technological advancements, humanity will be able to solve all major social and 
environmental problems of our times, without having to fundamentally rethink the structure or 
goals of our growth-based economic philosophy or consider the environmental footprint of 
Western-style lifestyles. In other words, techno-optimism is the belief that the problems caused 
by economic growth can be solved by more economic growth, supposing that we learn how to 
produce and consume more efficiently through the application of science and technology. 
Proponents of this view argue that through advancements in knowledge and design, together 
with market mechanisms, we will be able to decouple our economic activity from its 
environmental impact, avoiding the negative implications that economic growth has on bio-
physical limits. Should any of our vital resources get scarce, we just simply assume that free 
and efficient markets and price sensitivity will incentivise more exploration or even the 
development of substitute resources (BECKERMAN 1992). Rather than questioning the very 
model of growth economics, the dominant narrative of techno-optimism advocates ‘green 
growth’ or ‘sustainable growth’ (PURDEY 2010), an oxymoron by itself, one could argue. 
This paper intends to provide a critical analysis of the techno-optimist narrative as sole driver 
of sustainable change by placing it in a theoretical context, and also by presenting the case of 
smart cities as an analogy for this techno-centric approach and its flaws. The aim of the analysis 
is to prove that technology cannot and will not solve environmental problems so long as it is 
applied within a growth-based economic model. In order to take advantage of efficiency gains, 
which are without doubt an essential part of the transition to a more equal and sustainable 
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world, we argue that a value-shift is required away from the Economics of Growth  toward a 
‘post-growth’ or ‘steady state’ economy based on material sufficiency. 
2. Narratives of techno-optimism and environmental challenges 
Paul EHRLICH and John HOLDREN (1971) in their seminal article presented the so-
called IPAT equation that shows clearly that environmental impact is influenced through 
factors like the size of population, per capita income, and increasing productive or energy 
efficiencies through technological development. The equation showed that continuous 
population and consumption growth would exacerbate environmental problems unless 
technological advancement outweighed those impacts through efficiency gains (ibid.). The 
message of the IPAT equation was on the one hand that individuals and policymakers have 
various options for tackling environmental problems. Those who care about the environment 
could try to lessen impact either by trying to reduce consumption, or by trying to produce and 
consume as efficiently as possible. However, it also suggested that if people or nations were 
unable or unwilling to tackle certain parts of the IPAT equation, they could still reduce impacts 
by addressing one or more of the other variables, and it ended up marginalising the reduction 
of consumption as environmental action, and prioritize technological fixes (HUESEMANN 
2011). Indeed, this approach is fairly reasonable. Controlling population can have serious 
unintended social-economic-demographic effects that are equally – or even more – harmful 
than environmental effects. A similar dynamic could explain the side-lining of consumption 
reduction as an approach to sustainability. As a higher income is almost universally considered 
better than a lower income, governments and individuals have looked for other ways to 
decrease negative environmental impact. Reducing consumption is hardly a vote-winning 
political campaign slogan, especially in consumer-oriented societies most of us are living in. 
Nevertheless, the IPAT equation seemingly contains the win-win solution, we are seeking: 
improved efficiency through technological innovation. The equation suggests that all other 
factors should be put aside, it is still possible to reduce environmental impact through 
technological advancement. This ‘techno-fix’ approach provides a politically, economically, 
and socially much more attractive narrative to address environmental challenges. According to 
the same logic, this interpretation of the IPAT equation also opened up a strategy for the 
corporate world to try respond to environmental problems, in ways that would not interfere 
with interests of capital expansion. Businesses are in favour of increased consumption, not 
decreased demand. As a means of responding to environmental problems, therefore, 
technology companies have a clear incentive to privilege techno-fixes. Not only does this 
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strategy conveniently avoid having to confront the non-profitable terrains of consumption 
reduction, but it also opens up a huge market for ‘green products’ which could be sold to a 
growing demographic of environmentally aware consumers and governments (PEARSE 2012).  
Techno-optimism is a prominent ideology amongst companies that are directly involved 
in – and are gaining profit from – the widest possible spread of environmental-friendly, 
sustainable, zero-carbon cutting-edge solutions (TOWNSEND 2013). However, also in the 
wider public, to some extent we all tend to expect life-saving, almost miraculous solutions from 
technology companies which could reverse the negative effects of climate change and thereby 
help defeat the biggest threat of our age. This belief is nothing new, probably as old as humanity 
itself – to expect from technology the solution to all our challenges. To describe this, PINTÉR 
(2004, p.21) introduces the term Athens model. The Athens model is the paradigm of 
technophiles, who are convinced that “the technology is liberating and will increase the human 
well-being, resulted in a new electronic democracy – hence the name of the model: the direct 
democracy of the Greek city-state 2,500 years ago will make sense again in a new digital 
agora”. Although, his argument is centred around the development of the information society, 
it could be interpreted in the context of the relation between technology and environmental 
sustainability as well. This Athens model approach is extremely popular even in the narratives 
describing the history of mankind, leading directly to the notion that we have nothing to fear 
about the future, because just as technological innovations have solved all challenges in the 
past, they will in the future as well (RIDLEY 2020). 
The narrative of sustainable economic growth is just as prevalent as the ‘techno-fix 
approach’. A study defines a so-called cooperative reformism narrative, which claims that 
economic growth is important for improving lives and should be pursued, as it generates wealth 
and wellbeing. Growth can be achieved by continuous improvements in technology and 
efficiency, that will allow us to increase GDP, profits, and jobs while still reducing pollution 
and preserving ecosystems. Therefore, it will not threaten workers or companies, since 
investments in clean technologies will have positive long-term impact, as sustainable 
companies are more efficient in the long-term. The process of moving towards a more 
sustainable economic system requires a concerted and collaborative effort in which everyone 
contributes to reducing their impact on our planet, but through these technological investments, 
generation by generation we can build a more sustainability-conscious society (STEVENSON 
2019). Techno-optimism nowadays is fuelled by another phenomenon as well: the COVID-19 
pandemic. The pandemic accelerated the adoptions of digital payments, distance learning, 
remote working solutions, telemedicine and industrial automation, serving as a reminder for 
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us, that adversity often forces societies to advance, which could be easily paralleled with the 
fight against climate change (ECONOMIST 2021). Following this logic, we can assume that 
once the negative effects of climate change or environmental pollution become as devastating 
as the effects of the pandemic are today, we will be able and willing to switch to solutions that 
would stop those effects at once. 
3. Technology and climate change: are there positive changes? 
If a techno-centric approach really could have a positive contribution to the fight against 
the effects of climate change and to an environmentally sustainable lifestyle, there must be 
some testimony to this narrative. In the following section, we would like to present some 
samples on how the international community and technology companies are involved in ‘green 
growth’ and sustainability. We shall also investigate whether any positive effects on climate 
change of technological innovations are to be identified in the data. Afterwards, we analyse the 
justification of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, a model that could support the techno-
optimist paradigm. 
Firstly, we would like to take into account some of the major trends of environmental 
sustainability and technological innovation: 
• The OECD Environment Directorate has developed a project on Environmental Policy 
and Technological Innovation (EPTI) to investigate the effects of climate policy on 
technological development. With the aim of improving climate regulations whilst still 
allowing for innovation, the OECD views ICT as one of the critical industries ensuring 
the co-existence of economic growth and environmental improvement (OECD 2013). 
Figure 5 and 6 below, illustrate the exponential increase of some climate change-related 
technologies as positive examples of the technological progress in this field. Figure 6 
also illustrates the strong correlation between energy prices and innovations related to 
alternative energy. 
• The International Telecommunication Union (ITU 2019) identified two deep 
transformations of our age, the first one related to the so-called emerging technologies 
(artificial intelligence, 5G, blockchain etc.), and the other one being climate change. In 
order to reconcile environmental issues, the organisation – in accordance with the 
United Nations and its specialised agencies – believes that we must harness the digital 
revolution. To manage this process, the ITU has established a new Focus Group on 
Environmental Efficiency for Artificial Intelligence and other Emerging Technologies 
(FG-AI4EE) which raises awareness on the environmental impacts of frontier 
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technologies on a global platform to contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the objectives laid out in the Paris Agreement (ibid.). 
 
 
Figure 5: Innovation in environmental technologies, compared to all sectors. 
Source: OECD 2011. 
 
Figure 6: Technology trends between 2013–2019. Growth in green patent applications, %.  
Source: WIPO 2020. 
 
• Technology companies, such as IBM nowadays tend to pay more attention to 
environmental and sustainability issues. IBM has announced that it will achieve net 
zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, to further its decades-long work to address the 
global climate crisis. To achieve this goal, the company undertakes to reduce its 
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greenhouse gas emissions by 65% by 2025 against the base year of 2010, and to procure 
75% of the electricity it consumes worldwide from renewable sources by 2025, and 
90% by 2030, as well as to use viable technologies (in the future), such as carbon 
capture to remove emissions in an amount which equals or exceeds the level of IBM's 
residual emissions. As part of the pledge, the company joined the MIT Climate and 
Sustainability Consortium as part of the broader IBM Future of Climate Initiative (IBM 
2021). 
• Technology visionary, Bill Gates argues in his latest book, that effective climate change 
actions need – beyond technological innovations – coordinated policy measures, and 
governments must lead in this process, as technology alone cannot fix problems at hand. 
Although, he refers to himself a technophile, he also admits that innovation is not the 
only thing we need and argues that techno-fixes alone are not sufficient, but necessary 
(GATES 2021). Gates emphasizes that there is a need for action at all levels of 
government, from local governments (in determining building rules, energy rules, 
transportation systems, waste management etc.), through state or provincial 
governments (in regulating electricity, planning infrastructure etc.) to national 
legislatures (in shaping electricity markets, adopting pollution rules, create standards 
for vehicles and fuels, providing fiscal incentives and funding public R&D activities 
etc.). Nevertheless, his argument is generally tech-centric, according to his starting 
point, the solution for the fight against climate change necessarily has to start with the 
technological advancements (ibid.). 
After a brief overview of the global community and companies involved, we wanted to 
look at datasets describing climate change. The narrative, according to which technological 
innovation can reverse the effects of climate change is now almost 50 years old, therefore, we 
could assume that there should be some visible results from the previous decades in this 
relation. The latest assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 
2013:V) confirms that “warming in the climate system is unequivocal, with many of the 
observed changes unprecedented over decades to millennia: warming of the atmosphere and 
the ocean, diminishing snow and ice, rising sea levels and increasing concentrations of 
greenhouse gases. Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s 
surface than any preceding decade since 1850.” Although this evaluation could be claimed as 
relatively outdated, unfortunately, recent data keep demonstrating similar trends, in spite of the 
significant and continuous technological change we have been experiencing in the last decades. 
A UK-based climate-related webpage CarbonBrief published already in July 2020 that the year 
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could be the first or second warmest year on record (HAUSFATHER 2020a), and later in 
October it reaffirmed that 2020 will be the warmest year on Earth since reliable records began 
in the mid-1800s (HAUSFATHER 2020b). The report notes that it is all the more remarkable 
because 2020 lacks any major El Niño event, a factor that has contributed to most prior record 
warm years. Additional findings of the article claim that the first nine months of the year saw 
record concentrations of major greenhouse gases like CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide; that the 
Arctic Sea ice extent was also at record low levels for much of the summer; that six out of the 
first nine months in 2020 – January, April, May, June, July and September – saw record 
temperatures in at least one of the global surface temperature datasets; and that the rate of 
warming over the past 14 years is well above the long-term trend. These results are surprising 
also because during the spring of 2020, air pollution and the concentration of GHGs fell rapidly 
as the virus spread, and the global economic slowdown of the COVID-19 pandemic cut CO2 
emissions by some 7% throughout the year (VOOSEN 2021), which is just another sign that 
only dramatic action by the world’s countries, far beyond existing efforts, can begin to put an 
end to such tendencies. 
Official measurements released by the NASA show a significant and steady growing 
trend in the mean surface temperature from 1970 to 2020 (HAUSFATHER 2020b). What these 
graphs show is not a flattening curve (indicating that the temperature rise is declining), but an 
ever-intensifying increase. If technological innovation could effectively reverse trends, we 
should have been able to find some evidence in the figures, since the technology we are using 
today is fundamentally different from the technology of the 1970s; yet we cannot perceive any 
positive difference in the process of climate change. Another method to prove the positive 
effect of technological innovations on environmental sustainability would be the justification 
of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis. Economist Simon Kuznets argued that 
income inequality first increases as a nation develops, but eventually, as a nation’s economy 
continues to grow, levels of inequality begin to decline, leading to a broader distribution of 
wealth. A similar idea was later proposed with respect to environmental degradation, that 
became widely known as the ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’. The EKC hypothesis claims that 
an economy’s environmental impact tends to increase during the early phases of 
industrialisation, but as a nation becomes richer, its environmental impact levels off and 
eventually begins to decline. The essential reasoning behind this hypothesis can be summarised 
as follows: (1) as GDP grows, nations can dedicate more of their attention and resources toward 
environmental protection (a so-called ‘post-materialist’ need), whereas the poorest nations 
must focus solely on meeting their basic material needs, irrespective of environmental impact; 
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(2) richer nations will be able to develop and afford better technologies, which will make 
production cleaner and less resource-intensive; and (3) as nations get richer their economies 
tend to shift from ‘industrial’ economies to ‘post-industrial’ or ‘information’ or ‘service’ 
economies, which supposedly rely on lower material and energy flows (LOMBORG 2001). 
Based on this reasoning, the EKC hypothesis states that there are no environmental limits of 
growth, and that growth is ultimately good for the environment, even if at first it might seem 
contradictory. These narrative claims that limitless economic growth and caring for the 
environment is possible simultaneously. Empirical foundations of the hypothesis, however, are 
dubious, at best. In broad terms the empirical status of the EKC can be expressed as follows. 
Some studies have shown that where certain types of environmental damage are generated and 
suffered locally, an EKC can indeed be seen (DINDA 2004). These limited circumstances 
include wastewater discharge, SO2 emissions, and CO emissions. On the other hand, when 
environmental problems cross national boundaries or have longer-term impacts, studies 
conclude that the EKC does not hold (STERN 2010, KEREKES et al. 2018). Most importantly, 
an EKC exists neither for CO2 nor biodiversity loss (LUZZATI – ORSINI 2009), two of the 
most significant environmental crises. It is hard to defend a growth model based on the limited 
cases of environmental improvement if sustained growth in GDP fails to address (and indeed 
exacerbates) problems such as climate change or biodiversity loss. 
A study by HOLM and ENGLUND (2009) has done much to debunk the widely held 
belief that a movement toward a ‘service’, ‘information’, or ‘post-industrial’ economy 
automatically leads to reduced environmental impacts. The authors show that despite the 
significant growth of the service sector during the last decades in the wealthier countries of the 
world, overall resource consumption has also increased. Moreover, the limited extent to which 
some ‘service economies’ do seem to be decoupling growth from environmental impact per 
capita, is arguably due to the outsourcing of manufacturing to developing nations, especially 
China – and now with China becoming more and more developed, the phenomenon continues 
to less developed Southeast Asian countries (HOLM – ENGLUND 2009). In one of the most 
comprehensive reviews of data and methodologies used to estimate the EKC hypothesis, David 
STERN (2004, p.1435) concludes that “the statistical analysis on which the EKC is based on 
is not robust. There is little evidence for a common inverted U-shaped pathway that countries 
follow as their income rises.” One of the most serious criticisms of the EKC hypothesis, 
however, comes from the ecological footprint analysis. The EKC, if valid, would suggest that 
nations should seek growth in GDP if they want to reduce their environmental impact. But 
when this claim is considered in the context of ecological footprint analysis, the hypothesis 
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seems to be negated by reality. The United States is the richest nation on the planet in terms of 
per capita GDP, however, if the American standard of living was globalised, we would need 
more than four times the biocapacity of Earth to sustain humanity (GFN 2017). Even the 
somewhat less resource-intensive Western European nations – the so-called ‘green’ economies 
like Germany, France, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden – are grossly exceeding their 
share of the planet’s biocapacity (HICKEL 2020). These countries have the highest scores in 
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Index, but in fact – proving the flawed 
method of the index itself – some of them are the most environmentally unsustainable countries 
in the world. Another method developed by the UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS (2021) shows that 
all of the top-ranked countries in the SDG Index have significantly overused their fair share of 
planetary boundaries, in consumption-based terms – not only when it comes to resource use 
and emissions but also in terms of land use and chemical flows like nitrogen and phosphorous. 
Based on data regarding the consumption of the most developed countries, it can be concluded 
that even if there were an EKC, the tipping point in the curve would be occurring much too late 
in the process of development to validate anything like the conventional development path. 
Accordingly, the argument that sustainability will arrive when the entire world gets rich or 
‘developed’ is demonstrably wrong, and it is intellectually irresponsible to pretend otherwise 
(WHITE 2007). 
4. A case study: smart cities 
The techno-centric approach toward the environmental and sustainability issues can be 
best illustrated with an analogy through a similar case. In the following section, we would like 
to give a brief overview of the contradictory narratives around so called ‘smart cities’. The case 
of smart cities can serve as a proper illustration of the flawed hypotheses of a purely techno-
centric approach to development. A smart city means the extensive use – or, in other words: 
integration – of digital technological solutions in virtually every area of an urban entity 
(governance, mobility, economic development, security, waste management, planning, 
environmental issues etc.) to make it more effective, liveable and sustainable, in a nutshell: a 
better place for everyone to live in (ALBINO et al. 2015). In its purely technocratic form, the 
smart city narrative promises seamless mobility within the city, less pollution, on-demand 
services, less energy-use, a more just, more equal, greener, resilient and responsive city in 
perfect harmony with its environment and its residents (GREEN 2019). The term smart city 
was coined in the late 1990s, the tech companies started to apply the label from the middle of 
the 2000s as a common reference for complex ITC systems in urban infrastructure they 
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provided (HARRISON – DONNELLY 2011). It was at that time, that the tech-companies 
began to create the first divisions dedicated particularly to urban development issues (e.g. IBM 
Smarter Cities, Siemens Smart City, Microsoft CityNext). This was the period of techno-
optimism in relation to smart cities, determined and driven almost exclusively by technology 
companies (COHEN 2015). The academic sphere, researchers from the fields of urban studies 
or social studies joined the discourse only after that, and uncovered many concerns related to 
smart cities and threats the smart cities could induce (TOWNSEND 2013). The main problem 
with techno-fixes in cities and techno-centred narratives in urban development is that it does 
not take into account that urban life is not primarily about finding an optimum and taking full 
advantage of potentials. Serious concerns emerged that smart city initiatives will deepen 
inequalities between cities and within cities, between different social groups, between groups 
with different income levels, and that such developments will exclude certain groups of people, 
and some groups will benefit from innovations much more than others (SASSEN 2012, 
VANOLO 2014). On top of that, there is no evidence that smart city developments could even 
achieve certain goals set by the technology companies. Almost two decades have passed since 
the concept was introduced, but the most pressing urban issues are still with us: we could not 
solve the problem of traffic jams, the problem of poor air quality of cities, the challenge of 
securing affordable housing for urban residents, and overall, the urban inequality issues have 
worsened in recent years instead of improving (BARLOW – LÉVY-BENCHETON 2018). The 
point is that in this case, it seems that a techno-centric approach in itself could not effectively 
solve complex urban issues, and after the initial hopeful years, now even the most ambitious 
technology companies acknowledge that fact as well. There is a growing consensus nowadays, 
that exclusively technology-driven urban development tends to be the least favourable and least 
effective one (GREEN 2019). Development can achieve the most positive outcomes if as many 
participants are involved in the process as possible, namely the local government, the 
authorities, the academic sphere, the service providers and also the citizens themselves (civil 
groups, NGOs) (COHEN 2015), besides just tech-companies (WOETZEL – KUZNETSOVA 
2018). 
5. An outlook on economic growth 
The so-called ‘green growth’ approach, based on a profound faith in technological 
solutions, has come to define our times. There are occasional comments regarding the issue of 
overpopulation or the importance of not over-consuming, but the reality is that mainstream 
environmental discourse, especially in the political realm, has placed its faith, explicitly or 
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implicitly, almost entirely in techno-fixes. This would mean that we expect to reduce 
(eventually to zero) our environmental impact almost exclusively by producing and consuming 
the same goods and services more efficiently, which concept is in itself paradoxical. The 
argument holds, that this way, economies can still grow in terms of GDP, while environmental 
impact reduces. This, in essence, is part of the vision encapsulated within notions of 
‘sustainable development’ and ‘green growth’. It is so convenient that governments, 
businesses, and the general population tend to accept it without further inquiries into the 
specificities, irrespective of whether it has much empirical support. Perhaps the limits of 
technology can be most easily understood when clarifying exactly what is expected of 
technology in terms of achieving sustainability. Throughout much of the 20th century, 
developed economies achieved around 3% growth in GDP annually, meaning that they doubled 
in size roughly every 23 years. This has become a reference point for signifying political-
economic success, so let us assume that when the United Nations talks of ‘growth’ it means 
continuing levels of growth that have been experienced in recent decades. Over eighty years, 
at 3% growth, the economies of the developed world (populated by roughly 1 billion people) 
would have doubled in size three times, meaning they would be eight times larger, in terms of 
GDP, than they are now. If we also assume that by 2100 the world population is going to be 
around 11 billion (UNDESA 2019) and that this population has caught up to the living 
standards of the developed world by this stage, then the global economy would be almost 90 
times larger, in terms of GDP, than the size of the developed world’s aggregate economy today. 
Considering that ecosystems are trembling under the pressure of one ‘developed world’ at the 
existing size, no one could seriously think our planet could withstand the equivalent of a 90-
fold increase. There would be efficiency improvements, indeed, meaning that the impact could 
be significantly less than projected above, however, even based on estimates of decoupling, we 
would still need several planets worth of biocapacity (WEIDMANN et. al. 2015). The point is 
that efficiency gains could not possibly be expected to make the projected amount of GDP 
growth sustainable. The levels of decoupling required would simply be too much. Therefore, 
according to some experts, we should no longer focus on how to make our current growth 
model sustainable but rather to find out what economic model is sustainable at all 
(ALEXANDER 2014). 
We can find narratives other than ’perpetual economic growth’, although these are 
mostly theoretical ones, only vaguely developed and described. However, it is still worth 
paying attention to them because the following phase of this research could be finding a 
solution for a sustainable economic model through a deeper understanding of socio-economic 
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narratives. GUSKE et al. (2019) in their article propose the narrative of ‘Small is beautiful’ as 
a direct reference to the original concept of E. F. SCHUMACHER (1973), which refers to a 
complete reconfiguring of our economic system. According to this narrative, the structure of 
the economy is organized around small or medium-sized, local enterprises. These are mostly 
decoupled from international value chains and independent from global corporations. Instead, 
local businesses keep supply-chains local, try to use alternative resources and production 
methods, which will eventually lead to a replacement of international supply-chains. According 
to the authors, in this more sustainable economic system, a fundamental value shift has taken 
place. Economic growth is no longer the prevailing indicator for success and well-being; 
consumers no longer consider owning goods such as the latest fashion items or the newest 
technology a status symbol; producers no longer invest in excluding others from using valuable 
knowledge. Instead, community-oriented values prevail, putting well-being and a good life at 
the heart of society, which includes quality of life, social cohesion and participation. A different 
narrative from the same authors (ibid.) is named ‘Transparent and manageable’, where the 
economy is built on more sustainable production and consumption patterns, achieved by 
increasing transparency of international supply-chains and stricter standards regarding the 
environmental and social impact of products. Sustainable solutions are no longer more 
expensive, rather they are competitive in markets. This change in focus results in a change of 
the overarching economic goals. Producing and selling more goods, increasing profit margins 
and ultimately growing in terms of revenue is no longer the main goal, instead, network effects 
resulting from a higher number of users of sustainable solutions gain relevance. STEVENSON 
(2019) introduces the ‘Radical Transformationism’ narrative, according to which we have to 
accept that environmental sustainability is completely incompatible with continuing economic 
growth. This narrative rejects capitalism as the only viable economic system – in fact it claims 
that environmental sustainability is completely incompatible with continuing economic growth 
–, and recommends an alternative to our existing market-based economies through 
strengthening economic relations based on cooperation and sharing. Existing market-based 
environmental solutions are part of the problem not part of the solution, the narrative claims. 
This perspective is also associated with a fairly high level of scepticism about the existing 
sustainability initiatives of businesses, governments, and international institutions.  
6. Conclusions 
We have evidence that as nations get richer, their overall ecological footprints and 
carbon emissions tend to rise, from which it follows that the argument that higher GDP will 
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automatically produce sustainable economies (which is the EKC hypothesis) lacks evidential 
foundation. The main problem is that according to the narrative of growth-orientated economy, 
efficiency gains are almost always reinvested into increasing production and consumption, not 
reducing them. These rebound effects have caused the overall environmental impact of 
economies to increase, even though technology has produced many efficiency gains in 
production and cleaner solutions. In other words, technological advancement has resulted in 
relative decrease, but little or no absolute decrease of emissions and natural degradation. The 
latter is what is needed, however, given that the global economy is in serious ecological 
overrun. Since there seems to be no reason to assume that more efficient growth is going to 
reduce humanity’s ecological footprint within sustainable bounds, it follows that we must 
consider alternative models of economy – alternative models of progress – even if this 
challenge conventional economic wisdom. We cannot solve our problems using the same kinds 
of thinking that caused them. All appropriate technologies must be exploited – this paper does 
not argue otherwise –, it only maintains that technology by itself is not going to be able to solve 
environmental problems when the application of technology is governed by a growth 
imperative. Accordingly, this paper has argued that what is needed for true sustainability is a 
transition to a fundamentally different kind of economic thinking – an economic paradigm that 
seeks sufficiency rather than limitless growth. This may not be a popular message, and it may 
already be too late for a smooth transition from the infinite growth model (GILDING 2011), 
however, on a finite planet, currently there seems to be no alternative. Although this hypothesis 
hereby cannot be validated through empirical research - which was also not the purpose of this 
paper -, the professional opinion of the author reflects that there seems to be strong evidence 
that techno-optimism by itself cannot be the ultimate solution for problems emerging from 
global sustainability issues. 
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Can the trilemma of environmental policy be solved? 
Izabella FEIERABEND45 
Abstract 
In this paper I will analyse the main obstacles which prevent sustainable economic growth from being 
achieved. I define the sustainability problem as the impossible trinity of environmental policy. In my paper I will 
describe the trilemma and at the same time, I will assess the effectiveness of different policy instruments such as 
taxes and subsidies from an institutional economics point of view. The main research question is: to what extent 
can innovation strategies and specifically digitalisation contribute to meeting the EU decarbonisation goals?   
In my research I will carry out a statistical analysis (multiple regression) to assess the strength of the correlation 
between institutional stability, innovativeness, competitiveness, and environmental performance.  
To be able to achieve a climate neutral Europe by 2050, policymakers must proceed with the implementation of 
measures, adapt institutional frameworks, and promote well-targeted, coordinated investments.  
 
Keywords: sustainability, economic growth, institutional economics, innovation  
1. Introduction: The notion of the impossible trinity 
The term, “impossible trinity” is known in the context of international finance and refers 
to the impossibility of meeting three important goals; in other words, only two of them are 
achievable at the same time, whereas the third one has to be sacrificed (AIZENMAN et al. 
2013; MAGAS 2008). FRANKEL (2003) applied the same term to global environmental 
regulation. In his view globalisation, the regulation of externalities and national sovereignty 
jointly constitute a trilemma, yet in the case of an open economy which would like to take 
advantage of globalisation and a global market, externalities will be produced at a global level, 
making global regulation necessary, which would somehow restrict national sovereignty 
(FRANKEL 2003).  
In my paper, I would like to introduce a different interpretation of the trilemma. In 
environmental policy we must reduce negative environmental impacts and ensure economic 
growth while still considering society’s standards of living (Figure 7). 
For the moment achieving these three goals seems to be impossible because neither the 
current economic structure, nor the present stage of technological development, nor the formal 
and informal institutional environment guarantee a solution for the trilemma. The aim of this 
study is to identify which factors prevent sustainable growth from being achieved and answer 
the question of whether we really do face an impossible trinity or instead, the problem can be 
solved by the application of well-targeted policy measures. 
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Figure 7.: The impossible trinity of environmental policy 
Source: The author 
 
2. The description of the trilemma 
The main challenge of environmental policy is to achieve low-carbon economic growth 
without reducing social welfare. Growth theories have a broad literature; in my argumentation, 
I will focus on the Solow model and its revision, the green Solow model (SOLOW 2008; 
BROCK – TAYLOR 2010). GDP growth can essentially be guaranteed by technological 
development. If the progress in green technologies surpasses the progress in non-environmental 
technologies, the resultant abatement level will be higher than the marginal externality from 
the augmented production. Therefore, the economy could reach a sustainable growth. 
Economic growth does not necessarily result in higher environmental pressure, because by 
applying energy-efficient, low-carbon technologies, higher productivity can be achieved while 
the economy produces fewer negative externalities. The Brock-Taylor model is in line with the 
theory of EKC (Environmental Kuznets Curve) although its critics suggest that it cannot be 
generalised (ARROW et al. 2005; STERN 2004). Extremists argue that all kinds of economic 
growth must be stopped, or at least we must put an end to every kind of physical growth. We 
shall now analyse the two approaches in detail. 
Suppose that we would like to improve environmental performance by technological 
innovations it is generally inevitable to raise capital, as these innovations are usually capital-
intensive. Therefore, production costs will rise and depending on market conditions, these extra 
costs will be built in the price of the product. If there is a fierce competition within a dynamic 
market structure, where there are various suppliers and various perfect or nearly perfect 
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substitute products, consumers have more bargaining power. In this case, producers cannot 
charge all the extra production costs to the consumer, consequently the consumer surplus 
reduction and the social dead-weight loss will be lower. In case of an oligopoly or monopoly, 
the social welfare loss will be higher since the extra cost can be imposed on consumers. It is 
rather difficult how to measure social welfare46, hence defining social welfare as the social 
surplus is an inconvenient but necessary simplification, with many restrictions, and fails to 
assess numerous important factors: the adoption of low-carbon technologies reduces pollution, 
meaning that environmental quality and quality of life become better. In the long run, 
consumers benefit from the positive externalities of technology change. At the same time, it 
must be considered that consumers have different preferences, they have different reservation 
prices for environmental-friendly goods, and different discount rates for long-run 
environmental benefits. 
It is supposed that environmental regulation by negative incentives or economic 
structural change driven by the reduction of the output, would raise consumer prices in case of 
products, which are essential goods for consumers in general or for some groups of consumers. 
For those whose reservation price is below the new, augmented market price, they won’t be 
able to afford to buy some of the goods, and the consumer surplus will decrease. The reduction 
of production on the short run might enable to meet environmental goals without harming 
consumer surplus, however on the long run the decrease of economic growth will finally result 
in the reduction of economic competitivity, development, consequently lower employment rate 
and lower social welfare. Although sectorial change, moving towards quality improvements in 
spite of physical growth, in a knowledge economy driven by intellectual capital, is a long-term 
process, and needs positive incentives (from the market or the state) it has a much better 
outcome than the instantaneous restraint in production. 
The economic recession due to Covid-19 pandemic reflected that in case of a severe 
economic downturn pollution initially drops as economic activity slump, however it entails 
high social costs, as we have experienced and many sectors (LÓPEZ-FELDMAN et al. 2020; 
WANG – SU 2020). Moreover, rebooting the economy made necessary fiscal and monetary 
interventions, which led to even higher emissions (OECD 2020). The pandemic restrictions 
 
46 Social welfare or social well-being is broadly discussed in economic literature (RAWLS, 1982; SEN, 2003; 
KOCSIS, 2010; ARROW, 1996). Without taking any position in the theoretical debate, we can accept that income 
growth will result in a higher consumer utility, however this is not equal to the subjective perception of well-
being. According to Amartya SEN income is a means of carrying out activities, which cannot be monetised. 
RAWLS suggests that there are some primary goods, which are necessary to achieve some other specific goals. 
Therefore, indirectly income can be an indicator of social welfare. 
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and the period of confinement highlighted that business rationalisation even during an 
economic recovery is of crucial importance in environmental management, and it can reduce 
emissions to a great extent without restricting economic activity. For instance, non-standard 
employment strategies, such as teleworking, online conferences, webinars contribute to a 
reduction in the energy usage of the office buildings, and prevent CO2 emissions due to 
commuting, transport. The vis major situation forced the different actors to make use of online 
solutions, which has made accessible a more connected, more resource-efficient, paperless 
future (in areas such as online administration in the public sector, healthcare, education, and e-
business solutions). 
The third variety of the impossible trinity is targeting economic growth and social 
welfare, which would mean the maintenance of the status quo, the present economic structure. 
This means that substantial improvement in environmental quality cannot be achieved, only 
mitigation of the environmental pressure is possible. This path, however, is not sustainable, 
since growing environmental impacts will inevitably harm the quality of life and health, and 
will result in rising prices for non-renewable resources, hampering economic stability and 
consequently making it difficult to guarantee purchasing power and hence high living 
standards.  
3. Policy measures to solve the trilemma 
3.1. The role of subsidies in handling market failures  
After dealing with the target system of the impossible trinity, I will assess whether 
environmental policy measures can efficiently address the challenge.  
The first problem is elevated consumer prices due to the high costs of green innovation. 
The other challenge is that firms face difficulties financing environmental innovations which 
prevent these innovations from being carried out. Furthermore, an economic slowdown due to 
negative incentives harms social welfare. In the following section I will analyse whether the 
existing institutional environment can reduce consumers’ surplus loss and boost producers’ 
innovation potential.  
One possibility of fostering innovations is providing subsidies, especially at an earlier 
stage of development, during the proof-of-concept phase which involves many uncertainties 
and entails high costs. 
When carrying out a cost-benefit analysis of subsidies the following factors should be 
taken into account. By giving subsidies policy makers would like to reduce market failures and 
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eliminate innovation barriers to green investments. Environmental services and natural 
resources are public goods, therefore their production is not necessarily viable financially, and 
market actors are not motivated to produce them, which leads to a market failure.  
Market failures arise due to different reasons: 
1. The market does not reward environmentally conscious behaviour of firms, or green 
products. This can be handled in different ways apart from subsidies, for example through 
informal institutions such as environmental rankings and green awards from the supply side 
and by making use of “framing effect” to form consumer preferences from the demand side.  
2. High costs of capital also entail a market failure. In the continental Europe the banking 
sector plays the most important role in long-term and medium-term financing which is a lot 
more expensive than equity financing (which is more common in the US, and Great Britain) 
(GEDEON 1992). Venture capital investments are less habitual, moreover state-owned 
venture capital funds predominate, which is a less competitive structure than the dominance 
of private venture capital funds, due to the fact that private venture capital funds take into 
account competitivity and market potential while selecting innovations. In contrast, state-
owned companies may easily fail to assess competitiveness and channel venture capital and 
subsidies to the same investment projects, meaning that it is not the most innovative firms 
who succeed in gaining access to financial sources (KARSAI 2007). 
 
Subsidies, by the initial capital injection, make it possible to realise the investment with 
less financial risks and to launch green products on the market at a competitive price (it is not 
the consumers who have to pay a premium for the environmentally friendly aspect). 
In the cost-benefit analysis we should take into account as positive externalities of 
subsidies the promotion of innovations, the technological spill-over effect of investments and 
their contribution to sustainable GDP growth. Nevertheless, the question arises: how can we 
assure that subsidies do not become environmentally harmful subsidies? It is necessary to study 
whether positive externalities can offset negative externalities arising from the increase in 
economic activities and it must be assured that the most competitive investments get subsidised 
and that counterselection is avoided.  
ACEMOGLU et al. (2012) pointed out that subsidies are essential to ensuring that green 
technologies displace pollutant technologies. According to them, a combination of subsidies 
and taxes could be the key to directing innovation activity towards more sustainable 
technologies. It is also important to emphasise that without strict monitoring systems and the 
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possibility of imposing sanctions it cannot be guaranteed that green investments will achieve 
the desired effect.  
We are talking about an environmentally harmful subsidy if in the long run it results in 
higher environmental pressure despite guaranteeing better environmental performance (KISS 
2003). According to the EU methodology, in the cost-benefit analysis (which is the basis upon 
which governmental organisations can decide about the eligibility of a project for national or 
European subsidies) all positive and negative externalities must be taken into account, or 
quantified (EC 2008). Economic net present value must be calculated in this way, however in 
cost-benefit analysis gains are usually overcalculated while costs are underestimated 
(KEREKES et al. 1993). Information asymmetry problem arises as well, yet the investor has 
lot more precise information on the social, environmental, and economic effects of the 
investment, however as investors are interested in getting the subsidy, they tend to paint a more 
positive picture of the project. Therefore, independent auditors need to monitor the project 
results, something which elevates the aggregate costs of subsidies to a great extent.  
Consequently, only at very high costs can it be assured that subsidies do not become 
environmentally harmful subsidies. If subsidies cannot achieve the expected outcome, market 
failure cannot be successfully handled, and it is converted into government failure. Another 
prerequisite of proving subsidies is that the investment be financially viable and sustainable. 
This factor and the high transaction costs of getting information prevents SMEs from 
participating in innovation competition (KISS 2005; KISS 2009; HÁMORI – SZABÓ 2012). 
The precondition of carrying out a well-targeted environmental policy aimed at tackling 
innovation barriers by subsidies is that smaller market actors, SMEs and micro-enterprises be 
able to access information at a lower cost, and to achieve a higher level of confidence in 
economic and political institutions. If already financially strong enterprises are subsidised, 
while SME sector (that has major contribution to employment) is underrepresented in green 
innovation, the innovation gap is reproduced, although Pareto-improvement has been achieved. 
3.2. Negative incentives to tackle market failures or empowering market incentives to 
foster voluntary environmental engagement  
Other institutional solution aimed at internalising externalities is the introduction of 
negative incentives into the regulatory system, to reduce polluting activities and promote 
innovation. The second of these two goals can only be achieved (although not in every case) if 
there is a fierce competition in the sector with multiple actors and where the lack of innovation 
activities would result in competitive disadvantage and loss of market power. Essentially, it 
96 
 
depends on market institutions and formal economic institutions as to whether negative 
incentives can exert an innovation-promoting effect or whether instead they result in the 
reduction of production and/or inflation. It can be supposed that if a company reacts to 
environmental restrictions by innovating (despite reducing its production), it could meet 
environmental standards with the same or even higher productivity (Figure 8). Consequently, 
an ecotax will not put extra charge on production and the firm can remain competitive in prices 
(FEIERABEND 2011). 
 
Figure 8: The effect of technological innovation on productivity, meeting GHG reduction goals 
Source: FEIERABEND 2011, p. 130. 
 
Consequently, technological innovation results in a more cost-efficient production 
method with better environmental performance. As the production possibilities curve shifts up, 
pollution norms can be met or overperformed with higher productivity. 
If it is so, why do economically and technically supportable innovations not become a 
reality? The reasons for this can be due to market imperfections, and the internal characteristics 
of the enterprise, which can be analysed from a behavioural economic approach. There is a 
time lag between the initial (high) investment costs and the return on investment. There can be 
a substantial conflict of interest between the owners (with long-term interests) and managers 
(with short-term interests), the latter tending to be risk averse. Complex decision-making 
processes might prevent environmentally efficient innovations from being carried out due to 
market risks, and another reason might be companies having negative cash flow at the 
beginning of the innovation process. Companies might tend to make suboptimal technical 
changes to meet environmental requirements while reducing the amount of taxes to pay. 
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4. Do environmental regulations ensure better environmental 
performance? 
On a theoretical basis I have argued that environmental policy measures, positive and 
negative incentives might not achieve the desired environmental goals. In my empirical 
analysis I will use the Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) index developed by OECD47 to 
measure the depth of environmental policy measures, and I would like to analyse whether there 
is a correlation between EPS and environmental performance (measured in CO2 emissions per 
GDP PPP, on 2015 basis). 
Since policy measures generally have their effect in the long run, and not instantly, I will 
carry out a statical linear regression analysis with 3, 5 and 10 years of time lag. The latest data 
on EPS is of 2012 for all countries involved in the analysis48. 
The result of the linear regression (Table 3) suggests that there is practically no 
correlation between environmental policy stringency and environmental performance. We have 
a similar result (R2 = 0.011) in case of running linear regression on EPS (2012) and 
productivity-based CO2 emissions. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .406a .165 .121 .05499 
a. Predictors: (Constant), EPS 2012 
 
Table 3: Statistical relationship between CO2 emissions (CO2/GDP as of 2017) and EPS index as of 2012, 
analysed in SPSS 
Source: The author 
Thus, there arises the question: if environmental policy measures do not explain differing 
environmental performance among developed countries, what factors does it depend on? 
My assumption is that economic and political institutions do matter and institution 
stability can have an innovation-promoting effect by affecting market environment in a positive 
way, entailing market mechanisms. To measure economic and political stability I have 
prepared a composite indicator with the following factors – indicators prepared by the World 
Bank – (calculating with 0.2 weight in case of each of them): rule of law, government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and Doing Business ranks. 
 
47 The OECD EPS index includes market-based policies (taxes, trading schemes, FITs, DRS) and non-market 
policies (standards, R&D subsidies). 
48 The involved countries in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Ireland, Poland, Hungary, Great Britain, Germany, Norway, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
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In a statical analysis I wanted to study the relationship between institutional stability and 
innovation performance for the above-mentioned group of countries. I measured innovation 
performance by the Global Innovation Ranking. I found that there is a strong correlation 
between the governance composite indicator and innovation performance (Table 4). 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .855a .731 .722 1.39186 
a. Predictors: (Constant), governance 
 
Table 4: Statistical relationship between governance indicators and innovation performance, 2016, analysed in 
SPSS 
Source: The author 
On the following figure (Figure 9) we can observe to what extent do Business R&D 
activities (relative to GDP PPP) determine environmental performance measured by GHG 
emissions. We can see that actual data points are in line with the linear regression curve. The 
correlation between Business R&D investments and GHG emissions/GDP resulted to be strong 
(R2 = 0,7). That is, higher R&D performance will result in less GHG emissions. 
 
 
Figure 9: Business R&D investments and GHG emissions 




Empirical analysis shows that there is a strong correlation between innovativeness and 
environmental performance. Therefore, economic policy measures (not only environmental 
policy, because it is important to achieve policy synergies when tackling environmental 
problems) should focus on innovation promotion and fostering low-carbon investments. That 
means that a proactive policy approach is needed to facilitate economic structural change. 
From this perspective, environmental policy stringency, by itself, cannot efficiently face the 
climate challenge, if it is not embedded in a broader innovation policy which boosts 
digitalisation, energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies in all sectors, including 
households. Nevertheless, supportive formal institutions can only achieve their aims if informal 
institutions also provide a stimulus for clean technology investments. 
5. The European Green Deal will make a change? 
The EU has announced its ambitious strategy of turning climate-neutral by 2050 in 2019, 
and in order to do so, a series of sector-specific regulations has been elaborated. The European 
Green Deal aims at achieving a sustainable green growth; that means, from our perspective, 
that it would like to offer a solution for the impossible trinity of climate change. The question 
is: can it tackle the previously analysed efficiency problems? 
Some of the most important challenges are the following: the efficient usage of subsidies, 
the harmonisation of sector-specific regulations in member states and make the European 
market more integrated. 
To be able to guarantee that subsidies reach the desired environmental performance is a 
very hard task, due to information asymmetry problems and high monitoring costs. The target-
matrix of European subsidies focuses more and more on economic and financial sustainability 
by introducing market instruments in resource-allocation. We can mention as an example the 
renewable energy financing mechanism (EU 2020/1294) adopted in September 2020, entered 
now in the implementation phase. Renewable energy projects will be carried out via European-
level tendering procedures, the EU acting as a mediating body to help investor and target 
countries find each other, reducing market failures and making the European market more 
integrated. Member states (as donor countries) can realize their RES (Renewable energy 
sources) goals by carrying out Renewable Energy investment projects in host member states 
where RES projects are more cost-efficient, or electricity demand is higher. Therefore, a 
European-level optimisation can be achieved, and member states are not forced to implement 
renewable energy projects of low efficiency and subsidies will flow where the allocation is 
more efficient. At the same time there are various incentives built in the process to foster private 
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sector contributions: contributor private entities receive guarantees of origins for the energy 
produced by its contribution, and all contributions are linked to the Union-wide green label. 
Energy integration strategy also shows the same direction: the importance of a more 
integrated European energy market to be able to reduce transaction costs by establishing energy 
communities and making energy transformation more efficient. Energy efficiency is a key 
factor to be able to make economic growth sustainable and to cover energy demand by low-
carbon energy sources. Digitalisation offers many possibilities to enhance energy efficiency, 
for example by the development of smart grid, better adaptation to energy demand, and by 
making households more energy-efficient by the application of smart meters. 
The European Emission Trading System’s 2021 revision also shows the regulatory 
intention of correcting disfunctions of the ETS system by reducing emissions allowances and 
by enhanced carbon leakage regulation and a carbon border adjustment mechanism, measures 
intended to result in a higher carbon price, an approach more suited to internalising the 
externalities produced by the European Common Market. The current carbon price (around 40 
euros/t of CO2) approximately represents the efficient carbon price described in various carbon 
price models, although the disadvantage of cap-and-trade model is the price volatility affecting 
energy prices for households (WEITZMAN 2017). The new strategy also embraces Nordhaus’ 
view as its scope is to reduce carbon leakages deriving from import (NORDHAUS 2015). 
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the Just Transition Mechanism would 
guarantee that the climate neutral transition be achieved with the least social losses possible, 
and without ruining sector where climate neutrality is only attainable at high cost (if it is 
achievable at all). 
It is yet very early to assess the efficiency the new European policy measures; however, 
the experience shows that some obstacles might make it difficult to work. Heterogeneous and 
inflexible regulatory frameworks may hamper timely adaptation and makes coordination more 
difficult with higher transaction costs. Member states’ national policies, economic 
development, formal and informal institutions (cultural aspects, mentality, consumers’ 
preferences, corporate culture) and national interests can also differ to a great extent. 
According to common pool resources literature in case of a heterogeneous community it 
is difficult to elaborate and carry out environmental policies that meet all requirements, 
expectations, and equally effects the welfare function of participants (OSTROM 1990). 
Consequently, multi-level governance might be a better solution than top-down, centralised 
regulation. This principle is in line with the EU’s subsidiarity principle, too. The enhancement 
of Member States’ cooperation and interconnectedness might contribute to a better European 
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environmental performance, although significant differences between European countries will 
possibly remain, which will decelerate the pace of transition and generate high costs. 
EU policies can contribute to make a structural change; however, it is not clear if the 
efficiency deficits coming with subsidies and market imperfections of the cap-and-trade system 
can be handled by the new measures. The regulatory framework is not yet completed, and the 
institutional framework is under development. One of the key elements of this framework is 
the green taxonomy, which could reduce uncertainties for market actors and policy makers to 
develop strategies in line with EU policy incentives. 
6. Conclusion 
To conclude the empirical analysis, it has been proven that economic and political 
institutions play an important role in ensuring a motivating, innovation-promoting market 
environment for companies. As I have argued, there is a statistical evidence that governmental 
R&D policies, subsidies, and negative incentives (taxes, carbon trading schemes) cannot 
efficiently address the climate challenge, and by itself it cannot ensure better environmental 
performance. 
This can also be a salutary warning for ambitious EU policies like the Roadmap to a low-
carbon economy. As member states have rather different economic and political institutional 
environments, it is very difficult to harmonise environmental policies at the Community level. 
Nevertheless, EU policies targeting energy- and resources efficiency promise to be able 
to rationalise industrial and household energy performance and the European economy as a 
whole, by optimising resource-utilisation at a regional level. Digital solutions can contribute to 
a more competitive energy sector, plus a better, more interconnected organisation of company 
processes. Technological development and stable institutional environment might enable a 
more sustainable economic growth. 
Currently, and despite considerable policy enhancements, it cannot be stated that the 
trilemma can be solved in the medium or long term; in the short run it is totally impossible. 
Nevertheless, fostering smart technology growth, making market instruments work, and 
adjusting formal and informal institutions might bring the European economies closer to a more 
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Bős-Nagymaros, the Political Taboo of Hydroenergy 
Gábor László PORHAJAS49 - Bence Álmos KISS50 
Abstract 
The implementation of the Bős-Nagymaros dam system has been the subject of a long series of public-
political debates, which, even from the perspective of 30 years, can fuel heated discussions over the use of hydro 
energy. The dam has always played an important political role; in the 1980s, for the Hungarian green movements, 
which were just unfolding their wings and searching for their political identity. 
In our research, we examine how the case of Bős-Nagymaros made the possibility of utilizing hydropower a taboo 
in the debates on sustainable energy in Hungary. The hypothesis of our research is that the possibility of utilization 
of hydropower by Bős-Nagymaros has become a political issue as a consequence of assumptions, presumptions, 
and half-truths instead of a professional-political issue. The arc of this is outlined in our research with the 
methodology of discourse analysis. 
In our analysis, we show how a fundamentally sustainability-energy issue becomes a victim of everyday political 
debates, determining the possibility of using hydropower for many decades. We hope that, with our research we 
can contribute to the role of hydropower in Hungary in the discourse related to sustainability, which is becoming 
more and more powerful. 
 In the course of our analysis, we discussed the issue of the Bős-Nagymaros dam in a political and geopolitical 
dimension, during which we tried to grasp the centuries-old dimensions of the discourse at its roots. In this, the 
dam takes on the character of a political or social enemy, in which conflicts of power (political), economic, 
cultural, social and background generate layers of discourse. These real or unreal or exaggerated notions of 
danger and harm form specific social connotations that can thematize thinking, professional, and public discourse 
on a given issue for decades or centuries. 
 
Keywords: Bős-Nagymaros; renewable energy; water dam; Slovakian-Hungarian relationship 
1. Introduction 
The implementation of the Bős-Nagymaros dam system has been the subject of a long 
series of public-political debates, which, even from the perspective of 30 years, can fuel heated 
discussions over the use of hydro energy. The dam has always played an important political 
role; in the 1980s, for the Hungarian green movements, which were just unfolding their wings 
and searching for their political identity. There are many examples in history where a particular 
project or investment has become symbolic, with a long-term impact on broader professional 
and policy issues and thinking, such as the Aswan Dam in Egypt or the never opened 
Zwentendorf an der Donau nuclear power plant in neighbouring Austria. 
Despite the fact that hydropower is considered one of the oldest energy sources, 
hydropower in Hungary accounts for a very small share of the country's total energy mix 
(VARGA 2007). Nevertheless, the country's hydropower potential is significant, and it is no 
coincidence that the construction of large-scale hydropower capacity along the Danube - and 
to a lesser extent - the Tisza has been on the agenda for decades. In the following paper, we 
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look at the best known and most over-interpreted, politicised domestic investment; the Bős-
Nagymaros dam system, its political construction of meaning and its significant impact on 
policy thinking, outlined through the history of the construction of the dams. 
2. History of the Bős-Nagymaros Dam System 
The idea of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system has a very long history. (In our study, 
we will use the Hungarian name “Bős-Nagymaros” as we consider the two settlements as a 
symbolic political concept and not as a geographical name. It is important to note that while in 
the 1990s the term “Gabcikovo-Nagymaros” was used with preference in Hungarian 
professional writings and newspaper articles, today it has completely disappeared from the 
discourse.) As a direct antecedent, we can evaluate at the beginning of the 20th century, the 
idea arose that a dam system should be established on the Mosoni-Danube. The Treaty of 
Trianon also blocked this planning process. Substantial progress was made in the construction 
of the dam system in 1956 when the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
decided to examine the possibilities of using the Danube for energy purposes. It was agreed 
between Hungary and Czechoslovakia as early as 1963 that a joint investment program would 
be drawn up, but the final investment program, approved by a government decision by both 
parties, was only adopted in 1974 (based on MÁDL 1992). Subsequently, on 16 September 
1977, an international agreement on the implementation and operation of the Bős-Nagymaros 
Dam system was concluded between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic, promulgated in Hungary by Act No. 17 of 1978 (Legislative Decree) 
(BODNÁR 2000). 
According to the approved contracts, the purpose of the investment is the complex energy 
utilization of the affected Danube section; In Hungary, the Dunakiliti dam, a smaller part of 
the reservoir and the Nagymaros dam would have been built (based MÁDL 1992). The signed 
interstate treaty put Hungary on a forced track, the construction of the Bős-Nagymaros dam 
began. The deadline for completion was set by 1990 in the interstate treaty. It is important to 
note that the investment was initially supported by both the water management and energy, and 
even a large part of the geographical profession (HAJDÚ 1999). 
A few years after the signing of the intergovernmental agreement, both the Czechoslovak 
and Hungarian economies found themselves in a difficult situation (one of the main reasons for 
this was the 1979-1980 oil crisis - the price explosion). Its deadline is extended by 5 years, so 
it is amended to 1995 (based on MÁDL 1992). In order to accelerate the investment, both 
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technically and economically, Hungary took out an Austrian bank loan and entrusted much of 
the construction to Austrian Donauwerke AG, which has an extensive experience in the field 
of hydropower construction (BRAUN 2014).  
With the involvement of Donauwerke AG, the investment clearly intensified, so in the 
organization of the environmental movements that had already been organized in Hungary, a 
fierce social protest against the Bős-Nagymaros dam project began to unfold (based on MÁDL 
1992). 
3. Protests Against the Bős-Nagymaros Dam Project 
By the early 1980s, there was a growing debate in professional, scientific, and social 
circles as to whether the Bős-Nagymaros hydropower plant investment could cause serious 
environmental damage. Biologist János Vargha took the lead in this whole emerging protest 
professional block and started organizing professional discussions in the student clubs of 
several universities and colleges in Budapest, to which the experts of the National Water Office 
(Országos Vízügyi Hivatal - OVH) were regularly invited. According to many, fearing the 
failure of the discussions with János Vargha, OVH withdrew from the requests after a while 
and ordered a briefing in 1984 regarding the entire dam investment (FLEISCHER 1992). It is 
also important to mention that the foundations of these protest groups in Hungary in the early 
1980s could be laid by a network of new social movements in the capital and some larger rural 
towns (SZABÓ 1988). 
In 1984, social protests reached such a level that the Danube movement, which protested 
the investment, submitted a petition of 10,000 signatures to the Government of the Hungarian 
People's Republic demanding the immediate cessation of the Bős-Nagymaros dam project 
(FLEISCHER 1992). The Danube Movement was an organization uniting regional and national 
civil movements protesting dam construction, the best-known “member” of which was the 
Danube Circle, which organized János Vargha and several other experts around him. The 
Danube Circle was a so-called transitory team, denoting the type of social movement in which 
it is typically created by intellectuals with fewer but more enthusiastic and relatively large 
amounts of leisure time in order to organize a wider social protest (SZABÓ 1988). Thanks to 
the person(ality) of János Vargha, the Danube Circle was able to gain international recognition 
quickly. One of the most memorable moments was when in 1985 the organization received the 
Right Livelihood Award, also known as the alternative Nobel Prize (FLEISCHER 1992). 
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The circle of protesters against the Danube circle and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam 
system far outnumbered ecologically minded, environmentally friendly citizens. This was 
mainly due to the fact that the protest against the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system soon 
outgrew itself, as the case essentially advanced into a protest against the ruling elite and 
institutions of the entire Kádár regime, making it suitable for a very wide range of social 
mobilization. That the case of the dam system was apt to articulate the conflict between the 
political regime and society (SZABÓ 1999). 
As a sign of the softening of the political system, in 1988 it was already possible to hold 
open demonstrations without the participants or organizers being subjected to more serious 
police actions. Taking advantage of this, the Danube Circle organized several extremely 
successful demonstrations in the autumn of 1988. According to the reports of Népszabadság, 
20-25 thousand people took part in the demonstration on Vörösmarty Square on September 12, 
1988, and a few weeks later they managed to organize a demonstration at Kossuth Square, 
which moved 30,000 people. It is important to emphasize, however, that this extraordinary 
interest was no longer primarily about the case, these demonstrations were assessed by the 
participants as an anti-regime movement, the reports of contemporary newspapers also e.g., in 
connection with the demonstration on 12 September, the Magyar Nemzet emphasized that the 
rhymes most often heard at the demonstration demanded democracy. 
The petition, which was handed over to the President of the Hungarian Parliament in 
February 1989 and demanded the holding of a referendum, and which was signed by 140,000 
people, brought the result to the Hungarian Parliament, and put the issue of the dam system on 
the agenda. Finally, on 13 May 1989, the prime minister Miklós Németh decided to suspend 
the investment. 
With this step, the issue of the dam system seemed resolved to the Hungarian public, but 
in reality, it caused a great deal of foreign policy tension between Slovakia and Hungary, which 
were just now seeking independence. The debates around the dam system reached such a level 
by 1993 that it was already impossible to resolve the issue at the Hungarian-Slovak interstate 
level. Thus, in 1993, the governments of the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary 
appealed to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The International Court of Justice 
had to rule on such important issues as whether the Republic of Hungary had the right to 
unilaterally terminate the 1977 interstate treaty, not to build the power plant, and whether 
Czechoslovakia and the successor Slovak Republic had the right to operate the Gabcikovo 
power plant and divert the Danube at Cunovo. 
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The dispute was closed by the 1997 “Solomon” decision of the International Court of 
Justice, which ruled that Hungary had unilaterally terminated the 1976 interstate treaty, while 
the Slovak Republic had unlawfully diverted the Danube from Cunovo (NAGY 2014). 
4. Bős-Nagymaros as a Political Enemy 
In this case, Bős-Nagymaros appears as a moral and political enemy image, but these two 
characteristics cannot be separated (based on HORUCZI 1993). Moral enemy, which, on the 
one hand emphasizes the destruction of the environment, the destruction of natural life and its 
socio-economic consequences and on the other hand a political issue, that symbolized the 
future to be avoided and transcended as a violent, exaggerated, symbolic project on the brink 
of regime change. If the typification is carried out according to another aspect, the dam is both 
an external and an internal enemy - the Czechoslovak state's intervention in the Hungarian 
environment and the destructive activity of the Hungarian state - potential and current - as a 
horror of implementation - and similar party-political, ideologically based, all of which are the 
result of active actions and communication processes. It is abstract in this quality that narrows 
the protection of the environment, the values to be preserved for the future, into the specific 
dam project (based on SZABÓ 2006). 
In this, stereotyping and generalization - in the case of Hungary, the utilization of 
hydropower and the essence of Bős-Nagymaros - the establishment of various professional and 
social oppositions - artificiality and organicity, naturalness or destruction, efficiency - and the 
emotion where regime change its two sides, the overcoming of the world of state party plans 
and the petrified planned economy, and last but not least, the system-critical movements are at 
the centre of the discourse. simplification, personalization, and bipolarization simultaneously 
appear in the dam as a political enemy, simultaneously forming a framework for cognitive 
structures related to the dam and hydropower (based on EDELMAN 1998). 
The enlightenment techniques highlighted above have also become active shapers of 
political communication, channelling the direction of public discourse, diverting professional 
discourse where the problem of the political enemy depends on the political system as an 
environment, which can first stigmatize and then taboo the initiative, and later, policy decisions 
in the long run, as a result of which the issue is identified with a kind of pars pro toto argument, 
thus being treated together with the whole thematic discourse (SZABÓ et al. 2000). 
After the change of regime, the depressing issues of Bős-Nagymaros were not resolved 
even after the lawsuits in the Hague, and to this day they are part of the professional and social 
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discourse and heated debates on hydropower, land use and ecology. It took place within the 
framework of its social and opposition movements related to the dam, and in the framework of 
this it became an identity-forming and self-organizing force, in a word, "each concrete cube is 
a symbol" (DURAY 1987). However, the dam is far beyond our northern neighbour itself, as 
the first major, symbolic project of the newly independent republic in the early 1990s, so its 
political leaders consider it a matter of prestige. Finally, it should be noted that the process of 
politicization was coded into its system from the beginning; as János Vargha sums up „… the 
Danube dam system is a structure that its dreamers and beneficiaries could hardly have built 
without the conscious use and exploitation of the political implications of the investment and 
the Soviet-type political system, then the political overtones will appear” (VARGHA 1997, p. 
221; translated by the authors). 
5. Bős-Nagymaros as a Geopolitical Issue 
Based on the excellent source analysis of János VARGHA, the politicization of the dam 
was in the initiative from the very beginning, the far-reaching effects of which are still present 
in both political and professional discourse. Many believe that the movements organized to 
protect the Danube play a significant role in promoting regime change in Hungary, while in 
Slovakia the barrier is seen as a matter of prestige, in which, among other things, the direct 
involvement of the Hungarian minority plays a role. On the third hand, the European 
Commission, acting as a mediator between the two parties, set as a norm for the acceding 
countries that Hungary and Slovakia used the International Court of Justice in The Hague to 
resolve the conflict between them, noting that Hungary's argument building on its rules, it has 
failed to draw attention to one of the newest and most dynamically evolving areas of 
international law (based on VARGHA 1997; SZTANCS 2008). However, in a diplomatic 
matter that spans government cycles and political systems, neither party has actually been able 
to take meaningful action (HORVÁTH 2009; VARGHA 1997). 
The issue, which now dates back about a hundred years, has always been fundamentally 
political-geopolitical. At the beginning of the 20th century, the use of hydropower was closely 
linked to national politics. As far as it is known, it was believed that the establishment of 
hydropower plants in areas inhabited by nationalities would facilitate the assimilation processes 
by creating new centres for the Hungarian population. 
As part of this, they wanted to strengthen the Hungarian population in the region by 
diverting a part of the population of the Great Plain to the north, but the development of the 
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Danube waterway from a military point of view also appeared as an important argument during 
the First World War. 
Based on the principle of the unity of socialism, the formerly open geopolitical interests 
of the Hungarian People's Republic and Czechoslovakia, which came into the bloc from the 
1950s, came to the surface, where they assumed the same political character on both sides, 
completely taking into account the suggestions of working professionals. At the same time, it 
should be noted that environmental interests at that time still had very little influence on 
decisions, despite the fact that the case of the Rhine was already floating in the eyes of experts 
as an example to be avoided. In 1978, the year the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian interstate treaty 
on the Danube dam system came into force, when Hungarian television presented the film The 
Dying Rhine, and in 1979, Hungarian experts travelled to the Rhine to study the effects and 
consequences. Already at this time, the dam became a symbolic investment, in which 
ecological, but even broader economic aspects were relegated to the background in the 
centralized decision-making mechanism, which was characterized by the merging of public 
administration and industrial production. The central planning mechanism has often been 
extremely unreliable due to scientific constraints and conflicting information, as well as 
professional lobbying, in which, individual sectors have tried to carve out as much of the 
resources centrally allocated as possible due to megalomaniacal projects and proximity to 
power. Its design and construction were activities envied by many within the water profession. 
On the other hand, Woldemár LÁSZLÓFFY, the renowned hydrologist urged that water 
management should vigorously develop its relations with all branches of the natural sciences, 
but at the same time the spatial approach should prevail and examine the interaction of technical 
facilities and hydrological phenomena within a river basin (VARGHA 1997). 
The power balance of each sector was also influenced by subjective considerations. 
Hydropower parties, for example, have previously been able to successfully refer to the "Great 
Soviet Hydropower Plants", in which any criticism may have received a higher level of political 
influence. It had long urged the construction of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Danube dams in 
the Danube Commission, and the development of the waterway was primarily in the interest of 
the Soviet Union, as his ships transported most of the goods on this area of the Danube 
(VARGHA 1997). 
On the other hand, the basic idea that Czechoslovakia should be a Danube state is much 
older. The Czech national movement argued, among other things, for the unification of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, that this would provide a free path to the sea and connect Czechs 
surrounded by Germans with Slavic related peoples. The Danube border was a vital issue for 
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the Czechoslovak Republic, in which the unilateral claim to the right to exploit hydropower 
followed the French example, who, after occupying Alsace during the war and thus extending 
the country's border to the Rhine, demanded all the Rhine's hydropower (VARGHA 1997). 
From the Czechoslovak point of view, one of the most important gains was that the 
diversion of the Danube on the affected section fundamentally changes the nature of the 
Czechoslovak-Hungarian state border, which, although formally unchanged, essentially does. 
The Treaty of Trianon designated the Danube Shipping Main Line as the border between the 
two states on this section. With the construction of the side canal on the designated section of 
the Danube, the border will not be the main line of navigation of the river, but an irreversible 
river meandering in the middle of the abandoned riverbed. Thus, the bank of the Danube owned 
by the Hungarian state will be 31 kilometres shorter, while the section of the river under 
exclusively Czechoslovak sovereignty will increase by 25 kilometres (VARGHA 1997). 
Another political consequence of the side channel is that the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia is isolated from the Hungarian border in the affected section, and the economic 
sustaining power of the countryside decreases due to changing natural conditions, so they 
legally promote emigration on both sides (based on DURAY 1987). Compared to river 
hydropower, the construction of a side channel does not provide any significant energy, 
shipping, or flood protection benefits, but it exacerbates environmental damage and increases 
river maintenance costs. There were also dedicated Slovak interests in the construction of the 
dam within the Czechoslovak state, as these huge investments were financed by the federal 
government, so the Slovak government could have used roughly 40 billion crowns, mainly in 
the Czech-Moravian part, without the common coffers. that this would appear in the Slovak 
budget (DURAY 1987). 
The use of political arguments also plays an important role in the construction of dams 
on the common section of the Danube, instead of completing the river regulation previously 
planned and started and then abandoned, which could have fully met the needs of shipping. 
Politically indifferent river hydropower plants could never have been accepted by the water 
sector as opposed to the much more influential energy sector, because in that case the economic 
assessment would have been decisive.  
Political goals related to the construction of the side canal, which are roughly the same 





6. Long-term Consequences of Bős-Nagymaros 
The unresolved Bős-Nagymaros issue also left its mark on bilateral relations between the 
independent Slovak Republic and Hungary in the 1990s. One of the reasons for the 
fundamentally bad relationship was the situation of the Hungarians in Slovakia, and the other 
was the disputes over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system (MITROVITS 2013). Although 
we can now witness the consolidation of Slovak-Hungarian relations, the issue of the dam is 
still determining the possibilities of utilizing water energy in Hungary. Despite the fact that 
several of our domestic river sections could be suitable for the construction of smaller power 
plants, e.g., a power plant could be established at Adony and Fajsz as well, which would be 
suitable for generating 1TWh / year of electricity individually (MÉSZÁROS 2014). 
The biggest obstacle to the construction of hydropower plants in Hungary is still the case 
of the Nagymaros dam. The Hungarian professional groups are extremely divided on the issue, 
while the representatives of the water management profession basically believe that the 
utilization of water energy would be necessary in Hungary, and the Danube would be suitable 
for this, while environmental circles believe that the dam would cause unacceptable changes. 
Professional disputes between the two camps seem insoluble, and since the failure of the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system, with the exception of marginal political forces, no one in 
Hungary has dared to raise the issue of building additional dams. The main reasons for this, in 
our opinion, are the creation of a strong environmental lobby group who oppose similar 
investments, the prevention of the construction of the dam has become a symbolic cause of 
regime change, and the protest against the dam creates strong nostalgic feelings also in part 
(MÉSZÁROS 2014). 
Of course, the resentment of environmentalists is completely understandable, as to date 
we only have estimates of the damage caused to the flora and fauna of the Szigetköz by the 
Gabcikovo power plant and the diversion of the Danube at Cunovo. According to research led 
by Sándor Kerekes at the Corvinus University of Budapest, the value of natural capital in 
Szigetköz decreased by 800-1300 billion HUF at 1997 prices (KEREKES et al. 1998). 
7. Summary 
In the case of the dam, we can see a multi-layered, active use of symbols, which 
interweaves both the conflict and the issue of the utilization of hydropower. The clash of 
economic and social visions with ecological thinking has long thematized the issue of 
hydropower utilization, which today, once sustainability has come to the forefront, may once 
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again be the scene of heated debates. We believe that the issue of the dam was beyond itself in 
all political eras and as a result, its politicization was coded into it, as in the case of most large 
investments and international large investments. In the debates around the dam, the issue of 
hydropower utilization, landscaping, social and national politics, identity policy, military and 
defence policy, and countless layers of long-term development strategies and interstate 
cooperation collide in an arena. Most of the time, they shape the issue according to the current 
public and policy discourse, opening the debate towards the specific character, so we are sure 
that the issue of the dam will remain with us for a long time to come. 
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Expanding ecological rights and the effective dimension 
of political rhetoric 
Csendike SOMOGYVÁRI51 
Abstract 
Ecological inequality encompasses such matters as accessible fresh air, potable water, clean living spaces, 
and exposure to sunlight. In many places around the world, people, especially from lower income strata, are dying 
as a result of critical air pollution or working in physically dangerous, toxic environments. Introducing equal 
ecological rights is closely related to a better and more sustainable future. This paper seeks to answer the question 
of how expanding equal ecological rights may contribute to the efficacy of political rhetoric. In order to explore 
this question, the article presents a brief narrative review on the concept of performativity and ecological rights. 
Drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory on social inequality and symbolic violence, the paper presents a case 
study of the US Presidential Election of 2020 by analyzing statements related to ecological inequality of 
Presidential Candidate Joe Biden and President Donald Trump during the campaign period. The proposed 
methodology combines performance and discourse analysis with multimedia usage.  
Keywords: ecological inequality, political campaigns, performativity, sustainability 
1. Introduction 
As a result of global warming and overpopulation, the dilemma of a sustainable future is 
becoming an increasingly burning issue today. Narrative interpretations of what shall be 
considered as an effective socio-political action towards achieving this goal are heavily 
influencing our understanding of reality. In the second half of the twentieth century, language 
came into the spotlight as the Holy Grail of defining major crises such as social inequalities or 
state failures as many notable scholars from Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand de Saussure to 
Michael Foucault developed their own theories on linguistic structures and social relations. By 
the end of the century, the ultimate power of linguistic inventions has been called into question 
and the concept of performativity received an increasing attention. According to the 
interpretation of Karen BARAD (2003, p. 802) “a performative understanding of discursive 
practices challenges the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent 
preexisting things. Performativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything 
(including material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely a 
contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real.” 
The performative turn as a paradigmatic shift in the humanities and social sciences had a 
tremendous impact on such disciplines as linguistics, cultural studies, anthropology, 
ethnography, sociology, political science, and the relatively new discipline of performance 
studies. The concept of performativity infiltrated into complex theories in the post-modern era, 
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based on the idea of what we should call a performance. The concept is ultimately summoned 
to explain dynamic relations between social actors and their direct environment. 
Performance has two distinguished meanings that need to be taken into consideration: on 
the one hand, it is realized as an enactment out of conventional actions of daily life; and on the 
other hand, it could also be considered as a formal, public event which brings the meaning of 
public sphere into the discourse. In The Human Conditions, Hannah Arendt realizes public 
sphere as a space where different beings relate to each other and build up a common reality by 
speaking, and most importantly, by acting. Arendt has been inspired by the Aristotelian 
interpretation of public space and her theory of action revolved around distinguishing action 
(praxis) from fabrication. According to Arendt, the meaning of action is the articulation 
retrospectively given by narrators (ARENDT 1958). Following Pierre Bourdieu’s theory, these 
narratives are often interpreted by individuals in a dominant position who aim to impose their 
own cultural and symbolic products on the rest of society, thus playing a central role in the 
reproduction of the existing power relations (BOURDIEU 1989; CATTANI et al. 2014). 
Likewise Arendt, Bourdieu also relies on his own interpretation about the theory of action, 
which is based on the concept of “habitus,” defined as a socially constituted system of 
dispositions that orient “thoughts, perceptions, expressions, and actions” (BOURDIEU 1989). 
The concept of sustainability is a combination of ecological, economic, social, and 
institutional aspects of social development. Ecological inequality encompasses such matters as 
accessible fresh air, potable water, clean living spaces, and exposure to sunlight. In many 
places, people, especially from lower income strata, are dying as a result of critical air pollution 
or working in physically dangerous, toxic environments. Introducing equal ecological rights is 
closely related to a better and more sustainable future. This paper begins with the following 
observation: sustainability itself can be realized as a performative practice, thus the actions 
behind the words play a major role in interpreting the challenges we face. 
The paper is divided into four sections, including the introduction and conclusion. As the 
goal of this paper, I intend to reflect on the question how expanding equal ecological rights 
may contribute to political rhetoric. In order to explore this question, in the first section of the 
paper, I am proposing a brief narrative review on the concept of performativity and ecological 
rights. My aim is to highlight that despite becoming an increasingly important factor in the 
context of social development, thus playing a gradually important role in today’s political 
discourse, providing equal ecological rights are still reduced to empty promises in the absence 
of meaningful actions –even though at least these so-called empty words can create attention 
to the problem. In the second section of the paper, drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory on 
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social inequality and symbolic violence, I present a case study on the US Presidential Election 
of 2020 by analyzing statements related to ecological inequality of Presidential Candidate Joe 
Biden and President Donald Trump during the campaign period of 2020. The proposed 
methodology combines performance and discourse analysis with multimedia usage. In 
response to Bourdieu’s theory that claims, naturalized inequalities cannot be seen as problems 
to be solved, but as obvious facts of everyday life (KOOPMANS – DUYVENDAK 1995); I 
argue that advocating change on behalf of the dominated group is the only sufficient way to 
denaturalize social inequalities; but in special situations of the political sphere, such as for 
example in election campaign periods, the denaturalization of naturalized social inequalities 
can take place through the representations of actions by the actual dominant group who control 
the system in order to get as many votes as possible. Thus, these members of the dominant 
group, even if only temporarily, may advertise narratives that can lead to denaturalizing 
existing social inequalities. The accepted social order –although under external pressure, which 
in this case is the maximalization of votes– is ultimately shaped according to the interest of the 
dominant group in such a way that it can be favorable to the dominated group as well. 
Being aware of the complexity of this issue, the research has its own limitations. Using 
critical performativity in establishing social theories may disregard the fact that even though 
performativity and performance are both based on the word “to perform” which could be 
interpreted as “to act”, the two concepts are not the same. Performativity in social sciences 
relies heavily on linguistic explanations of the term, ignoring major characteristics of the 
theatrical performance itself. However, theatricalization of politics provides not only potential 
for understanding power relations and inequalities of the public sphere but also subjectivity 
concerning the question. As for the case study used in the research, due to the size requirements 
of the research, I do not have the capacity to reflect on the whole pool of political statements 
related to the environmental inequality, therefore this aspect of the research also carries with it 
the possibility of subjectivity. Reflecting on Bourdieu's theory, one cannot ignore the 
distinction between fabrication and action of the Arendtian philosophy. What is said in a 
political campaign, and what is realized from what has been said, therefore to what extent the 
actual denaturalization of social inequality could be measured in practice, requires further 
research. 
2. Performativity and environmental inequality 
In this section I intend to present why action matters in resolving such social issues as 
environmental inequality. The concept of performativity is feeding from the power of language 
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to effect change in the world: language does not simply describe social relations but may 
function as a form of social action. The concept of performative language was first developed 
by John L. Austin who suggested that there is a difference between constative language, which 
describes the relations in the public sphere, and performative language, which creates action in 
the social realm. For Austin, performative language included speech acts such as promising, 
swearing, betting, or performing a formal ceremony, signing declarations and so on. Austin 
claimed that a number of conditions must be met in order for such utterances to function 
performatively (AUSTIN 1962). 
Other notable scholars have redefined these basic insights to explore the various ways in 
which language can do things in the world. Most notably, Judith Butler developed the concept 
of performativity to describe how the concept of gender is constructed in the 1990s. Butler 
stressed out that gender is a socially constructed process, which is based on a number of 
constant performative acts (BUTLER 1990). Performativity, indeed, is the process of subject 
creation, which describes and occurs through linguistic means, as well as via other social 
practices. As a result of Butler’s original theory, the concept of performativity has been richly 
explored in anthropological studies of gender and sexuality and infiltrated into other disciplines 
as well. 
For example, scholars of ritual have also used the concept of performative action and 
performativity very productively, looking at how rituals work performatively. Resistance 
studies, that also relies heavily on the importance of action, also became increasingly interested 
in the concept of performativity. Social performances and practices have been also analyzed 
from a performative viewpoint. In the late 1990s, many researches were conducted to highlight 
that economies began to consider economic performativity, or how the practices of economists 
and other financial experts were not simply descriptive of their subject but also served to shape 
it. A number of challenges and issues have characterized theoretical debates about performative 
language and performativity. These include the role of actors’ intentions and issues of agency, 
the importance of context, the iterability or repeated versus spontaneous nature of performative 
action, and the effects of social roles and distributions of power across participants. 
As for environmental studies, for example the concept of performative environmentalism 
has also gained a significant attention. On one hand, environmental activists use performance 
to express their pain of living in a polluted region, which can also be connected to the discipline 
of resistance studies. However, only a limited number of researches have been conducted on 
performative and performance-based relationships to justice and especially on environmental 
injustice, despite its great potential (JAMAL – HALES 2016). Performative environmentalism 
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also includes a personalized practice on fighting against climate change as it serves to 
encourage all members of the society individually to act in order to promote a more sustainable 
future. However, environmental rights which are proclamations of a human right to 
environmental conditions of a specified quality, are also having performative aspects. Human 
rights and the environment are merged; human rights cannot be fulfilled without a clean and 
healthy environment; and sustainable environmental governance cannot exist without the 
establishment of and respect for human rights. In 1948, the promise itself that was declared 
through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a performative act. However, the 
performative act of signing the Declaration failed to solve all the issues we are facing today. 
Without the concrete action even performative acts can be empty words, although, these words 
can actually help to promote action to become alive through narratives. 
3. Ecological rights and political rhetoric 
Addressing environmental inequalities and injustice played a major role in the 2020 U.S. 
presidential campaign. As racism and social inequalities gained more media exposure as a 
result of the movements following the assassination of George Floyd, these issues became hot 
in shaping the campaign strategy of the two parties. In many US cities, people, especially from 
lower income strata, are dying as a result of critical air pollution or working in physically 
dangerous, toxic environments. A predicted 70% of toxic environments are located in low-
income neighborhoods, and an upwards of 2 million Americans live within a mile of sites that 
are vulnerable to flooding, and the fact that the majority of these are inhabited by colored 
communities makes environmental injustice not only an issue of social inequality but an issue 
of systematic racism. A 2018 study conducted by the EPA showed that at the national, state, 
and county levels, non-white Americans are disproportionately burdened by particulate matter 
or air pollution consisting of automobile fumes, smog, soot, oil smoke, ash, and construction 
dust (COLAROSSI 2020). 
In this case study, I have analyzed 15 statements on environmental injustice made by 
Presidential Candidate Joe Biden and President Donald Trump from July 2020 to October 
2020. The transcripts of the speeches and remarks including multimedia materials –such as 
videos, or social media posts are available on the official archive of the White House and on 
the multimedia converter site of Rev.com. Since it is a great number of statements, I do not 
present all the statements in a complete, cursive form, but the table created for this purpose 
contains a summary of all the texts that were analyzed (see Appendix). I find the most crucial 
materials to be the actual presidential debates, which are by nature different from pre-written 
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speeches and pre-arranged interviews. As opposed to traditional discourse analysis I do not 
only reflect on what has been said on a textual level, but I divide the analysis into two sections, 
in the first part I am only concentrating on the textual facts such as 1) during the statement, 
how many times environmental inequality has been mentioned?; 2.) what is the exact context 
of environmental inequality in the text?; and 3.) what kind of narrative the text conveyed on 
the topic? In the second section I am analyzing the actual performative interpretation of the 
statements by highlighting the dilemma around the question of action and representation. I 
assume that promoting equal ecological rights do have a positive effect on the efficacy of the 
political rhetoric and by that has a denaturizing effect on the environmental inequality. 
In case of the presidential debates, the first one was moderated by Chris Wallace of Fox 
News on September 29, 2020 in Cleveland, Ohio. Environmental injustice was mentioned five 
times explicitly during the discourse, first time at 36:50 by Candidate Joe Biden referring to 
“[President Trump’s] His failure to deal with the environment, [suburbs) are being flooded, 
they’re being burned out because his refusal to do anything”. At 48:50, Moderator Wallace 
brought climate change into question again, addressing President Trump to pull the US out of 
the Paris Climate Accord, and have rolled back a number of Obama Environmental records. 
According to President Trump’s strategy, he claimed “I want crystal clean water and air. I 
want beautiful clean air. We have now the lowest carbon… If you look at our numbers right 
now, we are doing phenomenally. But I haven’t destroyed our businesses”. In this section, 
President Trump rather reflected on forest management (50:32), energy prices (51:35), and 
automotive industry (52:08), while his opponent proposed expanding the opportunities of green 
jobs (52:34), zero none admission of greenhouse gases (53:03). From 55:39, the fierce tempers 
of the debaters make it difficult to interpret the text, since both of them are unable to complete 
their sentences. Until 59:24, the topic was merely about the Green New Deal plan which also 
generated heavy fights between the candidates. In the final debate moderated by Kristen 
Welker of NBC News on October 22, 2020 in Nashville, Tennessee, environmental issues 
appeared seven times explicitly. At 12:41, Moderator Welker addressed the debaters by saying 
“President Trump, you say that environmental regulations have hurt jobs in the energy sector, 
Vice President Biden, you have said you see addressing climate change as an opportunity to 
create new jobs.” President Trump reflected on the question by highlighted the Paris Accords 
that “treated [the US] very unfairly” (13:08), claiming that “[The Trump administration] has 
done an incredible job environmentally, we have the cleanest air, the cleanest water, and the 
best carbon emission standards that we’ve seen in many, many years”. (14:03) “And we 
haven’t destroyed our industries”. (14:41). Presidential Candidate Biden, on the other hand 
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mentioned that “Climate change, global warming is an existential threat to humanity” (14:47) 
and his plan “will create millions of new good paying jobs” (16:03). President Trump reacted 
by saying “[Joe Biden’s] plan is an economic disaster (16:42). Until 20:59, the debate became 
as turbulent as the first time, while the topic was still on the environmental issues. 
According to the database of Rev. com, from 15 January 2020 to 20 January 2021, by and 
large, 432 speeches, interviews and statements have been released by party members, 
candidates and advocates of both the Republican and Democratic party. Out of 432 speeches I 
only concentrated on those which made by either Presidential Candidate Joe Biden or President 
Donald Trump. Since I only analyzed speeches from July 2020 to October 2020, made by the 
two opponents, I experienced a shift from environmental issues to the current COVID-19 
pandemic management, which means between the two Presidential Debates, the focus was on 
the pandemic, and much less on environmental inequalities. As opposed to my initial belief in 
the analyzed texts, President Donald Trump referred two times higher on environmental issues, 
however, the context was closely related to the economic aspect of environmentalism, and in 
many cases the term had a rather negative connotation. President Candidate Joe Biden, on the 
other hand, made it clear that reflecting on environmental inequality was a great part of his 
agenda by not only addressing climate change itself, but fighting against environmental 
injustice with action – introducing the Biden-plan. Since environmentalism has always been 
more of a left-wing topic, it is not surprising that it has a great importance in the agenda of the 
Democratic party. 
However, these two debates can be analyzed not only in a contextual form, but with the 
help of performance analysis, we can consider these debates as public, formal events. 
Therefore, in this context, the performers –President Trump and President Candidate Joe 
Biden– not only used their speech to create an effect on the viewers. Relying on Austin’s theory 
on performativity, what Austin calls constative utterances, might be such statement as “It’s a 
sunny day,” or “I went shopping” which are perlocutionary acts; thus, by saying “I went 
shopping,” I am not doing it, I am merely reporting an occurrence (SALIH 2006). The problem 
of perlocutionary acts is that language does not carry the actual action, therefore the possibility 
of change, but rather manifesting as a representation of the action. This sense of representation 
does not equal to the representationalist belief that language refers to preexisting conditions, 
but as in the theatrical terminology, it is portraying a certain behavior. Giving the fact that the 
viewer has their own perceptions about the world in case of a Presidential Debate, likewise in 
the theater, the viewer will identify with whom they share views. 
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For Bourdieu, neo-liberalism is deeply rooted in numerous types of symbolic violence. 
The moment when the dominant group force their views on the oppressed group to maintain 
the existing social order, symbolic violence occurs immediately. In his research, Bourdieu’s 
theory did not feed from merely rational action theory. According to Bourdieu, the stability 
that the habitus communicates with the social world is closely related to the process of 
naturalization of the public space and of the state of social domination that characterizes it. 
Therefore, the most prominent part of his research relies on structures. Domination, in 
Bourdieu’s framework, emerges through the obligation of specific subjectivities on objective 
dispositions, naturalizing social domination and its reproduction. Social denaturalization 
dissolves the symbolic violence, contributing to the autonomy of social agents. Bourdieu 
claimed that the reproduction of domination works through many channels, one of them being 
the emotional aspect of the habitus. The hierarchical order of the society and its boundaries are 
partly grounded in bodily emotions, including shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety and guilt 
(BOURDIEU 1984). In this sense, Bourdieu’s theory on body could be easily matched to Judith 
Butler’s performativity. 
I argue that advocating change on behalf of the dominated group is the only sufficient 
way to denaturalize social inequalities; but in special situations of the political sphere, such as 
for example in election campaign periods, the denaturalization of naturalized social inequalities 
can take place through the representation of actions by the actual dominant group who control 
the system in order to get as many votes as possible. Thus, representatives of the dominant 
group, even if only temporarily, may advertise narratives that can lead to denaturalizing 
existing social inequalities. The accepted social order –although under external pressure, which 
in this case is the maximalization of votes– is ultimately shaped according to the interest of the 
dominant group in such a way that it can be favorable to the dominated group as well. 
According to the case study I have made, the Presidential Debates of 2020, promoting 
environmental equality and expanding ecological rights, even if it is just a representation of 
action, has denaturalizing effects on environmental inequality, since it builds a narrative around 
the issue. The way of naturalizing social inequality is to be silent about it. However, the concept 
of performativity operates with real action, even the flawed representation of the action could 
be sufficient to create a narrative that draws attention to the seriousness of the problem and 
thus can lead to the real action that denaturalizes social inequality. Although, it is important to 
mention that the use of Bourdieu’s symbolic violence could also be excellently illustrated in 
the case study outlined, as both debaters stressed the need to maintain the existing economic 
order, which, however, does not bridge the gap between real social inequalities. As for my pre-
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existing research question of how expanding ecological rights may contribute to the efficacy 
of political rhetoric was well demonstrated by this case study as during the campaign period 
and especially in the two Presidential Debates the discourse on environmental inequalities not 
only was significant, but according to many analysis one of the most important factors during 
the election campaign period which shifted towards the COVID-19 crisis management during 
the final months of the campaign. 
4. Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to reflect on the question how expanding equal ecological 
rights may contribute to political rhetoric. In order to explore this question, in the first section 
of the paper, I proposed a brief narrative review on the concept of performativity and ecological 
rights. My aim was to highlight that despite becoming an increasingly important factor in the 
context of social development, thus playing a gradually important role in today’s political 
discourse, providing equal ecological rights is still reduced to empty promises in the absence 
of meaningful actions. The concept of performativity is feeding from the power of language to 
effect change in the world: language does not simply describe social relations but may function 
as a form of social action. 
In the second section of the paper, drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory on social 
inequality and symbolic violence, I present a case study on the US Presidential Election of 
2020 by analyzing statements related to ecological inequality of Presidential Candidate Joe 
Biden and President Donald Trump during the campaign period of 2020. The proposed 
methodology combines performance and discourse analysis with multimedia usage. In 
response to Bourdieu’s theory that claims, naturalized inequalities cannot be seen as problems 
to be solved, but as obvious facts of everyday life (KOOPMANS – DUYVENDAK 1995) I 
argued that advocating change on behalf of the dominated group is the only sufficient way to 
denaturalize social inequalities; but in special situations of the political sphere, such as for 
example in election campaign periods, the denaturalization of naturalized social inequalities 
can take place through the representations of actions by actual dominant group who control the 
system in order to get as many votes as possible. Thus, representatives of the dominant group, 
even if only temporarily, may advertise narratives that can lead to denaturalizing existing social 
inequalities. The accepted social order –although under external pressure, which in this case is 
the maximalization of votes– is ultimately shaped according to the interest of the dominant 
group in such a way that it can be favorable to the dominated group as well. 
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In this case study, I have analyzed 15 statements on environmental injustice made by 
Presidential Candidate Joe Biden and President Donald Trump from July 2020 to October 
2020. The transcripts of the speeches and remarks including multimedia materials –such as 
videos, or social media posts are available on the official archive of the White House and on 
the multimedia converter site of Rev.com. According to the database of Rev. com, from 15 
January 2020 to 20 January 2021, by and large, 432 speeches, interviews and statements have 
been released by party members, candidates and advocates of both the Republican and 
Democratic party. Out of 432 speeches I only concentrated on those which were made by either 
Presidential Candidate Joe Biden or President Donald Trump. 
Since I only analyzed speeches from July 2020 to October 2020, made by the two 
opponents, I experienced a shift from environmental issues to the current COVID-19 pandemic 
management, which means between the two Presidential Debates, the focus was rather on the 
pandemic, and much less on environmental inequalities. As opposed to my initial belief in the 
analyzed texts, President Donald Trump referred two times higher on environmental issues, 
however, the context was closely related to the economic aspect of environmentalism, and in 
many cases the term had a rather negative connotation. President Candidate Joe Biden, on the 
other hand, made it clear that reflecting on environmental inequality is a great part of his agenda 
by not only addressing climate change itself, but fighting against environmental injustice with 
action – introducing the Biden-plan. However, these two debates can be analyzed not only in a 
contextual form, but with the help of performance analysis, we can consider these debates as 
public, formal events. Therefore, in this context, the performers –President Trump and 
President Candidate Joe Biden– not only used their speech to create an effect on the viewers. 
Referring to Bourdieu’s theory on symbolic violence, according to the case study I have made, 
the Presidential Debates of 2020, promoting environmental equality and expanding ecological 
rights, even if it is just a representation of action, has denaturalizing effects on environmental 
inequality, since it builds a narrative around the issue. The way of naturalizing social inequality 
is to be silent about it. However, the concept of performativity operates with real action, even 
the flawed representation of the action could be sufficient to create a narrative that draws 
attention to the seriousness of the problem and thus can lead to the real action that denaturalize 
social inequality. Although, it is important to mention that the use of Bourdieu’s symbolic 
violence could also be excellently illustrated in the case study outlined, as both debaters 
stressed the need to maintain the existing economic order, which, however, does not bridge the 
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6. Appendix 
Summary of all the texts that were analyzed. 
Date Name Number of referring directly to 
environmental equality 
2020.07.14 Joe Biden Clean Energy Plan Speech Transcript July 14 6 
2020.07.16 Donald Trump Speech Transcript on Rolling Back 
Environmental Regulations 
9 
2020.07.21 Donald Trump Tulsa, Oklahoma Rally Speech Transcript 3 
2020.07.28 Joe Biden Racial Equity Plan Speech Transcript July 28 2 
2020.08.06 Joe Biden Interview Transcript August 6: Compares Black and 
Latino Diversity & Faces Criticism 
1 
2020.08.17 Donald Trump Speech Transcript Minnesota August 17 4 
2020.08.21 Joe Biden 2020 DNC Speech Transcript 1 
2020.09.03 Donald Trump Latrobe, Pennsylvania Rally Speech Transcript 
September 3 
1 
2020.09.08 Donald Trump Speech in Jupiter, Florida Transcript 
September 8: Environmental Accomplishments 
16 
2020.09.14 Joe Biden Climate Change Speech Transcript in Wilmington, 
Delaware September 14 
5 
2020.09.16 Donald Trump ABC News Town Hall Transcript with George 
Stephanopoulos in Philadelphia 
1 
2020.09.20 Joe Biden Philadelphia Speech Transcript Sept. 20: Accuses 
Trump & Republicans of Abuse of Power Over SCOTUS 
2 
2020.09.23 Joe Biden Racial Equity Discussion Transcript September 23 1 
2020.09.29 Donald Trump & Joe Biden 1st Presidential Debate Transcript 
2020 
5 
2020.10.22 Donald Trump & Joe Biden Final Presidential Debate 
Transcript 2020 
7 
Environmental issues in Joe Biden's Speeches 18 
























Indonesia's Foreign Policy in Energy Security Issues 
Donie KADEWANDANA52 
Abstract 
Energy security is still one of the international security issues and part of countries' foreign policy. Energy 
sources are considered an important part of national economic growth and global market products and have a very 
strategic value for the interests of national and international security policies. The purpose of energy security is to 
secure a country's energy supply and demand. To fulfill this, strategic efforts are needed in dealing with energy 
problems, both at the national and international levels. The study results show that based on the principle of a free 
and active foreign policy, the Indonesian government has built international energy partnerships and cooperation 
through various international forums and institutions. Through these various collaborations, Indonesia has a 
unique opportunity to take advantage of technology transfer, capacity building, and investment. However, it seems 
that Indonesia has not optimized all the opportunities that exist. In addition, there is still no institutionalization of 
international energy security policies at the level of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Energy security 
in the international arena is a strategic issue that Indonesia’s foreign policy needs to focus on in order to build 
total diplomacy. It is hoped that the country will no longer depend solely on diplomats' ability in global diplomacy 
forums. Indonesian citizens and other stakeholders, both at home and abroad, can also contribute to the image of 
the Indonesian nation in the international arena. By increasing diplomatic activities involving many stakeholders, 
it is hoped that Indonesia's energy diplomacy efforts will run more effectively and have a wider and more 
significant impact in the international arena. 
Keywords: Foreign policy, energy security, energy policy, diplomacy 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, energy security is still one of the national and international problems of 
countries around the world. Energy sources have a very strategic value in terms of national and 
international security. Massive industrialization and global population growth require 
substantial energy resources to operate power plants, various modes of transportation, and 
industry. 
Under these conditions, cooperation between countries in securing energy sources is 
crucial, especially industrialized countries that are highly dependent on countries that produce 
energy sources. At the same time, energy dependence also leads to opportunities and risks for 
competition and conflict between countries in obtaining energy supplies. Therefore, a country's 
energy security policy should involve diplomacy between countries because energy security in 
foreign policy emphasizes strategic political economy and political security relations, both at 
the domestic and international levels. 
So far, the Indonesian government's attention to the energy sector is still oriented towards 
energy management at the domestic level. At the same time, its attention to foreign policy is 
still not optimal. Indonesia should have played a significant role at the international level 
because Indonesia has abundant natural resources, especially oil, natural gas and coal. 
 
52 Corvinus University of Budapest, Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science, PhD 
Student, donie.kadewandana@stud.uni-corvinus.hu  
131 
 
Indonesia has enormous potential in energy, oil reserves of 9 billion barrels with a production 
capacity of 500 million barrels per year, gas reserves of 182 trillion cubic feet with a production 
capacity of three trillion cubic feet per year, and coal reserves of 19.3 billion tonnes with a 
capacity production of 130 million tonnes per year (PRASETYONO 2008). 
In this context, the Indonesian government has not seen energy as a strategic commodity, 
which is an important issue in foreign policy that can support Indonesian diplomacy's 
effectiveness and optimization, both at the regional and international levels. This condition is 
evident from the weak institutionalization process of energy security policies in government 
institutions at the forefront of Indonesian diplomacy. The government has also not encouraged 
the progress of national and private energy companies and other stakeholders to become players 
in regional and international energy markets (ALAMI 2015). As part of the effort to look at the 
energy security side, this study places energy security as an important issue. This needs to be 
of concern for Indonesia's foreign policy and diplomacy. This chapter will analyze Indonesia's 
foreign policy in energy security issues. 
2. Energy Situation in Indonesia 
2.1. Indonesian Energy Sources Production Conditions 
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. In 2020, the population is 
270.20 million people (BPS 2020), with 80 percent concentrated in Java, Bali and Madura (IAE 
2018). Indonesia, in reality, is abundant in natural resources, as evidenced by its vast oil, natural 
gas, and coal deposits and lifting. However, given the country's vast population, Indonesia's 
energy resources are not as great as they appear, as oil, natural gas, and coal reserves are 
depleting and will likely not last for more than 40 years, unless new proven energy resources 
are discovered (IBRAHIM 2006). 
Indonesia is a crude oil exporter as well as a crude oil importer. It is the first in East Asia 
among natural gas exporting countries, third globally among coal exporting countries, and first 
in Southeast Asia among oil importing countries. Despite this, the number of confirmed oil 
reserves and lifting is decreasing (KURTUBI 2011). 
Like other emerging markets, Indonesia's energy consumption has also experienced a 
rapid increase. Data shows that Indonesia's energy consumption percentage increased by an 
average of 2.6% per year from 99 Mtoe in 1990 to 240 Mtoe in 2017. Indonesia's primary 
energy consumption has steadily increased, from 0.71 tons of oil equivalent (toe)/capita in 2010 
to 0.76 toe/capita in 2015 or growing by 1.5% per year. This trend is projected to continue to 
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increase and requires the government to prepare related policies to ensure energy supply meets 
domestic needs (WINANTI et al. 2020). 
Despite being a country that produces various forms of energy sources, Indonesia relies 
in particular for most of its energy fulfilment on fossil energy sources, such as oil, natural gas, 
and coal. According to data from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 91.45 percent 
of Indonesia's energy needs in 2018 were supplied from fossil energy sources. This degree of 
dependence on fossil energy sources is expected to continue to increase. However, in recent 
years, the Indonesian government has begun to push for a shift towards meeting energy needs 
from renewable energy sources (KEMENTERIAN ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA 
MINERAL 2018). 
2.2. Energy situation: crude oil, natural gas, coal and new and renewable energy 
Indonesia's petroleum resources can be said to be very limited and have been widely 
used. According to data from the SKK MIGAS annual report (2016), for example, it shows that 
92.1% of total reserves have been utilized. In particular, Indonesia's petroleum reserves in 2016 
were 7,251.11 million stock tank barrels (MSTB), or decreased by 0.74% compared to the 
previous year. The current oil production is 338 million barrels per year. Considering the 
existing, proven oil reserves, it is estimated that proven oil reserves will be exhausted within 
the next nine years. 
In the past, Indonesia was known as one of the largest producers of fossil fuel energy in 
the world, especially oil. However, this condition has changed along with the declining 
capacity of oil production and the increasing need for petroleum consumption in the form of 
fuel oil (Bahan Bakar Minyak/BBM). Since 2004, Indonesia has even been known as a net oil 
importer; in aggregate, the government must import petroleum to cover domestic energy needs 
(especially in fuel) (PWC INDONESIA 2018). EIA (2014) noted that Indonesia imports more 
than 441,000 barrels/day of oil. Most of these imports come from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and 
Azerbaijan. In a smaller percentage, several other countries are also sources of Indonesia's 
petroleum imports, namely Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Brunei Darussalam, and 
Angola. This need to import oil is closely related to the lack of oil refinery capacity in 
Indonesia. As a result, most of the imports are in the form of gasoline for vehicles, gasoil for 
power plants, liquid petroleum gas (LPG) for households, alternative fuels for aircraft 
(AFTUR), and diesel for vehicles and engines. 
Interestingly, Indonesia continues to export petroleum even though it has become a net 
importer of total oil. This is due to the need to maintain market access and state revenue from 
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oil production. In 2014, EIA reported that Indonesia's oil exports reached 381,000 barrels/day, 
and most of these exports were destined for countries in the region, such as Japan, Australia, 
Thailand, and China. However, oil exports are projected to continue to decline until reserves 
are exhausted by 2035. On the other hand, petroleum imports are projected to continue to 
increase to meet Indonesia's energy needs. BPPT data (2018) shows that oil fuel imports 
reached 22.9 kiloliters (KL) in 2016 and will increase by 6.3% growth per year to 182.3 million 
KL in 2050 (EIA 2014). 
Like oil, natural gas reserves also decreased compared to 2017 by 5.04% (BPPT 2018). 
Nevertheless, Indonesia's natural gas reserves can be categorized as still quite significant. In 
2015, EIA noted that Indonesia had natural gas reserves of 103.4 trillion cubic feet (tcf), and 
with this amount, Indonesia ranks13th largest in terms of natural gas reserves in the world and 
the second largest in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Based on SKK MIGAS (2016) records only 34.5% of total natural gas reserves have been 
produced, implying that the opportunity for natural gas production is bigger than for oil. 
Nevertheless, there is a trend for a rising consumption of natural gas in Indonesia. EIA notes 
that domestic demand for natural gas has doubled since 2005. This makes it likely that gas 
exports will decrease in the future. 
Indonesia's total coal resources up to 2015 were estimated at 127 billion tons, of which 
an estimated 32.3 billion tons were proven coal reserves (DITJEN MINERBA ESDM 2015). 
The majority of these coal reserves are characterized as low to medium rank (i.e. calorific 
value) and are mostly sourced on the islands of Sumatra (50 per cent) and Kalimantan (49.5 
per cent), while the rest are scattered on other islands. 
National coal production is projected to continue to increase. Although initially intended 
as an export commodity, national coal production has gradually led to meeting domestic needs, 
especially to meeting the needs of steam power plants (PLTU) and several industries, such as 
cement, textiles, steel, etc. It was recorded that in 2016, the share of Indonesian coal production 
exported was 79% and this is projected to continue to decline to 9% by 2050. At the same time, 
imports of certain types of coal needed by industry are projected to increase from 4 million 
tonnes in 2016 to 11 million tonnes by 2050 (DITJEN MINERBA ESDM 2015). 
Indonesia's potential for new and renewable energy (NRE) is quite large and consists of 
various sources. However, the potential of these various NRE sources has not been optimally 
harnessed due to various constraints such as geographical location and very high investment 
costs. Currently, the use of renewable energy is dominated by hydropower, especially in 
hydroelectric power plants (PLTA). In addition, other sources of NRE that are produced in 
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limited quantities are biomass, geothermal, and biodiesel. On the other hand, the development 
and utilization of other renewable energy sources such as solar energy, wind, uranium, ocean 
waves, and tides are still very limited in Indonesia (DITJEN EBTKE 2016). 
2.3. Energy Consumption Projection Map 
Along with Indonesia's economic and population growth, demand for national energy is 
also projected to increase. The projection of domestic energy growth from 2016-2050 shows 
that final energy demand will increase by 5.3% per year. This will manifest itself in an increase 
in energy demand from 795 million barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) in 2016 to 4,569 million 
BOE in 2050. By 2050, the largest form of final energy consumption by energy source will be 
fuel, at 40.1%, followed by electricity at 21.3%, gas at 17.7%, coal at 11.0%, and the remaining 
LPG, biofuels (BBN), and biomass at each below 4% (BPPT 2018). 
When viewed in terms of energy utilization by sector, data from the Handbook of Energy 
and Economic Statistics of Indonesia (2018) indicated that the industrial sector ranked as the 
highest energy-absorbing sector in 2008, with a consumption of 320,302,447 BOE. However, 
the pattern of energy consumption in this sector fluctuated with a relatively small upward trend. 
In 2018, the industrial sector only absorbed 334,446,969 BOE. This stands in contrast with the 
transportation sector, which in 2008 contributed to the energy consumption of 185,668,882 
BOE, experiencing a significant increase in 2018 to reach 391,397,487 BOE.  This made it the 
largest contributor to Indonesia's energy consumption sector, beating the industrial sector. In 
addition, the household sector always ranks third, and the commercial sector ranks fourth in 
terms of Indonesia's energy consumption (KEMENTERIAN ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA 
MINERAL 2018). 
3. Energy Security in a Global Constellation 
In the global context, energy security has become an issue and agenda for the foreign 
policy of world countries. Energy is not only seen as an important component for national 
economic growth and international commodity markets but also has strategic value for national 
and international security policies. Securitization of energy issues raises the concept of energy 
security. Burgess, an American physician and politician, said that currently, energy has become 
a central dimension in formulating security policies. Whenever there is a fluctuation in world 
oil prices and related regional instability, such as conflicts or disruptions to distribution 
channels, it is always a concern of developed industrial consuming countries. These countries 
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carry out strategic calculations to secure oil supplies even with the use of military force, if 
necessary. Therefore, energy and its availability and access are vital objects to be secured by 
using various resources owned by countries in the world (SYNDER 2008). 
Conceptually, DEESE defines energy security as a condition in which a country feels a 
high probability that it will have an adequate supply of energy, both traditional and non-
traditional, at affordable prices. DEESE emphasized that the safe condition in this energy issue 
is a guarantee of energy sources, distribution channels, and price stability (DEESE 1980). 
International Energy Agency data shows a significant increase in world energy 
consumption since the beginning of 1990 and is projected to increase until 2040. Data shows 
an increase in world energy consumption by around 62%, from 8,761 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (Mtoe) in 1990 to 14,126 Mtoe in 2018. The energy needs are mostly met from non-
renewable energy sources such as oil, natural gas, and coal (EIA 2010). 
When mapped from these global data, the level of energy consumption of non-OECD 
countries contributed more and experienced a relatively high increase compared to the OECD 
countries' level of energy consumption. In 2016 the energy consumption of non-OECD 
countries stood at 230.8 quads and is projected to increase significantly to reach 400.1 quads 
in 2030 (see Figure 10) (STATISTA 2013).53 
Among non-OECD countries, China and India experienced the highest levels of 
consumption. In 1990, their consumption level reached 10% of total world consumption and 
increased by 20% in 2007 (EIA 2010). China and India are the largest consuming countries 
and the first to be the most ambitious in developing energy diversification types and sources. 
4. Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in Energy Security 
Like other countries in the world, Indonesia also faces the same problem related to the 
increasing demand for energy amidst limited energy sources available. Until now, oil, natural 
gas and coal are still the primary sources of fossil energy in almost all countries. In the long 
term, the increasing demand will be difficult to fulfil from limited fossil energy sources, due to 
to climate-related problems. Therefore, efforts to seek renewable energy sources are growing 
and encouraging the emergence of energy security policies in various countries. 
 
53 The OECD's members are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 




Figure 10: Comparison of predicted increase in energy consumption between OECD and non-OECD countries 
in 2006-2030 [unit: in quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTU)] (Note: “Nicht-OECD” in chart needs to be 
translated: “Non-OECD”) 
Source: Statista 2013 https://www.statista.com/statistics/263991/energy-consumption-in-oecd-and-non-oecd-
countries-until -2030/ 
 
According to the US Energy Information Administration, in 2018 Indonesia was the 9th 
largest energy-consuming country in the world and the largest among ASEAN member 
countries (EIA 2018). Data shows that the percentage of Indonesia's energy consumption 
increased by an average of 2.6% per year from 99 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent) in 
1990 to 240 Mtoe in 2017. Indonesia's primary energy consumption per capita has steadily 
increased from 0.71 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe)/ capita in 2010 to 0.76 toe/capita in 2015, or 
by 1.5% per year. This trend is projected to increase and requires the government to introduce 
related policies to ensure energy supply meets domestic needs (WINANTI et al. 2020). 
Despite being a country that produces various forms of energy sources, Indonesia still 
depends on fossil energy sources for most of its energy fulfilment, such as petroleum, natural 
gas and coal. Based on data from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia, 
91.45 per cent of Indonesia's energy needs in 2018 were supplied from fossil energy sources 
(see Table 5). The degree of dependence is expected to continue to increase. However, in recent 
years, especially during the President Joko Widodo era, the government has begun to encourage 
a shift towards meeting energy needs from renewable energy sources. 
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To achieve energy security and energy independence, the Indonesian government needs 
support from various stakeholders. Institutionally, there are several government institutions 
and agencies that have an interest in energy issues in Indonesia. They include the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Development and 
Environment, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the National Energy Council. Various institutions' involvement implies that efforts to meet 
national energy needs are carried out at both the domestic and international levels. 
In addition, financial support from foreign investors is very important due to the 
government's inability to finance all exploration and exploitation of new energy resources. 
During the intense global energy competition lately, inviting foreign investors to Indonesia is 
certainly not an easy task for the government. In addition to a conducive investment climate, 
diplomacy with foreign investors also plays a very important role in a country. 
Especially during the second term of President Joko Widodo elected for 2019-2024, the 
government began planning a new and renewable energy policy, which became one of the 
national energy policy pillars. President Jokowi emphasized that renewable energy is the future 
of national energy fulfilment and pledged to reduce Indonesia's dependence on fossil energy, 
particularly petroleum (KUSUMAWARDHANI 2019). 
The priority of developing new and renewable energy as a pillar of national energy policy 
cannot be separated from the role of diplomacy. External and internal factors drive this. From 
the external side, this policy is part of Indonesia's commitment to the global agenda. In the 
Paris Agreement, the Indonesian Government is committed to making new and renewable 
energy an important component in the 23% national energy mix by 2025 (SETIAWAN 2019). 
This commitment is part of an action plan to respond to the climate change narrative. However, 
this energy mix target does not appear to be easy to achieve, given the low target achievement 
to date. A policy vision is not necessarily followed by a concrete and measurable policy action 
plan at the technical level of government programs. Apart from external factors, new and 
renewable energy development policies are also driven by domestic interests, including the 
need to reduce the Current Account Deficit (CAD), energy diversification to ensure distribution 






























BIOMASS  BIOFUEL  BIOGAS  TOTAL 
2008 224 476 236 29 13 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 114 0,06 n.a 1,092 
2009 236 478 251 28 15 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 109 0,77 n.a 1,117 
2010 282 464 270 41 15 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 107 1 n.a 1,180 
2011 334 563 261 28 15 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 105 2 n.a 1,308 
2012 345 589 259 29 15 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 99 4 n.a 1,340 
2013 302 587 270 38 15 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 95 6 n.a 1,313 
2014 320 584 271 38 16 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 92 11 n.a 1,332 
2015 364 607 275 35 16 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 84 6 n.a 1,387 
2016 380 534 277 45 17 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 80 19 n.a 1,352 
2017 407 567 275 47 20 n.a  n.a n.a n.a 75 16 n.a 1,407 
2018 483 569 288 40 26 0,35  0,46 29 0,008 67 28 0,16 1,530 
Table 5: Comparison of fossil and non-fossil energy/new and renewable energy sources in 2008-2018 [unit: in million Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)] 
Source: Author’s edition based on the data of KEMENTERIAN ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA MINERAL, HANDBOOK OF ENERGY & ECONOMIC STATISTICS 
OF INDONESIA 2018. 
In the context of international relations, diplomacy serves to improve relations and discuss 
each country's national interests. Given the situation above, the role of energy diplomacy is as 
important as political and security diplomacy because it also involves vital national interests. 
In this context, Indonesia's energy diplomacy is very much oriented towards meeting energy 
needs to support sustainable development implementation. Although the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is one of the leading institutions in implementing Indonesia's energy diplomacy, 
institutionally this energy diplomacy activity is spread across various ministries, or what is 
known as sectoral energy diplomacy. In practice, other actors, especially technical ministries 
such as the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry 
of Forestry, are also involved in energy diplomacy activities with foreign parties, namely 
cooperation carried out with other countries in the energy sector, for example between the 
Indonesian Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Energy of Brunei Darussalam (ANGGORO 
2011). 
In accordance with the foreign policy principle of being free and active in forging 
partnerships and cooperation in energy development, the Indonesian government is currently 
actively involved in various international energy cooperation frameworks. This cooperation is 
promoted through various international forums (bilateral, regional and multilateral) and 
international institutions (UN and non-UN). According to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources of the Republic of Indonesia as quoted by Alami, Indonesia is currently involved in 
nearly one hundred types of international energy forums. Of the hundreds of cooperation 
forums, ironically, there are only a few cooperation forums that have entered the stage of 
activities that are operational (ALAMI 2015). 
Several international energy collaborations which are at the operational level are moving 
forward; among others that can be noted are: the Indonesia-Japan energy cooperation for 
technology transfer and institutional improvement; Indonesia-Netherlands energy cooperation 
for new and renewable energy, especially power generation from micro-hydro; work energy 
cooperation between ASEAN countries, which includes the establishment of the ASEAN 
Power Grid; the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline; and the ASEAN Forum on Coal. The ASEAN 
Energy Cooperation focuses its activities on the oil and gas sector as well as pursuing alternative 
energy through the development of new and renewable energy. The Indonesia-China energy 
cooperation takes the form of investment, and the Indonesia-Norway energy cooperation is 
related to reducing carbon emissions (NICOLAS 2009). In addition, there are several 
international energy collaborations that have no continuation at all, and many of these 
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collaborations are still limited to norm-setting, such as memoranda of understanding (MoU), 
letters of intent (Lol), and others. 
The above reality needs to be understood especially in relation to international relations, 
which are increasingly complex at this time. Diplomacy, as we know it conventionally, has 
been transformed in accordance with the times in which we live. This definition implicitly 
shows that diplomacy is the exclusive field of diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
However, significant changes in the conditions of international relations in modern times, 
especially due to the rapid development of globalization, liberalization and technology, have 
broken through the boundaries of professional diplomacy that were previously synonymous 
with the ministry of foreign affairs through their diplomats. Diplomatic activities no longer 
belong only to diplomats but also involve other government and non-government actors such 
as technical ministries, non-governmental organizations, business and private sectors, non-
governmental organizations, parliament members, and academics and non-governmental 
organizations (ALAMI 2017). 
Indonesia's energy diplomacy, which is spread across various ministries with their 
respective competencies, should not cause problems if cross-sectoral coordination is well 
managed. Only, in reality, this function seems to be still not running in an integrated manner. 
So far, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has a central role in diplomacy, 
namely as a coordinator and consultant for other international actors in establishing foreign 
relations, in fact, has not optimally carried out its function. In addition, it is time for the 
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to set up a special directorate that deals with energy 
issues. 
Cross-sectoral coordination plays a central role in Indonesia's energy diplomacy, which 
simultaneously involves many players. Diplomacy will be useful if there is effective 
coordination among the players. It is hoped that the communication generated through this 
coordination will bring synergy between energy diplomacy actors in determining the issues they 
will present at international forums. 
In the current context, diplomacy is not the exclusive domain of the state. In multi-track 
diplomacy, the government is not the only actor. Diplomacy involves professional participation 
from businesses, citizens, educators, peace activists, religious institutions, funding platforms, 
and media opinion and public perception. By combining all relevant actors' efforts, countries 
can use total diplomacy (DIAMOND – MCDONALD 1996). 
Indonesia needs total diplomacy to build partnerships with international diplomacy actors 
where the scope of diplomacy is expanding. By involving increasingly diverse actors, both state 
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and non-state, Indonesia's bargaining power in the negotiation process will be strengthened. In 
addition, Indonesia needs total diplomacy because in every negotiation, the ability to follow up 
on agreements is often not optimal. It is not enough for Indonesian diplomacy to stop after 
creating understanding; the most important thing is implementing that understanding. Through 
total diplomacy, the gap between desire and implementation will be resolved more quickly, 
given the various actors involved. 
Therefore, an understanding of total diplomacy can facilitate the organization of strategies 
in dealing with stakeholder institutions at the international level. Total diplomacy is essentially 
a form of negotiation carried out, both formally and informally, by involving many parties, not 
only between governments but also by the private sector, through informal networks. Total 
diplomacy should address the goals of securing energy supplies, accessing markets and 
investing outside the country, as well as ensuring the sustainable transformation of the main 
energy source from fossil to renewable energy. 
Total diplomacy in the energy sector can be supported through three activities: knowledge 
production, stakeholder engagement and new public diplomacy. Stakeholders such as the civil 
society, media and public opinion need to get a bigger picture of Indonesia's energy security 
goals. The new public diplomacy must be able to use all available methods to reach the general 
public. A new public diplomacy should also avoid one-way communication by providing 
opportunities for an exchange of views. This effort takes advantage of active discussion through 
education, youth peace activism, religious groups as well as massive distribution on major 
media and social media. 
It is hoped that the state will no longer depend solely on the skills of career diplomats in 
global diplomacy forums. Indonesian citizens, both at home and abroad, can also contribute to 
the image of the Indonesian nation in the international arena. Total diplomacy provides many 
creative and innovative steps developed by all components of the nation. However, the 
implementation of total diplomacy is based on simple assumptions; that is, the government 
cannot alone overcome various challenges in increasingly complex international issues without 
the involvement of many stakeholders. By increasing diplomatic activities that include many 
stakeholders, energy diplomacy efforts will run more effectively and have a broader impact on 







Energy security is currently still a concern of the international community and is part of 
countries' foreign policy in the world. The goal of energy security is to secure a country's energy 
supply and needs. To fulfil this, strategic efforts are needed in dealing with energy problems, 
both at the national and international levels. 
Foreign policy is an inseparable part of efforts to achieve the goal of energy security 
policy. Based on the principle of a free and active foreign policy, the Indonesian government 
has built international energy partnerships and cooperation through various international 
forums and institutions. Through these various collaborations, Indonesia has a unique 
opportunity to take advantage of technology transfer, capacity building, and investment. 
However, it seems that Indonesia has not yet optimized all the opportunities that exist. In 
addition, there is still no institutionalization of international energy security policies at the level 
of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The strategic effort that Indonesia needs to make in energy security in the international 
sphere is the need to build total diplomacy. It is hoped that the state will no longer depend only 
on diplomats' capabilities in global diplomacy forums. Indonesian citizens and other 
stakeholders, both at home and abroad, can also contribute to the Indonesian nation's image in 
the international arena. By increasing diplomatic activities that include many stakeholders, it is 
hoped that Indonesia's energy diplomacy efforts will run more effectively and have a broader 
and more significant impact on the international arena. 
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Labeling of statuses and its effects on human rights of 




Bangladesh is a sanctuary of 1.2 million Rohingya people who have fled from the state-run persecution 
against them in Myanmar. They have been stripped of their citizenship rights of their birth and ancestral land, 
Burma, present-day Myanmar. Currently, they are the largest stateless minority in the world. The first exodus 
occurred in 1978 and the last in 2017. The Rohingya people have been identified by many different names:   
Registered refugee, Unregistered refugee, Undocumented Myanmar Nationals, and Forcibly Displaced Myanmar 
Nationals so far here in Bangladesh. By taking up the issue, this study examines why the labeling of the Rohingya 
people and how it affects their human rights in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar of Bangladesh. To that end, this 
investigation explores and collects data from secondary sources in a qualitative setting. After an exploration of the 
relevant literature and secondary data, it comprehends that the naming of the Rohingya people in different statuses 
has considerable effects on their human rights. Those labeling and stratifications are involved with discrimination 
as well as deprivations of the Rohingya people. Finding the labeling a political issue, this study recommends 
considering their human rights as human being irrespective of labeling them in pejorative categories. 
 
Keywords: labeling, host, humanitarian provision, human rights, discriminations.  
1. Introduction 
The refugee crisis and the number of refugees have reached an unprecedented high in 
recent times globally. The term ‘refugee’ has a strong and explicit legal basis. The label refugee 
is the most privileged status of forcibly displaced people (ZETTER 2007), and only as refugees, 
those people can enjoy many human rights except citizenship rights for the time being 
(MARFLEET 2006). Criteria are also quite clear to determine who is a refugee and who is not. 
But the definition attracts much contested connotation with individual interest and purposes of 
the nation-states. Now there is much labeling of forcibly displaced people even though having 
explicit criteria of refugeehood. Empirical studies contend that labeling matters to the life and 
livelihood of incumbents. LEE and NERGHES (2018) claim that the labeling of displaced 
individuals may harm their safety and lives; negative framing may undermine their position in 
the host country, it may even create vulnerable identities (SERUGHETTI 2018) and wrong 
perception against them. Nevertheless, it is a widely used phenomenon to the twenty-first 
century forcibly displaced people around the globe. 
Bangladesh is a host country of 1.2 million Rohingya people, including many newborns 
in Bangladesh. For hundreds of years they lived in Burma, present-day Myanmar, (IBRAHIM 
2016; WADE 2017) but they were stripped of their citizenship rights during the junta 
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government in 1982. Now they are the largest stateless minority people in the world (AHSAN 
ULLAH 2016). The first exodus occurred in 1978 and the last in 2017. Their camps are situated 
in the Teknaf and Ukhya area of the southeastern district Cox’s Bazar (CXB) of Bangladesh. 
Locally, the zones are known as Nayapara camp and Kutupalong camp respectively in those 
two areas. The Rohingya people have been identified by many different names: Registered 
refugee, Unregistered refugee, Undocumented Myanmar Nationals (UMNs), and Forcibly 
Displaced Nationals (FDMNs) so far since 1978 here in Bangladesh (ZETTER – RUAUDEL 
2016; SULTANA 2019). Approximately 30,000 of them have refugee status while the rest of 
the population are known as unregistered refugee or UMNs. Newcomers are registered as 
Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) in Bangladesh and live mainly on 
humanitarian provisions. They also have many informal labeling terms such as ‘victims, 
problems, threat or burden for Bangladesh (GUHATHAKURTA 2017; RAHMAN 2010; 
PARNINI et al. 2013). Both the categories and the labeling have had negative effects on these 
ill-fated people. Normally the services and facilities vary according to this labeling. The issue 
of labeling of refugees now does not only affect distribution of services but it reveals the 
political agenda and other external ‘Othering’ factors (VIGIL – BAILLIE 2018; ZETTER 
2007). By taking up the issue, this study has been conducted to identify the reasons of labeling 
of the Rohingya people in Bangladesh as well as to investigate the implications of the labeling 
of their human rights. The findings and analysis will offer a scope to understand the implications 
of labeling in a developing country perspective, however, further study can be conducted to 
examine the difference of its impact in the case of a developed country context. 
This article is organized into six parts. The first section has highlighted an overview of 
the intensity of refugee crisis and background of the study. The section that follows, outlines 
the key concept ‘labeling of refugee- like people’ and human rights from relevant literature, 
sets the scene of the paper. The third part briefly demonstrates the study procedure. And the 
fourth section illustrates the formal labeling of the Rohingya people since 1978 to till date. The 
fifth section analyses reasons behind the labeling and its effect of human rights on these 
categorized people. And finally, it sums up that it is high time for policymakers, practitioners, 
and researchers to raise their voice against this pejorative category of refugee like people. This 




2. Conceptual framework 
In response to the magnitudes of the problem, the international refugee regime (IRR) 
led by UNHCR so far has devised three durable solutions: repatriation, local integration, and 
resettlement. Encountering a myriad of challenges in executing its mandate of three durable 
solutions, it can hardly bring the host country, home country or third country to a single table, 
or can manage funding to that end. UNHCR has a universal mandate about the management of 
the refugee crisis but there is no obligation for many state parties to rectify the 1951 
Conventions as well as to approve durable solutions of refugee crisis till date (TÜRK – DOWD 
2014). 
The UN Refugee Convention of 1951 is oftentimes called the convention for the 
solution of the refugee crisis in Europe (CHIMNI 2004). Since the Cold war period, European 
countries were exhausted to accept and integrate refugees or economic migrants even after the 
rectification of the convention. In this situation the label ‘asylum seekers’ continued to apply 
to (irregular) migrants since the 1990s (ZETTER 2007). ZETTER (2007) further maintains that 
the term ‘labeling’ refers to an extremely complex set of values and judgments which is 
determined by the intervention and interests of state and non-state actors, and upon the actions 
and demands of the labeled subjects, who are requested to conform to and incorporate it. By 
Labeling it constraints the specific protection needs of forcibly displaced migrants in the hour 
of need and ignore their meaningful agencies of choices for well-being (SERUGHETTI 2018). 
However, VIGIL and BAILLIE (2018) argue quite differently in refugee integration in Canada 
that after a proper resettlement, refugees can create their own labeling and identities as ‘we’ 
instead of ‘us’ and ‘them’. But whilst only a minimum percentage (1% in 2018) of the total 
refugee can resettle in a proper way in the western countries (UNHCR 2018), this type of 
positive labeling can just be an example, not the change makers for hundreds of thousands of 
refugees. To put it another way, there is no guarantee of human rights for the rest of the refugees 
around the globe. 
Human rights are a norm. These rights are an inalienable and fundamental irrespective 
of the color, creed, size of the ethnic group, religion, language or any other status but only 
because of being a human being (UNOHRHC 2021). Besides, there are ranges of legal 
frameworks and interpretations of human rights. Resultantly, it is also a legal issue. Different 
national, regional, and international entities have formulated and adopted those legal 
frameworks to safeguard human rights, even for those who are not in a normal setting such as 
refugee and so on. But the human rights of refugee-like people depend on refugee governance 
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which is quite different in the global south compared to those in the global north. Any refugee 
can avail most of the human rights in Western countries upon receiving refugee status. They 
can be free from want as well free of fear in that regard. But it is crucial in the present day 
whether one will be granted that status or any other pejorative categories. Besides a refugee 
framework, human rights issues of refugees have been decisively challenged by the state 
interest and international system (AMIT 2019). On the other hand, refugees in the global south 
normally have no refugee status and no freedom from want or fear. They struggle to survive for 
extended exile in a de facto refugee situation in which different labeling can affect their 
minimum rights in the camps. Although human rights here refer to limited senses such as 
freedom of movement, right to work, food, shelter, water-sanitation, health. 
3. Methodology 
The study has adopted a qualitative methodology based on secondary resources. For this 
investigation, it explored documents and literature both for theoretical purpose as well as 
metadata. So, the literature includes but not exhausted to relevant study on labeling and human 
rights of refugees, and the reports by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and UNHCR, 
human rights report by NGO-INGO, popular media reports on the Rohingya people in 
Bangladesh. Moreover, some of the latest data have been collected from web searching. Several 
field visits and field observations in Teknaf and Ukhya of CXB for other research purposes in 
2019 were also helpful to substantiate some claims from secondary data. Refined data has been 
presented accordingly to the objectives of the study. 
4. Labeling to Rohingya People in Bangladesh 
4.1. ‘Registered Refugee’ labeling of Rohingya people 
The Rohingya crisis is rooted in British colonial legacy in Burma (SMITH 1999; 
IBRAHIM 2016; WADE 2017) and the Rohingya Muslims have a long history of labeling. In 
the post-Second World War period, the formation of nation and nation-state was expedited 
everywhere in the world including in Burma. Unlike in other parts of the British colony, Burma 
has also been suffering from dire consequences of the ‘divide and rule’ policy. Subsequent 
authoritarian rulers also exploited those ethnic divisions to consolidate their power. Moreover, 
the Burmanization process intentionally included the erasing of century-long evidence of 
Rohingya Muslims and rewriting and forming of contra-Rohingya discourse to exclude them 
from the territory (WADE 2017). Eventually, the exclusion resulted in the labeling of the 
Rohingya Muslims as ‘Other’ or foreigners in their ancestral land in Burma under the contested 
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Citizenship Law of 1982. From British colony to an independent Bangladesh (the then East 
Pakistan), there were no strict borders between the two countries. Even after the independence, 
people of the Rakhine state of Burma and Bangladesh could move between them without 
immigration issues because of porous bordering between the regions of countries 
(BJORNBERG 2016). Resultantly, the Rohingya people could run away to Bangladesh in case 
of any kind of persecution against them by the authoritarian military government in Burma. The 
first exodus of the Rohingya people took place in 1978 which was resolved bilaterally without 
extending the crisis. But both the border and sovereignty continued to be stricter in the post-
Cold War period with rising of nation-state. Similarly, the refugee issue has also turned into a 
crisis and a matter of scientific study. The frequency of persecution against the Rohingya people 
and the period of exile continued to increase since 1990. Consequently, hundreds of thousands 
of Rohingya people fled to Bangladesh in 1991, 2012, 2014, and 2017. 
Some 200,000 Rohingya people returned to Myanmar in 1994-95 from the influx in the 
1990s. There was an accusation of involuntary repatriation (GRUNDY-WARR – WONG 
1997). Approximately 30,000 Rohingya people could escape the repatriation. And the 
humanitarian organization led by UNHCR urged the government to accept them as refugees. 
Since Bangladesh is not a state party of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and protocol in 
1967, GoB did not accept the Rohingya as refugees. However, they eventually received special 
recognition as refugees by the UNHCR, and later, GoB also accepted that status of those 
Rohingya to end the refugee crisis in Bangladesh at that time (GHOSH 2018). They are also 
called the ‘people of the UNHCR (SULTANA 2019). Two (government) camps were built up 
in Nayapara of Teknaf and Kutupalong of Ukhiya area of the district. Every one of them got an 
identity card although that was not much useful in protecting them from vulnerabilities.  
4.2. Undocumented Myanmar Nationals (UMNs) 
Besides the registered refugee status, there were more than 200,000 Rohingya people, 
living in the makeshifts and inside the local community (KIRAGU et al. 2011) before 2017. 
They were not registered in any government jurisdiction, though a government statistic revealed 
the total number as 300,000-500,000 (GoB 2014; IOM 2016). And this group of undocumented 
the Rohingya people was labeled as Undocumented Myanmar Nationals (UMNs). Ad hoc 
makeshifts camps near the Kutupalong became their sanctuary. UMNs did not receive any 
support from UNHCR and GoB. They are also considered as unregistered refugees. Thus, 
everything such as shelter, sanitation, health services were unplanned and unhygienic to live in. 
They had no identity card. UMNs had to manage their livelihood themselves except for some 
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ad hoc humanitarian aid through NGOs. But the area was intentionally left so underdeveloped 
that there were not even any sufficient employment opportunities for the host community 
people. Since there is no legal and administrative framework to maintain refugee and asylum 
seekers in Bangladesh, the Rohingya people were treated under the Foreigners Act (FA) of 
1946. According to this Act, UMNs can be subjected to imprisonment for up to five years and 
fines (IOM 2016). 
4.3. Forcibly displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) 
The largest influx of Rohingya people in 2017 brought forth new labeling for them in the 
refugee camps in Bangladesh. They live in the thirty-four settlement camps in Nayapara and 
Kutupalong. The sudden influx and growth of the camps blurred the earlier demarcation 
between registered and UMNs (Author’s field visit in 2019). Currently, almost all the Rohingya 
people are named as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) (DAILY STAR 2017). 
This time the Rohingya conundrum has attracted most of the international agencies for 
humanitarian assistance. Every one of them is under UNHCR led humanitarian provision. They 
receive very basic needs such as food, shelter, health care on a minimum scale on monthly 
basis. GoB is against their scope of self-reliance (BIGD 2018). Humanitarian organizations 
work as implementing agencies in the labeling of these statuses to the Rohingya people. In a 
present-day nation-state system, these organizations can hardly make any influence on the 
states’ decisions. FDMNs have no identity card but are documented based on household. 
Kutupalong is the largest and most densely populated camps in the world with approximately 
1 million Rohingya people (VINCE 2020). 
5. Why label the Rohingya people? 
Labeling is not objective rather it holds a deep meaning to the targeted groups. 
Bangladesh did not accede the UN Refugee Convention since it believes that it is not capable 
of fulfilling the legal bindings of the convention and protocol. Considering the lifesaving of the 
Rohingya people it attempted to manage them in a bureaucratic way, not under any national 
legal framework. Labeling has occurred both formally and informally. It is done initially for 
administrative purposes by the respective unit of government, a bureaucratic process (ZETTER 
1991). Labeling is considered as essential for the proper governance of refugees and aliens. 
Some labels are created by the media and public discourses (LEE – NERGHES 2018) mostly 
the many informal labeling. 
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Primarily, Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) plays the key role in 
labeling and the management of the Rohingya people while the UNHCR assists in the entire 
process. UNHCR had no direct mandate for the protection of the Rohingya people. It dealt with 
the Rohingya issue under an MoU signed with Bangladesh in 1993. After the repatriation of the 
majority of the Rohingya of 1990s influx in 1994, GoB did not accept much support and 
proposal from UNHCR for the remaining Rohingya people (UNHCR 2011). And the current 
mandate was re-established since 2006 through different activity-based agreements mainly for 
protection and management. The implications varied in the case of the first exodus and the 
repeated influxes of the said people. The Rohingya people were just called the Rohingya during 
the exodus in 1978 but they got different labeling between in 1991 and 2017. This time it is not 
only administrative but also political since there is no policy of the government for such 
management. UNHCR, IOM however provided the technical and logistic support for the 
documentation, labels were decided by the GoB, that was a political decision. And UNHCR 
could conduct refugee status determination (RSD) only in Dhaka city of Bangladesh (UNHCR 
2013). The Rohingya people encountered every well-founded fear to have refugee status but 
they are labeled as something else from time to time. Such politics strikes the very core of 
refugeehood. Informally, the Rohingya people are called criminals sex workers, a burden, ‘local 
gypsies’ (LOESCHER – MILNER 2008), and so on. It happened apparently because of that 
Bangladesh is not a state party of the UN Refugee Convention 1951. UNHCR including other 
NGOs cannot perform protection and assistance tasks without authorization of the GoB. But it 
is always not an issue of acceding this convention rather than involving history, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic conditions and so on. The movement of people between the porous border of 
Burma and Bangladesh changed reversely in the post independent period. Since then, more 
Rohingya people tend to enter Bangladesh than the Bangladeshi people in Burma. So, the GoB 
was extra cautious about the infiltration of the Rohingya people and it avoided any pull factors 
at that part of Bangladesh. Most importantly, the area was kept quite underdeveloped than the 
average other parts of the country. GoB was against any kind of self-reliant activities even for 
the registered refugees, whatever the limited scope was offered from the NGOs, those were also 
halted shortly. Registered refugees, however, had a scope to resettle in a third country but that 
was also suspended in 2010 (ZETTER – RUAUDEL 2016). To Put it differently, the few who 
received the (quite) proper label, GoB did not execute the amenities further because those were 
identified as pull factors of further Rohingya flow. The Rohingya are treated in a temporary and 
intermediate manner however some of them from the first influx have spent several decades in 
exile in Bangladesh. Most of the Southeast and South Asian countries are the parties of many 
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other human rights frameworks such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Those countries can preserve 
refugees’ human rights under these legal bindings but state sovereignty over nationality 
constraints their application to a great extent (ADJAMI – HARRINGTON 2008). 
Since the adoption of UN refugee convention, the refugee regime is considered as a 
western brainchild and the labeling alike in the twenty-first century. Labeling in the global north 
has a trickle-down effect on the host countries in the global south, although South Asia has a 
long history of rejection of refugee policy (BEHRMAN 2019; DAVIES 2006). The region has 
many experiences of hosting refugee and sanctuary of lives. A similar situation happened to 
forcibly displaced people from the then East Pakistan (Bangladesh) to India, present day refugee 
from Myanmar to Thailand and so on. None of them were granted refugee status. However, 
such state-centric actions cannot bring forth any benefits for the host countries rather those 
actions exacerbate the vulnerabilities of the already vulnerable people. In this situation, refugees 
are captured in the state of exception’ (AGAMBEN 1998) in which the host government can 
exercise legal action against them even though refugee-like people cannot avail any rights 
legally. Consequently, the Rohingya people in the camps in Bangladesh are controlled, 
excluded from the host community, and ended up in a more vulnerable situation. Besides, many 
other hierarchical labelings have created much discrimination among the different categories of 
the Rohingya people. Thus, host countries apply such labelling to avoid their responsibilities to 
so-called aliens’ human rights and protection. Labeling acts as an effective tool in the fortress 
of nation-state and eventually securitization of forcibly displaced people. 
6. Implications of labeling 
It can be said from the above findings that the labeling of Rohingya people has presented 
many human rights implications. It did not strike the non-refoulement principle and deportation 
cases, but it affected some very basic services and rights as a human beings. It is evident that 
with refugee status, they could receive sufficient aid, good shelter, enjoy more agencies and 
exert power over other Rohingya people in the camps at least until 2017. In extended periods 
some other adjacent areas of Teknaf and Ukhiya of Cox’s Bazar were also in their movement 
radius. Registered refugees were also in de facto local integration with some self-reliance 
opportunities in the protracted situation, (UNHCR 2007). They were not restricted to mix, 
marry and join with local people and eventually many of them managed to acquire a 
Bangladeshi national identity card as well (ZETTER – RAUADEL 2016). There was an 
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unofficial signal to those Rohingya people for assimilation in the local community as an ending 
of the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh until the last largest influx. 
On the other hand, the scale of vulnerability of UMNs was higher than that of recognized 
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. They had no right to work and were to manage their own 
livelihoods. They were the prime victims of labor exploitation, sexual exploitation, and human 
trafficking. Eventually, IOM provided humanitarian support of food, shelter and documentation 
to some extent until 2017. The classification of the Rohingya people as registered refugees and 
UMNs, sometimes causes more consequences than suffering the monsoon in Kutupalong camp 
(SULTANA 2019). In the light of this reality, UMNs avoided approaching law enforcement 
agencies even when serious crime was committed against them (IOM 2016). 
The condition of the Rohingya people drastically worsened due to the new influx or since 
the addition of FDMN to the demography. They live in a very unhygienic, overcrowded and 
cramped condition (BBC 2018; GHOSH 2018). Tellingly, they cannot move outside the camps 
at all, no permission of assembly, no access to mobile phones or the internet. The de-
politicization move of the GoB, deters the Rohingya people from participating in the decision-
making process of their very own issues. The Rohingya people are not only excluded from the 
local people legally and social, but also razor wire fencing is being erected very fast for physical 
distance (Author’s observation 2019). FDMNs have no legal support in Bangladesh, although 
it is a signatory of many international covenants of human rights. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) declares that everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy other countries' 
asylum from persecution (UDHR 1948: Art 14). Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child obliges the state parties to implement the registration process of a child 
immediately after its birth. The CEDAW article 9 supports women’s rights along with the 
nationality of their children whereas Article 24 of International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights calls for the nationality rights of every child. Unfortunately, the UN bodies cannot 
enforce these Human Rights Laws for every individual because these are mostly applicable to 
a citizen of State. The UDHR also emphasizes on nationality and citizenship of the people 
(WEISSBRODT – COLLINS 2006). Both Myanmar and Bangladesh ignore the human rights 
of Rohingya people in ‘us and others’ discourse which is happening now and then in the 
international state system (ROY 2020). Labeling is applied just as a hyper technique. The 








Figure 11: Human rights among the Rohingya people 
Source: The author 
 
Rohingya people cannot demand rights from the GoB, so they have to face the unexpected 
consequences. The state authority oftentimes justifies its activities by hosting millions of 
Rohingya people for an extended period. Tellingly, labeling is decaying their agencies on one 
hand while inequality and deprivations among the Rohingya are generating security challenges 
for the host country as well the region as a whole on the other. 
7. Conclusion and Recommendation 
By labeling the Rohingya people in different statuses has considerable effects on their 
human rights. Some of them with refugee status used to enjoy freedom of movement to some 
extent and livelihood. They began to live meaningful lives. UMNs in the case of the Rohingya 
people, however, had some uncertainties about their life and livelihood; they could enjoy more 
freedom than with the status of FDMNs (CHEUNG 2011). Except for the very basic needs of 
food, shelter, water-sanitation and health services, the issue of freedom of speech, right to work 
and freedom of movement are beyond negotiation for FDMNs. These stratifications and 
labeling are causing discrimination and deprivations among the Rohingya people at large 
(SULTANA 2019). Therefore, finding the labeling a political issue, this study recommends the 
competent authority to consider their human rights as a human being, without labeling them in 
different categories. Since refugee or these forcibly displaced people have crossed the 
international border, international organizations such as the UN, ASEAN, and other 
humanitarian organizations need to play their part strongly in the solution of the crisis. To that 
end, international actors can consider creating a safe zone in the Rakhine state of Myanmar 
under the direct supervision of the UN and obligatory burden-sharing for every member state 
of the UN for refugees around the globe including Rohingya refugees. The UN and other 



















policy for South Asian countries as well because the minimum human rights of refugees- like 
people can be preserved with refugee status. 
It is quite challenging to implement these recommendations but that will reduce the 
refugee crisis to a great extent. Firstly, because of the safe zone and UN intervention inside the 
source country, it will be more effective in safeguarding the human rights of the targeted group 
of people. Secondly, even if any of the flight of people crossed a border, every UN member 
state would have to bear the burden of humanitarian provisions proportionately until their 
repatriation to the country of origin. Thus, it can create strong international pressure on the 
country of origin and will think seriously before any persecution against minority people. 
Thirdly, by having refugee status, they can enjoy the minimum human rights in the host country. 
The upshot of this is that there are sufficient international legal frameworks to address such 
recommendations; it is now a matter of enforcement and a way of implementation. 
Undoubtedly, the fulfillment of human rights of these hundreds of thousands of Rohingya 
people is the prerequisite of security and sustainable development of the region as well. 
8. Acknowledgement 
An earlier version of this study was presented in the Online 9th Interdisciplinary Doctoral 
Conference (IDK2020) held in 27-28 November, 2020 in the University of Pécs, Hungary. 
Thanks to the conference session chair for his valuable comments.  
9. References 
ADJAMI. M. – HARRINGTON. J. 2008: The Scope and Content of Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 27(3): pp. 93–109. 
AGAMBEN, G. 1998: Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. California: Stanford 
University Press. 
AHSAN ULLAH, A. K. M. 2016: Rohingya crisis in Myanmar: Seeking justice for the 
“stateless”. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 32(3): pp. 285-301. 
AMIT, R. 2019: Reclaiming Refugee Rights as Human Rights. Pace International Law Review 
31(2): pp. 557-561. 
BIGD (Brac Institute of Governance and Development). 2018: Self-Reliance Situation of Host 
Communities in Cox’s Bazar. Commissioned by Save the Children, Brac, World Vision, 
WFP and UNHCR. 
BEHRMAN, S. 2019: Laws of Asylum and Protection: The Indian Experience in a South Asian 
Context. Refugee watch 15: pp. 15-28. 
157 
 
BJORNBERG, A. 2016: Rohingya Territoriality in Myanmar and Bangladesh: Humanitarian 
Crisis and National Disordering. Myanmar’s Mountain and Maritime Borderscapes: Local 
Practices, Boundary-Making and Figured Worlds, p.146. 
BBC. 2018: Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis. 24 April 2018. 
Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41566561 [Accessed on 18 July 
2018] 
CHEUNG, S. 2011: Migration control and the solutions impasse in South and Southeast Asia: 
Implications from the Rohingya experience. Journal of Refugee Studies 25(1): pp. 50-70. 
CHIMNI, B. S. 2004: From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: towards a critical history 
of durable solutions to refugee problems. Refugee Survey Quarterly 23(3): pp. 55-73. 
DAVIES, S. E. 2006: The Asian rejection? International refugee law in Asia. Australian Journal 
of Politics & History 52(4): pp. 562-575. 
GHOSH, B. 2018: Refugee and Mixed Migration Flows: Managing a Looming Humanitarian 
and Economic Crisis. Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan. 
LOESCHER, G. – MILNER, J. H. 2008: Burmese refugees in South and Southeast Asia: A 
comparative regional analysis, in LOESCHER, G. – MILNER, J., - NEWMAN, E. (eds.). 
Protracted refugee situations: Political, human rights and security implications. Tokyo: UN 
University Press. 
GUHATHAKURTA, M. 2017: Understanding violence, strategizing protection: perspectives 
from Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Asian journal of social science 45(6): pp. 639-665. 
GRUNDY-WARR, C. – WONG, E. 1997: Sanctuary under a plastic sheet–the unresolved 
problem of Rohingya refugees. - IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 5(3): pp. 79-91. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2018: Bangladesh is not my country: the plight of Rohingya 
refugees from Myanmar. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/bangladesh0818_web2.pdf (Accessed 
on 18 July 2018) 
IBRAHIM, A. 2016: The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Genocide. London: Hurst & Company. 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM). 2016: A needs assessment 
of UMNs population and capacity assessment of service providers in makeshift settlements 
with a focus on Sex and Gender Based Violence (SGBV). Dhaka: International 
Organization for Migration. 
KIRAGU, E. – ROSI, A. L. – MORRIS, T. 2011: States of denial: A review of UNHCR’s 
response to the protracted situation of stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Policy 
Dev. Eval. Serv. UNHCR. 
158 
 
LEE, J. S. – NERGHES, A. 2018: Refugee or migrant crisis? Labels, perceived agency, and 
sentiment polarity in online discussions. Social Media+ Society 4(3): pp. 1-22. 
MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES (MSF). 2002: 10 Years for the Rohingya refugee in 
Bangladesh: Past, present and future. Retrieved from: https://www.msf.org/ten-years-
rohingya-refugeespast-present-and-future-report-summary [Accessed on 15 July 2020] 
PARNINI, S. N. – OTHMAN, M. R. – GHAZALI, A. S. 2013: The Rohingya refugee crisis 
and Bangladesh-Myanmar relations. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 22(1): pp. 133-
146. 
RAHMAN, U. 2010: The Rohingya refugee: A security dilemma for Bangladesh. Journal of 
Immigrant & Refugee Studies 8(2): pp. 233-239. 
ROY, S. 2020: Statelessness of Myanmar's Rohingya Ethnic Population: Assessing the Role of 
International Community. Social Science Review, 37(1): pp. 277-294. University of 
Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
SERUGHETTI, G. 2018: Smuggled or Trafficked? Refugee or job seeker? Deconstructing rigid 
classifications by rethinking women’s vulnerability. Anti-trafficking review (11). 
SMITH, M. 1999: Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed. 
SULTANA, I. Z. 2019: Rohingyas in Bangladesh: Owning Rohingya Identity in Disowning 
Spaces. Ontario: York University. 
THE DAILY STAR 2017: Forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals.- Retrieved from: 
https://www.thedailystar.net/city/forcibly-displaced-myanmar-nationals-1469374 
(Accessed on 10 June 2018) 
THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH 2020: Humanitarian Assistance for Forcibly 
Displaced Myanmar Nationals (in Bengali). Retrieved from: 
https://modmr.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/modmr.portal.gov.bd/page/fc7d8708_a0b7_
4a2f_acf4_df4824384398/Rohingya_at%20a%20glance.pdf (Accessed on 10 March 2021) 
THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH 2014: National strategy paper on Myanmar 
refugees and undocumented Myanmar Nationals in Bangladesh. 
TÜRK, V. – DOWD, R. 2014: Protection gaps. The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced 
migration studies. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-289. 
UNHCR 2007: Bangladesh: Analysis of Gaps in the Protection of Rohingya Refugees.- 
Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org/46fa1af32.pdf (Accessed on 10 January 2020) 
UNHCR 2011: State of Denial: a review of UNHCR’s response to the protracted situation of 
stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. 
159 
 
UNHCR. 2013: UNHCR Global Appeal 2012-2013. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org ›  
 en-my/pdf   
UNHCR. 2018: Towards a global compact on refugees. Retrieved from: 
http://www.unhcr.org/towards-a-global-compact-on-refugees.html [Accessed on 18 July 
2018] 
UNHROHC. 2021. What are human rights? Retrieved from: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx [Accessed on 5 March 
2021] 
WADE, F. 2017: Myanmar's enemy within: Buddhist violence and the making of a Muslim 
'other'. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
WEISSBRODT, D. – COLLINS, C. 2006: The human rights of stateless persons. Human Rights 
Quarterly 28: pp. 245-276.  
VIGIL, Y. N., - BAILLIE ABIDI, C. 2018: “We” the Refugees: Reflections on Refugee Labels 
and Identities. Refuge. Canada's Journal on Refugees/Refuge: 34(2): pp. 52-60. 
VINCE, G. 2020: The world’s largest refugee camp prepares for covid-19. Bmj, 368. Retrieved 
from: 
https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/bmj.m1205.full_.pdf 
(Accessed on 7 May 2020) 
ZETTER, R. – RUAUDEL, H. 2016: Refugees’ right to work and access to labor markets–An 
assessment. World Bank Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD) and the Global 
Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) Thematic Working 
Group on Forced Migration. KNOMAD Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank 
Group. 
ZETTER, R. 2007: More labels, fewer refugees: Remaking the refugee label in an era of 
globalization. Journal of refugee studies 20(2): pp. 172-192. 
ZETTER, R. 1991: Labeling refugees: Forming and transforming a bureaucratic identity. 




Can international organisations save the environment? 




Amid the dynamism of international relations, the role and place of the international organisations in the 
system has received particular attention in recent years. Geopolitical events regularly challenge the multilateral 
institutions on the one hand, but transnational threats require strengthened cooperation on the other. The COVID-
pandemic is not the only global problem that calls for international partnership. Environmental aspects of common 
actions in international fora are attracting increasing attention within societies and at global level, too. In the 
meantime, multilateral institutions strive to be proactive to show their efficiency, relevance and added value. In a 
similar spirit, the Council of Europe is also developing its mechanisms to respond to the global environmental 
crisis.  
The paper aims to illustrate the dilemma concerning the future role of the Council of Europe in the light of 
environmental challenges by applying an empirical approach and seeks to obtain an answer to this question 
through a case study. To obtain the most comprehensive and holistic picture possible, a qualitative analysis is 
planned, which will examine the responses of the Council of Europe to the environmental crises.  The results of 
this analysis may serve to enrich the general literature on multilateral organisations, as well as contribute to the 
body of research concerning the future place of multilateral cooperation in today’s globalised world.  
 
Keywords: multilateralism, transnational threat, environment crisis, Council of Europe, World 
Forum for Democracy 
1. Introduction 
The main feature of the international order after World War II is the appearance of 
international organisations that introduced new questions in the field of international relations, 
namely the issue of integration, multilateralism, national competence, or supranationalism. 
New theories have been developed to describe the new phenomenon of European integration, 
to understand and possibly tackle the challenges of formal international cooperation. 
The history of the Council of Europe56 as an intergovernmental organisation forms an 
integral part of the political context after the World War II. It perfectly reflects the waves of the 
European integration process, the clash of renewable theories with political reality, the struggle 
between federalists and the supporters of national sovereignty, the division of the continent 
within a bipolar international system or the alternations of “small” and “great” Europe concepts 
(GAZDAG 1999, p. 14). 
It is almost a cliché to say that multilateralism faces serious challenges now, but neither 
the analysis of the main tenets of multilateralism nor the assessment of factors leading to the 
weakening commitments of states to intergovernmental organisations are within the focus of 
 
55 Corvinus University of Budapest, Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science, PhD 
Candidate, Chief of the Ministerial Commissioner’s Cabinet responsible for the Development of Neighbourhood 
Policy of Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. aferenci@mfa.gov.hu 
56 Hereinafter referred to as CoE. 
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this paper. The current study limits itself to describing the trend whereby international 
cooperation in the field of environmental protection has increased in the recent decades, with a 
particular focus on the environment-related issues in the Council of Europe. It also seeks 
answers to these questions: how, concretely, the Council of Europe may respond to the global 
environmental crisis, and how the Council of Europe might strengthen international cooperation 
to save the environment. 
2. Transnational challenges 
The Council of Europe, in a manner similar to other regional intergovernmental 
cooperation frameworks, has always paid particular attention to the changes taking place in the 
world and has adapted its responses and mechanisms to a fast-moving world. The Organisation 
showed that it was ready to assume a new mission and responsibility at the time of democratic 
transition of the Central and East European countries by developing new institutional 
structures57 and it also reacted rapidly to the appearance of terrorism shocking the US and the 
world in 2001. At that time, the Council of Europe reinforced its activity in the field of 
counterterrorism and elaborated a new legal instrument to assist the global efforts against 
terrorism.58 
The migration influx which peaked in 2015 also provoked a rapid reaction. The Secretary 
General established the institution of special representative on migration and refugees to give 
an answer to the humanitarian crisis, as well as to provide assistance and support to the member 
states concerned (MANDATE, SPECIAL REPRESESENTATIVE ON MIGRATION 2020). 
The current pandemic is a manifestation of another transnational threat and the answers 
given to the situation by the intergovernmental organisations reflect the expectation that 
multilateral institutions be actively involved in the crisis management. Indeed, their 
contribution based on general values set in legally binding instruments such as the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms59 seems to be conducive to 
strengthening cooperation among international actors so that they may overcome the pandemic 
successfully. 
 
57The CoE developed numerous new structures and institutions, such as the European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance, the Commissioner for Human Rights, or the European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
commonly known as Venice Commission in the 1990s.  
58The Council of Europe has adopted the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism to increase the effectiveness 
of existing international texts on the fight against terrorism. 
59 The Council of Europe Convention entered into force in 1953. It sets forth a number of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, including the right to life, prohibition of torture, right to liberty and security, right to a fair trial, freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, right to an 
effective remedy, prohibition of discrimination. Hereinafter referred to as ECHR.  
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Conversely, when the international community confronts geopolitical, geostrategic types 
of challenges, such as the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 (PACE RESOLUTION 
1633 2008), or the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 (PACE 
RESOLUTION 1988 2014), the human rights and rule of law based intergovernmental 
organisations entirely lack the means to influence events in a substantial manner.60 
Taking into account the above, it seems that the efficiency of multilateralism should be 
analysed from different angles and there is no obvious answer in today’s interconnected and 
interdependent world with multiple actors. 
When the Council of Europe was founded in 1949, the primary goal was to achieve a 
greater unity between its members, to safeguard and realise the ideals and principles of a 
common European heritage and to facilitate economic and social progress (PREAMBLE,  
STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 1949). Following this objective and mandate, 
the Council of Europe systematically elaborated a normative regulatory scheme with 
fundamental human rights treaties. The mission of the Organisation at the time of the foundation 
was to discuss “questions of common concern and… [to conclude] agreements and common 
action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the 
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (ARTICLE 1, 
STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 1949). The aim to develop the normative basis 
for a single European legal area in the field of human rights, democracy and rule of law 
appeared a few decades later when the Council of Europe assumed its role in preparing the new 
democracies of Eastern Europe to comply with the international standards after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the 1990s.61 In the 1990s the role of these values become much more 
significant since the European integration process needed solid democratic and human rights 
architecture, a stable system of rule of law as well.62 Accordingly, the Council of Europe defines 
itself as the continent’s leading human rights organisation and its tools are mainly regulatory 
instruments, advisory organs and independent institutions with complex monitoring functions 
in most of the cases. The more than two hundred conventions, the European Court of Human 
Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the European Commission for Democracy through Law are intended, first and 
foremost, to guarantee fundamental human rights and all other, newer types of challenge are 
always observed through the prism of human rights. In contrast to the United Nations, whose 
 
60 Author’s opinion 
61 Author’s opinion 
62 Preamble and in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. 
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more global character and membership empowers the Organisation to be more efficient in 
coordinating international actions against global challenges, the Council of Europe places its 
focus on the human rights and standard-setting aspects of the transnational challenges. These 
conditions determine the extent to which the Council of Europe may answer global threats. On 
the one hand, they make it possible to elaborate a comprehensive and unique normative scheme 
in relation to the environment; on the other hand, the human rights approach limits the scope of 
its field of possible concrete actions. 
3. Environment in the forefront of international cooperation 
3.1. From the very beginning 
This chapter aims to provide a general overview on the milestone events leading to an 
institutionalised environmental cooperation at a global level and does not seek to provide an 
exhaustive, chronological analysis. Given the global nature of the threats to environment, the 
United Nations was the first international organisation addressing the new challenges. The 
Stockholm Declaration on the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment adopted 
in 1972 can be regarded as the starting point of a rights-based approach to environmental 
protection (UNITED NATIONS REPORT 1972). It formulated the principle that "Man 
[should] have the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations" 
(UNITED NATIONS REPORT 1972, p. 4). 
As the professor of history, Jacobus A. DU PISANI pointed out, the conference was 
preceded by a period of an immense scientific and technological progress that caused terrible 
damage to the natural environment. By the 1970s, people recognised the threats that rapid 
population growth, pollution and resource depletion posed to the environment. Ecological 
disasters were widely reported in the press, the green movement was launched, the first 
environmental non-governmental organisations were set up and environmental concern became 
more acute and radical because of the fear that economic growth might endanger the survival 
of the human race and the planet (DU PISANI 2006, pp. 83-96). When explaining the historical 
context of sustainable development DU PISANI writes that “This alarmist mood, in expectation 
of an imminent ecological catastrophe, stimulated a new mode of thinking about development 
and prepared the way for sustainable development as an alternative to unlimited economic 
growth” (DU PISANI 2006, p. 89). 
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Thus, the economic development, its negative impact on the environment and other 
worrying trends of the rapid progress, the protection of environment came into the foreground 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The first major and widely known report of the Club of Rome, the 
Limits to Growth also examined the impact of economic development on nature by assessing 
industrial output and pollution. As the report highlights “With world population doubling time 
a little more than 30 years…. on both sides of the man-environment equation, the situation will 
tend to worsen dangerously. We cannot expect technological solutions alone to get us out of 
this vicious circle. The strategy for dealing with the two key issues of development and 
environment must be conceived as a joint one” (MEADOWS et al. 1972, p. 192). 
In the light of the growing need to tackle the problems, the United Nations, the European 
Community, and the Council of Europe also responded to this emerging, new type of challenge, 
which induced legislative initiative and more focused international cooperation. The UN 
General Assembly decided to establish a World Commission on Environment and 
Development63 (UNGA RESOLUTION 38/161 1983) to formulate a global agenda for change 
to propose long-term environmental strategies and to consider the means how the international 
community can address more effectively the environment concerns (BRUNDTLAND 
REPORT 1987, p. 6). The UN General Assembly also decided to establish the United Nations 
Environment Programme with the aim “to promote international co-operation in the field of the 
environment and to recommend, as appropriate, policies to this end” (UNGA RESOLUTION 
2997 1972). The World Commission chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland identified many 
industrial, environmental accidents from Mexico City, India, the USA but serious disasters were 
reported on the European continent, in Basel or Seveso, Italy (ESKENAZI et al. 2018), too, not 
forgetting the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl (BRUNDTLAND REPORT 1987 p. 156). 
The report served as a background for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (also known as the Earth Summit)64, which produced the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (RIO DECLARATION 1992). The declaration (also called 
Agenda 21) was a plan of action to be taken on globally, nationally, and locally by governments, 
organisations, and individuals in every area in which human beings have an impact on the 
environment. 
 





The actions above led to the Millennium Summit65 of the United Nations in 2000, when 
the heads of state and government adopted the Millennium Development Goals, with a view to 
ensuring environmental sustainability as part of the issues (UNGA RESOLUTION 55/2  2000). 
The industrial disasters and economic expansion also prompted the European Community 
to develop legislation with a view to preventing similar catastrophes. The environment policy 
in the Community dates back to 1972 when political leaders decided to launch environment 
action programmes. The so-called Seveso-Directive (COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 82/501/EEC 
1982) was adopted following the chemical accident in Italy but it was later amended in view of 
the lessons learned from later accidents resulting into Seveso-II (COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
96/82/EC 1996). The first legal basis for a common environment policy was developed in the 
Single European Act in 1987 but subsequent treaty revisions strengthened the Community’s 
commitment to environmental protection.  The Treaty of Maastricht of 1993 made the 
environment an official EU policy area, while the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 “established 
the duty to integrate environmental protection into all EU sectoral policies with a view to 
promoting sustainable development” (FACT SHEETS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 2021). 
In 2012 Seveso-III (DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU 2012) was adopted taking into account, amongst 
others, the changes in the Union legislation on the classification of chemicals and increased 
rights for citizens to access information and justice” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
ENVIRONMENT 2021).66 
“Considering the very high rate of industrialisation in the European Union the Seveso 
Directive has contributed to achieving a low frequency of major accidents. The Directive is 
widely considered as a benchmark for industrial accident policy and has been a role model for 
legislation in many countries world-wide” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENVIRONMENT 
2021). 
The current legal basis for the environment policy of the European Union is enshrined in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union emphasising that the Union environment 
policy aims at “preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting 
human health, prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, promoting measures at 
international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular 
combating climate change” (TREATY, EU 2012, Article 191). 
 
65 https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml, retrieved on 6 March 2021.  
66 Major accident hazards, The Seveso Directive - Technological Disaster Risk Reduction, 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/, retrieved on 6 March 2021. 
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Although the environmental disasters resulted in extensive litigation, neither future 
generations nor the environment are ever represented in court cases. Thus, Polly Higgins, an 
environmental lawyer proposed to the United Nations that ecocide be recognised as an 
international Crime Against Peace alongside Genocide, Crimes of Humanity, War Crimes and 
Crimes of Aggression, to be brought before the International Criminal Court. Higgins defined 
ecocide as "The extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystems of a given territory, 
whether by human agency or by any other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by 
the inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished" (HIGGINS et al. 2013, p. 257). 
To conclude the presentation of the main achievements of international cooperation it 
should be recalled that, due to the joint efforts in the international climate policy the first, legally 
binding international treaty on climate change was adopted in 2015. The Paris Agreement, 
which entered into force on 4 November 2016, aims to limit global warming by targeting a 
global peak level of greenhouse gas emissions, with a view to achieving a climate-neutral world 
by mid-century (PARIS AGREEMENT 2015, Article 4). 
3.2. Environmental issues at the agenda of the Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe has also recognised the importance of environment protection 
since the 1970s. To protect nature, the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife 
and Natural Habitats, commonly known as Bern Convention, was drafted in 1979 with a view 
to promoting national conservation policies through regional planning policies and pollution 
abatement (COE CONVENTION ETS 104, 1979). 
After the major disasters of the 1980s, the Organisation decided to set up a Co-operation 
Group for the prevention of, protection against, and organisation of relief in major natural and 
technological disasters. The objective of the “group shall be to make a multidisciplinary study 
of the co-operation methods for the prevention of, protection against, and organisation of relief 
in major natural and technological disasters” (CM RESOLUTION (87)2, 1987). Another aim 
of the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement was to develop new methodologies and tools for 
efficient risk management. To meet the major challenges posed by natural and technological 
hazards, the Agreement launched innovative action to promote a greater risk culture within the 
population, as well as better management of disaster situations by all responsible authorities 
(FACING RISK TOGETHER, CoE 2010). 
The legislative activity continued in the Council of Europe leading to the adoption of the 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment in 1993, to ensure adequate compensation for damage resulting from activities 
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dangerous to the environment, while also providing for means of prevention and reinstatement. 
As a further step, the Convention on the Protection of Environment through Criminal Law was 
also adopted in 1998. This convention aimed at a better protection of the environment by using 
the solution of last resort, the criminal law, for deterring and preventing conduct, which is most 
harmful to it (EXPLANATORY REPORT 1998, p. 2). The Landscape Convention was 
concluded in 2000 to promote landscape protection, management, and planning, and to organise 
European co-operation on landscape issues (COE CONVENTION ETS 176. 2000). Besides 
this standard-setting activity, there have been several efforts by the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe to add the right to a healthy environment to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Assembly referred to Principle 1 of the 1972 Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (REPORT, UNITED NATIONS 1972) and 
the conventions mentioned above, when arguing to draft an additional protocol to the ECHR 
concerning the right to a healthy environment (PACE RECOMMENDATION 1885 2009). 
Individuals and international fora are increasingly aware of the fact that environment 
related questions have serious impact on fundamental human rights.  The European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social 
Charter have no explicit reference to the right to a healthy environment, however, both 
instruments indirectly contain a certain degree of protection with regards to environmental 
matters through the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the European 
Committee on Social Rights, as the intergovernmental  Steering Committee on Human Rights67 
clearly stated (COE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 2021, p. 42). “Both the Court and the 
Committee have emphasized the evolutive nature of both instruments. The Convention and the 
Charter are living instruments, which, in order to effectively protect, need to be interpreted in 
light of present-day conditions. Such conditions are considered to include the current 
environmental crisis” (COE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 2021, p. 42). 
New impetus was given to the normative efforts of the Council of Europe in the field of 
environment and human rights after the unprecedented Amazon rainforest wildfire and the 
Australia bushfires in 2019. The European Court of Human Rights also delivered a new, an 
emblematic judgement in a case where the environmental pollution endangered the health of 
the applicants (ANNUAL REPORT, ECtHR 2020). To respond to the urgent needs, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided on 19-21 November 2019 to instruct 
its steering committee on human rights to update the Handbook on Human Rights and the 
 
67 Hereinafter referred to as CDDH (Comité directeur pour les droits de l’homme), intergovernmental expert 
committee of the Committee of Ministers.  
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Environment68 and, to develop a draft non-binding instrument of the Committee of Ministers 
recalling existing standards in this field for the 2020-2021 biennium (PROGRAMME AND 
BUDGET 2020-2021, CDDH 2019). To streamline the resources and capacity, the Steering 
Committee for Human Rights decided to set up a Drafting group on Human Rights and 
Environment (CDDH-ENV) at its plenary meeting held on 27-30 November 2020 (STEERING 
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 2020, p. 16). At its subsequent plenary meeting the 
new working group was tasked with the update of the Manual on Human Rights and the 
Environment, as well as the compilation of the draft non-binding legal instrument on human 
rights and environment. Besides, the new subgroup was also instructed to “consider the need 
for further work in this field, bearing in mind the obligations of the member States under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the steady development of the case-law by the 
European Court of Human Rights and national courts that foster the interconnection between 
the protection of the environment and human rights” (TERMS OF REFERENCE 2020). 
While the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights reacts more and more 
frequently to the environmental aspects, the first climate change application has been only 
lodged with the Court in the autumn of 2020. “The case concerns greenhouse gas emissions, 
which are believed to be contributing to global warming and manifested, among other things, 
by heat waves which would impact the living conditions and heath of the applicants. The 
applicants, aged between 8 and 21 years, claim that the forest fires that Portugal has experienced 
every year for several years, in particular since 2017, are the direct result of global warming to 
which such emissions have contributed.”69 The applicants’ case was submitted against 33 
member-states of the Council of Europe.70 
4. World Forum for Democracy 
The Council of Europe always seeks the most suitable structures and mechanisms to 
ensure its visibility on the one hand, and to promote Council of Europe principles across the 
world, on the other. The World Forum for Democracy was initiated in 2012 as a platform for 
dialogue and innovation in democratic governance. The annual event is co-organized by the 
Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the French authorities, the regional authorities of 
 
68 Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, Council of Europe Publishing, First edition 2006, second edition 
2012. https://rm.coe.int/09000016806962d1, retrieved on 30 May 2021. 
69 Protecting the environment using human rights law, CoE Website, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/human-
rights-environment, retrieved on 30 May 2021. 
70 Cláudia Duarte Agostinho et autres contre le Portugal et 32 autres États introduite le 7 septembre 2020, Requête 
no 39371/20, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-206535%22]}, retrieved on 30 May 2021. 
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Grand Est and the City of Strasbourg (A LOOK INSIDE 2016). The World Forum is a thematic 
event, the Forum addresses the key challenges each year with the involvement of government 
and parliamentary level, the civil society and private sector, academia, and youth.  Since 2012, 
the Forum addressed among others the issue of old models and new realities of democracy, the 
challenges of the digital age, the participation of youth in revitalising democracy, the dilemma 
of freedom versus control in the context of the migration crisis, as well as the problem of 
equality, populism, or the information age. 
The World Forum is not an institutionalised framework, rather a flexible, international 
floor where the stakeholders could exchange their views, build on the experience of the others 
and could elaborate recommendations to all level, from the governments, parliaments and 
political parties, through civil society and private sector to the international organisations 
(WORLD FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY 2018). 
The Forum is the eloquent example for reducing the transaction cost of coordination, the 
feature often referred to as an argument by the supporters of the institutionalist theory of 
international relations. According to Graham Allison, the challenges of the current world such 
as terrorism, drug trafficking and pandemics are the evidence that states can no longer react 
unilaterally to these threats, but global collaboration is needed (ALLISON 2000, p. 84). 
5. Can Democracy save the environment? 
The global pandemic reached Europe at the beginning of 2020 and redirected the attention 
to the global threats, to the interdependence, to the importance of cooperation and common 
responsibility. The societies recognised at global level to what extent we are interconnected. 
The lessons were drawn, and the World Forum will respond to the world events this year. The 
conference is exceptional this year also in terms of organisation, as the first event of the program 
was launched already last November with the aim that that through the campaign “12 months, 
1 question” could focus on one topic related to the question “Can democracy save 
environment?” The ninth Forum is therefore organised in three parts: the formal launching on 
18 November 2020, the 12 month-long series of events to be accessible on the WFD website 
(November 2020 – November 2021) and a 3-day live in-person event in November 2021. 
According to the concept note, the Forum seeks the answer to the question, who is 
responsible for the environmental protection. The national governments, international 
organisations or the citizens are the actors who are setting the scene? “What is preventing 
governments from taking more radical steps? Perhaps they are influenced by business and 
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economic interests, or by the demand for increased investment of public money in other areas 
ranging from infrastructure to pensions to public services” (WORLD FORUM FOR 
DEMOCRACY 2020). The experience of crisis management during the global pandemic raised 
the issue of the most suitable government approach to efficiently tackle the environmental 
challenges and the burden sharing between the public and private sector, is also a question that 
the 9th Forum intends to answer. 
Given that the relevance and added value of the Council of Europe derive from standard-
setting activity, the World Forum for Democracy can be considered rather as an awareness-
raising tool to direct the attention of all stakeholders, ranging from government to the civil 
sphere, to the importance of the issue. This spectacular international gathering will spotlight the 
environment-related challenges and place the issue on the political agenda of the Council of 
Europe. Therefore, the Forum strengthens and complements the normative efforts of the 
Organisation to legally regulate the right to a healthy environment. 
The 47 member states of the Council of Europe assume the presidency of the main 
decision body, the Committee of Ministers on a rotational basis. As the procedures and working 
methods of the Committee of Ministers (CM) specifies “The Chair of the CM is held for a six-
month term in turn by the representatives of the members in English alphabetical order. The 
Chair passes to a new Chair mid-May and mid-November, at a date fixed by the CM based on 
a joint proposal by the incoming and outgoing Chairs” (IGUIDE 2021, p. 2). 
Georgia assumed the Presidency between November 2019 and May 2020 and set as its 
Chairmanship priority the interrelationship between human rights and environmental 
protection. The programme of the Georgian Chairmanship recalled that the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not mention the environment and it is not 
specifically designed to provide general protection of the environment as such. In their view, 
the legal protection from environmental harm is firmly tied to fundamental rights such as the 
right to life, the right to respect for private life and family life and the right to respect for one’s 
home. The Georgian Presidency also aimed to strengthen environmental protection work in the 
Council of Europe through the existing programmes and treaties to secure better human rights 
protection standards in member states. In this spirit, the Georgian Presidency held an 
International High-Level Conference on Environmental Protection and Human Rights on 27 
February 2020 in Strasbourg. This event supported the organisation by the European Court of 
Human Rights of an International Conference on Human Rights and Environmental Protection 
“Human Rights for the Planet” held in Strasbourg on 9 April 2020 at the European Court of 
Human Rights (PRIORITIES, GEORGIAN PRESIDENCY 2019). 
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Rik DAEMS, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly also called for the upgrading 
of the current legal instruments, with the ultimate aim of drafting an additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights concerning the right to a healthy environment. In this 
perspective, he presented a three-step plan: the drafting of a recommendation by the Committee 
of Ministers to the member States on human rights and the environment; a possible convention 
on this issue setting out some standards; as well as, in the medium term, the drafting of an 
addition Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights (SPEECH, RIK DAEMS 2020). 
The joint declaration adopted at the end of the Chairmanship on 15 May 2020 
acknowledges the worrying trend in respect of the climate and the environment, underlines the 
Council of Europe’s commitment to environmental protection by referring its previous standard 
setting activity. The declaration proposed to launch a Council of Europe Strategy on the 
Environment and Human Rights with the aim of supporting member States in meeting their 
obligations in the field, including in respect of the United Nations Convention on Climate 
Change. The Declaration finally calls on the Committee of Ministers to elaborate a draft non-
binding instrument on human rights and the environment for the possible adoption by the 
Committee of Ministers at the latest by the end of next year (JOINT DECLARATION 2020). 
The Hungarian Presidency scheduled between May and November 2021 also intends to 
promote the implementation of the Council of Europe's existing instruments in the field of 
protecting the environment, thus a special emphasis will be placed on the European Landscape 
Convention and the Bern Convention. International cooperation and mutual assistance to ensure 
the fundamental right to a healthy environment is also an important part of the Hungarian 
Chairmanship efforts (KORMÁNYHATÁROZAT 1616/2020). 
6. Conclusions 
A considerable period has passed since international organisations appeared on the world 
scene besides the governments, as traditional players. Despite the creation of international 
organisations, the states remained the main actors of international relations given the simple 
fact that the new organisations functioned as intergovernmental structures. CAPORASO asked 
the question right after the collapse of the bipolar world in 1992, “Why has the concept of 
multilateralism not played a more prominent role in theories of international relations?”. The 
answer at that time was the lack of good examples or experience, or alternatively, the rise of 
bilateralism in the period of the Cold War. However, economists were already arguing already 
at that time that interdependence was on the increase, meaning that questions such as energy, 
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pollution, air traffic, trade and investment could not be dealt with effectively within the national 
arena (CAPORASO 1992). 
Due to these, mainly economic-related phenomena the perception about multilateralism 
has slowly changed as the influence and role of new players, the non-governmental or non-state 
actors has increased.  
At present, the impact of civil society and non-governmental organisations is undoubtedly 
high on the activity of intergovernmental organisations. Besides, the governments are obliged 
to face more and more transnational challenges, the effective management of which go beyond 
the national competence and require cross-border coordination, indeed global cooperation. The 
environment is precisely that kind of transnational phenomenon and the fact that only 
international partnership could bring concrete results is not a recent recognition. 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Chair of the UN World Commission on Environment and 
Development wrote in her report already in 1987 that “The traditional forms of national 
sovereignty are increasingly challenged by the realities of ecological and economic 
interdependence. Nowhere is this truer than in shared ecosystems and in 'the global commons' 
- those parts of the planet that fall outside national jurisdictions. Here, sustainable development 
can be secured only through international cooperation and agreed regimes for surveillance, 
development, and management in the common interest” (BRUNDTLAND REPORT 1987, p. 
179). 
After examining the ongoing developments in the Council of Europe related to the 
environmental protection and its connection to fundamental human rights, it can be concluded 
that the greatest added value of the Council of Europe is the possible elaboration of a new 
regulatory scheme. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights already tackles to 
some extent the environment-related aspects, but the Organisation also deliberately aims to 
further and strengthen its norms through guidelines, recommendations, or new legally binding 
instruments.   
In the light of the findings of the present paper, it is fair to say that it is not necessarily 
the international organisations but rather international cooperation which has the potential to 
save the environment. However, the international organisations have the means at their disposal 
to boost the level of interest at all levels of the society so that the public may seriously consider 
the impact of destruction of the environment. If the awareness-raising campaign is combined 
with legally enforceable targets, the international organisations, which include the Council of 
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The promise of sustainability and the pandemic? How 
Hungarian fashion production companies could gain 




East and Central European countries have been operating as invisible ‘tailor shops’ for Western fashion 
brands for decades. Fashion brands lately are moving back from Asia and this process can lead to a stronger 
European fashion industry. The COVID-19 pandemic could act as a catalyst to an already ongoing relocation 
tendency in production as the need for shorter, more resilient supply chains and the reform of existing production 
practices has been growing and serves sustainability. The aim of my paper is to examine the social aspect of the 
fashion industry and opportunities for Hungarian fashion production companies in terms of economic 
sustainability and competitiveness. My goal is to focus on examining the possible solutions of the tension between 
economic and social sustainability due to relocation tendencies as capacity (e.g. limits of labor, aging employers 
(employees?) and lack of technology development) versus growing orders and that existing assembly activity, 
contract work and that most workers are trained-on-the job or had vocational training. On the one hand, it is a 
disadvantage as it means low value-added process while on the other hand, fashion industry is a significant 
employer in rural areas for people with disabilities as well. The methodology of this research is qualitative 
(literature review and interviews). 
Keywords: re-location, global supply chain, Hungary, fashion industry, sustainability 
1. Introduction 
Sustainability has become a recent buzzword in the fashion industry as it has in other 
industries, but we have to differentiate between economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability. The three conceptual pillars of the paradigm of sustainability were first suggested 
by KAHN in 1995. According to his theory, the principles of economic sustainability are 
growth, development, knowledge and awareness, that market allocation of resources are limited 
and that there is a ‘trickle-down’ effect, suggesting that growth helps the poor. Social 
sustainability is usually considered as poverty alleviation and equity, empowerment, 
accessibility, participation, sharing, cultural identity and institutional stability. Furthermore, 
environmental sustainability refers to eco-system integrity, carrying capacity and biodiversity 
where natural resources are seen and handled as a source of economic inputs and a sink for 
waste (KAHN 1995). 
The social aspect of sustainability has been neglected and is also one of the most difficult 
to define. The failure of development and economic growth sparked a growing interest in social 
sustainability, but it has been termed as a ‘concept in chaos’ which compromises its importance 
and utility (VALLANCE et al. 2011). The authors suggest that social sustainability has three 
 




components: the first, ‘development’ sustainability, is concerned with meeting basic needs, 
inter- and intra-generational equity; second, ‘bridge sustainability’ focuses on changing 
behaviour so as to achieve bio-physical environmental goals; third, ‘maintenance sustainability’ 
refers to social acceptance or what can be sustained in social terms. 
MCGUINN et al. (2020) also emphasize that there is a fuzzy concept around social 
sustainability with no universal definition and adds core themes such as: human well-being and 
equity, access to basic needs, fair distribution of income, good working conditions and decent 
wages, equality of rights, inter-and intragenerational justice, access to social and health services 
and to education, social cohesion and inclusion, empowerment, and participation in policy-
making (MCGUINN et al. 2020). 
According to the voluntary sustainability initiative UN Global Compact, while it is the 
primary duty of governments to protect, respect, fulfil and progressively realize human rights, 
businesses can, and should, do their part. The Global Compact defines social sustainability from 
the firm’s point of view, as doing business in ways that benefits society and protects people 
(UN Global Compact). The cornerstone of the social dimension of corporate sustainability is 
human rights. The UN Global Compact expects businesses to undertake due diligence to avoid 
violating human rights and to address any adverse impacts on human rights that may be related 
to their activities and additional steps, such as creating decent jobs and more inclusive value 
chains. 
Kahn’s concept says that the three pillars of sustainability have to be coordinated in a 
comprehensive manner, so that integration and interlinking can arrest the negative synergies. 
However, as I suggest, there is a fundamental conflict of interest – or at least a tension – among 
several factors. Within Hungarian fashion companies – regarding the features of the industry’s 
supply chain and the characteristics of local companies – I identified several correlations worth 
studying. One of them is the minimum wage raise, which on the one hand means a higher salary 
for employees, however, on the other hand, for employers it means losing competitiveness. 
Furthermore, significant contract work and lack of capital; that means a low value-added 
activity; results in a trap for Hungarian fashion companies in subcontracting and make it 
challenging for moving towards higher value-added levels. The lack of capital also makes 
automatization more difficult, and adversely affects the development of plants and investing 
into new technologies and developing new solutions for companies that would increase their 
attractiveness among clients and increase productivity. 
According to Jeremy Rifkin, technology will always be cheaper than the cheapest labor. 
His vision is jobless factories in the future as information technology eliminates tens of millions 
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of jobs in the manufacturing industry (RIFKIN 1995). If technology leads to a reduced 
workforce, it will not serve social sustainability and inclusive employment.  As minimum wages 
increase companies lose their competitive advantage, and because of the seasonal rhythm of 
fashion (I will elaborate on this later) it makes it difficult for companies to manage their 
decreasing margins. The growing lack of labor and problem of aging employees have long 
posed challenges to the Hungarian fashion industry, as it grapples with the potential benefits of 
shorter supply chains and relocation tendencies. 
The fashion industry term comprises several aspects such as design, production and retail, 
and includes many segments such as textiles, garments, shoes, leather and fur and even textile 
cleaning, from the production of raw materials through the care, design and making of the 
garments to retail and even communication. The textile industry primarily produces raw 
materials for the garment industry, such as the production of the underwear and outerwear. I 
use fashion industry to refer to garment production intended for export (contract work for 
foreign brands) as it is the most relevant segment in terms of the discussion of Hungarian 
fashion production, representing the biggest value in exports and the biggest employer within 
different segments. 
The textile industry is considered to be a significantly higher polluter than garment 
manufacturing. As textile production is mainly based in Asia and Hungarian fashion companies 
rely on the already produced raw materials from the textile segment, I will focus mainly on the 
social aspects of sustainability. 
This paper focuses on the host country’s manufacturing background and the position of 
Hungary’s fashion production companies due to the shorter supply chains boosted by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Two questions are at the center of this research. First, are we moving 
closer to shorter supply chains? There is a growing literature in recent years in terms of 
(theoretical) examining the possible positive effects of shorter supply chains (both 
environmentally and economically). Second, in view of tensions between economic and social 
sustainability, what effect will shorter supply chains have on the Hungarian fashion industry 
and production sector (nearshoring, backshoring and onshoring)? 
2. The neglected social sustainability in the fashion industry 
The fashion industry is repeatedly referred to as ‘the second most polluting industry of 
the world’ (FRIEDMAN 2018). The most discussed and known sustainability issues of fashion 
are carbon emission, water consumption and pollution, environmental and microplastic 
pollution, and waste generation (MCFALL – JOHNSEN 2020). There is also a practice among 
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fashion brands of burning unsold collections at the end of the season, mainly with the aim of 
image-protection, causing serious environmental concerns (NAPIER – SANGUINETI 2018). 
Although sustainability concerns among the fashion industry have risen during the past 
few years, there is still a lack of reliable sources and data on the ecological footprint of the 
industry.  Due to its impossible-to-trace supply chain, it is hard to put a number on it 
(FRIEDMAN 2018). The current overproduction and overconsumption of the fashion industry 
is far from offering the economic sustainability in which supply satisfies the present 
consumption level without compromising future needs. With outsourced production, fashion 
companies can also turn a blind eye to environmental issues, human and labor rights violation 
during production. 
The current discussion about the sustainability of fashion is more centered around the 
environmental aspect – the social pillar is rather neglected. This omission was also underscored 
by The Fashion Pact (signed by 49 major fashion brands at the G7 Summit in 2019), one of the 
first, largely celebrated sustainability joint commitments to key environmental goals among 
leading actors. Labor rights fashion NGOs (Fashion Revolution, Fair Wear) have criticized the 
initiative for omitting the social aspect of the fashion industry. 
The world press has also covered and followed worker rights exploitation (e.g. sweatshop 
cases, The collapse of Rana Plaza in 2013), infringement of labor rights and working conditions, 
but the leading discourse and commitment of fashion brands are centered around environmental 
issues and the use of ‘greener’, recycled and organic materials. 
While other industrial sectors (like automobiles and electronics) build strategic 
partnerships and have their own factories and subsidiaries, the admitted practice in the fashion 
industry is working together with independent suppliers who are producing for several brands. 
(ANTALÓCZY – SASS 1998). That is also in line with the absence of due diligence practice 
and the issues of direct responsibility among fashion brands towards aspects of social 
sustainability. Furthermore, commitments towards granting living wages and proper working 
conditions are even outsourced to third party auditor companies in the fashion industry. The 
system has proved to be a hideaway for fashion brands and does not serve the interests of 
fashion workers (CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN 2019). This was also confirmed by a 2018 
research from the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute. Their main conclusion was 
that even when fashion brands are members of initiatives established to grant living wages and 
the development of fair working conditions, the opaque system allows them to relinquish direct 
responsibility (EDWARDS et al. 2019). 
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Furthermore, although discussion around the (un)sustainability of the fashion industry is 
mainly centered around fast fashion, other market segments (that I will discuss later) of the 
fashion industry cannot be considered ‘innocent’ either. The question is still open and 
unanswered regarding primarily voluntary and mainly image-making sustainability 
commitments, the ever-growing greenwashing of the fashion brands when it reaches a critical 
mass of the customers and turns to actual financial pressure under the guise of being more 
sustainable. 
Another question is also being raised in the center of debate of fashion’s sustainability, 
namely: the responsibility of fashion companies. As fashion is intensively globalized and most 
of the activities are outsourced, furthermore the supply chain is notoriously impenetrable, 
making monitoring and traceability challenging. There is an ongoing process within the 
European Union towards the regulation of supply chains: the German government has published 
a draft supply chain law that aims to hold companies accountable for human rights breaches. It 
is considered to be Europe's strongest legislation against worker exploitation (WATTS 2021). 
3. How COVID-19 disrupted the supply chain of the fashion industry 
The year 2020 also heightened the awareness of many challenges the fashion industry is 
facing, including supplier relationships, greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), employment 
structure, overproduction and waste. The COVID-19 pandemic most visibly disrupted the 
global supply chains of the fashion industry: as China is the biggest exporter of textiles 
(WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 2020), it raised the concerns in terms of dependency. 
When the pandemic broke out in China, the flow of raw materials to fashion producing 
companies in various countries was cut off as the pandemic spread – and variably affected – 
the different continents and countries. The fashion industry (including production, retail and 
consumption as well) faced various disruptions when the pandemic hit Western (European) 
consumer markets, with store closures and cancellation of fashion brand orders from mainly 
Southeast-Asian and East-Central European companies, or companies stuck with unsold 
collections (TEODORO-RODRIGUEZ 2020). 
Consequently, COVID-19 not only meant closed stores for fashion businesses but a 
humanitarian crisis at the end of the supply chain. Many brands cancelled orders when the first 
pandemic ‘hit’ with lockdowns, refusing to pay for billions of dollars of goods that had already 
been manufactured and shipped (ANNER – NOVA 2020) before the coronavirus outbreak. The 
result was devastating for the countries and millions of workers throughout the region of 
Southeast Asia. After a year, fashion companies slashed prices to stay competitive and orders 
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for the current season were down by 30% compared to the previous year; manufacturers even 
accepted orders below cost (DEELEY 2021). From the perspective of economic and social 
sustainability, the pandemic is having a devastating effect on the dependent end of the supply 
chain. 
The coronavirus pandemic and the following crisis turned attention to the importance of 
shorter supply chains and the need to reform existing production practices. Despite some 
progress being made by the global fashion industry in terms of wanting to escape from the co-
dependent relationship with China, the country remains the powerhouse of manufacturing 
infrastructure and a primary source of raw materials and other products, like trims and zippers 
(HALL 2020). Because of its labor-intensive nature as well as its geographical footprint, the 
garment value chain is one of the most exposed to supply chain shocks. Still, the 
interconnectedness and the economic case for making large-scale changes in the physical 
location of supply chains also has limits, such as making long-term investments or accepting a 
higher cost of goods (LUND – KRISHNAN 2020). As textile and garment companies operate 
in a competitive and highly globalized market, this puts pressure on prices and margins, leaving 
companies little buffers for such crises (EURATEX 2020). 
4. Delocation, then relocation: Problems with the supply chain of fashion 
4.1. The theories of delocation and the characteristics of fashion 
Fashion, especially the garment industry, is the most globalized industry of all 
(BONACICH – APPELBAUM 2000). Several factors and motives are shaping the production 
background of the fashion industry: international trade relations, regulations and agreements, 
institutional frameworks and conventions, the structure and business model of the certain 
fashion brands, (new) technology and human resources. Lately, social media and visibility, 
customer perceptions and expectations – for example the effect of ‘Made in’ - and transparency 
and sustainability concerns are also among the shaping factors of the fashion industry. 
The concepts of global commodity chains and value chains examine the world economy 
in light of globalization’s geographical inequalities. A common point they consider is that 
inequalities are caused by the way in which construction is organized. Even if we talk about 
production-driven or consumer-driven supply chains (GEREFFI 2001), internal power 
asymmetry provides different opportunities for position and profit-making (MOLNÁR 2017). 
By PORTER’s ‘location paradox’ (PORTER 1990), fashion brands – independently from 
the closeness of their market destination – outsourced production to independent suppliers and 
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subcontractors, rather than own factories – where production is the cheapest. Working together 
with independent factories and low labor cost allowed them to flexibly move (towards) 
production and assured competitiveness. Fashion brands can react quickly to economic changes 
by creating their own locations that lead to profitability in the long-term, by terminating fully 
or partly owned production facilities, and by outsourcing and using short-term contracts. 
According to comparative advantage, a feature of the delocation of the fashion brands’ 
production is that it moves resources and capabilities that can be developed during a certain 
time, rather than natural resources. A worker with a lower wage (naturally compared to the 
original country) who can be ‘trained-on-the job’ for relatively easy-to-make assembly tasks, 
can enjoy an absolute advantage, and that country can export more effectively (due to the lack 
or scarcity of the local, internal market). The Heckscher-Ohlin model (OHLIN 1967) says that 
countries export products that use their abundant and cheap factors of production and import 
products that use the countries' scarce factors. Furthermore, the factor theory says that 
comparative advantages in international trade do not come from differences of productivity, but 
rather from the availability of certain production factors. On the production side of the fashion 
industry, formerly fashion brands generated profits primarily from low labor costs. 
The textile and garment industry (especially the later as the needed technology/plant is 
relatively cheaper and easier to establish) with its high need of human labor are often a first 
step of industrialization in a developing country’s economy (FUKUNISHI – YANAGATA 
2014), while developed countries are moved towards upgrading, processes that require 
knowledge, higher value added and the opportunity for better profit (GEREFFI – 
MEMEDOVIC 2003). Upgrading means stepping out from a dependent position which is made 
possible through taking strategic functions and building own supply chains (SCHMITZ 2006). 
In the fashion industry, we can distinguish CMT (cut-make-trim), OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacturing – manufacturing with the addition of sourcing equipment and raw materials), 
ODM (Original Design Manufacturing – manufacturing with the addition of design) and OBM 
(Own Brand Manufacturing) as steps of development. 
With a neoliberal world economy, peripheral countries (like China, Bangladesh and 
Vietnam) became popular for fashion brands to outsource production for cheap labor as well as 
for cost-effectiveness.  Outsourcing has also targeted semi-periphery countries (Central and 
Eastern Europe, former soviet successor states and Balkan countries), and occurs within a 
country’s border as well (e.g. Italy). This extensional inequality relation is described by 
Wallerstein’s core-periphery model (WALLERSTEIN 1974). Extensionally, geographical 
inequality can be also described by the so-called pyramid model of the fashion industry: at the 
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top of the pyramid are the luxury brands and their small quantity collections (‘officially’) made 
by expert designers in Western-Europe (Italy and France especially have a long-standing 
heritage in the luxury sector); placed in the middle of the pyramid is the production of the ready-
to-wear segment (with bigger orders) made in Spain and Turkey; and at the base of the pyramid 
are the former socialist countries and the mass production of brands made in China and 
Southeast-Asian countries (THOMAS 2008). From the 1990s, the basis of the collaboration 
between Western and Eastern European countries’ fashion industry was the so-called outward 
processing trade (OPT) practice: contractors transported semi-processed products, like fabrics, 
cuttings or semi-finished products to low wage subcontractors in Eastern Europe for assembly 
and intermediate work processes (HANZL – HAVLIK 2003). As a result, periphery countries 
acted as ‘sewing workshops’ for Western fashion brands, a practice that has also remained after 
the regime change and accession to the European Union as well. The region is attractive for 
Western companies because of its geographical and cultural proximity, the existing production 
capacities, qualified workforce and low-level respect and inadequate adherence to national 
labor rights regulation (TERRE DES FEMMES 2002). In parallel with delocation tendencies, 
European fashion production also became a ‘declining industry’ with the Hungarian fashion 
industry becoming deeply integrated into global supply chains through the high rate of export 
and contract work.  Eastern-Central Europe is designated as semi-periphery in the world 
economy because of its intermediate and dependent position. According to ARRIGHI and 
DRANGEL, revenue from the core countries is able to block the periphery’s interests and they 
provide low income for them to stay in that position (MOLNÁR 2017). This theory holds 
validity in terms of the history of the region’s fashion production, as to this day companies do 
not earn enough from contract work to move towards significantly higher value-added 
processes or releasing their own products. 
Subcontracting, along with delocation is an intensifying feature of the fashion industry. 
The delocation – the remove from the local, native location and the outsourcing of certain 
processes – of the garment industry started in the 1950s with Japanese, Western European and 
American brands delocalizing towards Southeastern Asia, especially China (and Eastern-
Europe) and intensified with the financialization of the world economy (MONTERO 2011). 
The growing ‘internationalization’ of the fashion companies and the stepping into new markets 
and reaching out to new customer segments and strengthening middle classes provided the 
opportunity to widen their markets and reshaped the structure of fashion production, making it 
geographically fragmented. The fragmented production and the delocation of manufacturing 
(and the ceasing of own production) gave the opportunity for fashion companies to reduce their 
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costs with the delocation of labour-intensive processes, but had a degrading effect on local light 
industry (AMIGHINI – RABELLOTTI 2010). 
With intensified globalization, we have to separate the ‘headquarter’ country of the brand 
and the actual country of origin (COO). Delocation can look as if low value-added, labor 
intensive processes (CMT, assembly activities) are outsourced while high value-added 
activities (design and product development) are retained in the original country (AMIGHINI-
RABELLOTTI 2010). 
It is more sensible to see brand image (especially luxury brands) as being strongly 
associated with the COO, which indicates quality and a proof for the conditions in which the 
product is made and how it was made. Sustainability and ethical fashion have become ever 
more important determinants in customers’ decisions (FUTUREBRAND 2014). 
According to ANTALÓCZY and SASS (1998), Hungarian fashion companies work for 
6-8 brands at the same time, often through intermediates. German and Austrian clients are 
willing to build longer partnerships, but Italian and French companies pay lower fees, change 
their suppliers often and make contracts for 4-5 months at a time.  From the perspective of the 
host country, contract work is usually evaluated negatively as the subcontracting companies are 
heavily dependent and vulnerable. 
During CMT and OEM processes in the garment manufacturing even if there is no 
‘official’ knowledge transfer and no need for special know-how (just a need for on-the-job 
training) for assembly activities, we will see from the example of Hungarian fashion companies 
that producing garments for ‘Western demand’ helped them to acquire and learn the proper 
means of making quality garments even in the absence of contract work. 
4. 2. Triggers for relocation 
Decades ago, several European and American fashion brands rushed to reallocate their 
production to Asia with the aim of reducing labor costs. But the differences have become 
smaller as wages in peripheral countries have also increased. Fashion brands can benefit from 
proximity of production to their markets as well (BOF – MCKINSEY&COMPANY 2019). The 
fashion industry has reached a crossroads where speed beats marginal cost advantages and 
sustainability concerns are getting stronger. Traditional fashion supply chains are facing 
challenges due to convergent labor costs. Transportation is also significant: sea transport is the 
most common, but this takes time: around 30 days are required for a parcel to reach Western-
European markets from Asia, and air transport is considered to be too expensive 
(ANDERSSON et al. 2018). The ‘slowness’ of sea transport will not be able to serve the current 
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need for speed in the fashion industry and will thus need to be balanced with air transport. 
Former advantages of delocation are also derogated by geopolitical tension, which brings 
insecurity to trade agreements and fluctuating exchange rates. Relocation, as the action of 
moving to a new place primary focuses on fashion, moving away from Asian production takes 
place in nearshoring. As the practice of transferring a business operation to a nearby country, 
especially in preference to a more distant one, and backshoring or onshoring as the repatriation 
of production to the home country. 
With outsourcing and delocation the fashion brand does not have to invest into the needed 
plant and ongoing technological development, therefore it can easily move production to 
another place. One single fashion collection can contain around hundred ‘looks’ (a whole set 
of garments, like trousers, blouses, coats and additional accessories) and every single garment 
might require different technology and expertise. In the past, fashion brands presented two main 
collections (spring-summer and autumn-winter), then the industry added two additional 
collections (resort/cruise and pre-fall). With the growing pressure from fast fashion brands who 
present new garments on a weekly basis, the practice of ‘upper’ fashion brands have also 
changed, and we can witness the changing (growing) speed of fashion (several smaller 
collections per year) and a more ‘on-demand’ practice. This means a more rapid product cycle 
and shorter, more insecure relationship between fashion brands and suppliers. With the growing 
importance of speed in production and the fast-paced changes in fashion trends, the process has 
resulted in increasing domestic production that drives down costs and results in shorter lead 
times. Recent studies refer to this process as nearshoring (ANDERSSON et al. 2018). 
Conventional organizational structures and forecast-driven supply chains were formerly 
declared to be inadequate to meet the challenges of volatile and turbulent demand which typify 
fashion markets today; there is a constant call for agile supply chains to manage this volatility 
(CHRISTOPHER et al. 2004). Even if there is a tendency for the rationalization of the supply 
chain (meaning fewer suppliers for fashion brands), relying on a smaller number of suppliers 
can increase the risk of supply chain disruption (MCMASTER et al. 2020). 
Ordering and producing smaller quantities closer to the home country is also a tool for 
cost-effectiveness and can serve sustainability as well because relocation means reduced carbon 
emissions in transport and overproduction. 
Even if we consider delocation (and outsourced production) as a continuously ongoing 
tendency, operational challenges and increasing costs affect the management of the global 
supply chain. This leads to the reconsideration and reorganization of the activities within the 
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supply chain, such as relocation of production or switching to a local supplier (ROBINSON – 
HSIEH 2016). 
Developments in automatization and robotics have diminished the comparative 
advantages of low-cost countries (ROBINSON – HSIEH 2016). Furthermore, relocation 
tendencies are making supply chains more transparent and traceable, which supports 
sustainability. Nearshoring and onshoring can make even more economic sense as technology 
develops because automation will increase labor productivity, thus offsetting higher labor costs 
of near-and onshore production. But the garment industry is lagging behind other sectors in 
automation. One reason for this is that fashion companies rely on cheap labor; and the other is 
that sewing fabrics have proven difficult for robots to handle.  Only in recent years have 
solutions for automation in sewing selected fabrics become market ready (ANDERSSON et al. 
2018). The complexity of the garments and the wide range of fabrics within one collection make 
automation more difficult. On the other hand, challenges posed by automation are beneficial 
because this elevates the importance of human labor and employment. 
Various literature (KINKEL – MALOCA 2009; KINKEL 2012) dealing with relocation 
tendencies and reshoring, mentions a correction-strategy undertaken by fashion companies for 
bad decisions made with regards to the location of production in which they have miscalculated 
the benefits, costs and risks of outsourcing and production (ROBINSON – HSIEH 2016). Cost-
efficiency is not the only consideration of relocation: the recognition of the importance of local 
supply and production, changing customer needs, cost reduction and optimalization of the 
supply chain are also factors behind relocation tendencies. According to Robinson and Hsieh, 
certain fashion brands have started to reconsider the location of their production based on the 
customers’ perception of value connected to the ‘Made in’ effect, which also affects their 
position on the market. Pressure from (social) media and nongovernmental organizations and 
scandals in connection with human and labor rights violations mainly in Southeast Asia can 
also shape fashion brands’ decisions as part of an ‘image saving’, more ‘reliable’ working 
conditions and more regulated (but not necessarily enforced) labor rights. 
ANDERSSON et al. (2018) identified nearshoring, automation and sustainability as the 
three main tools for establishing a demand-focused garment value chain, offering nearshoring 
to mass market brands as well, stating that this tendency will not happen without challenges. 
As we have seen, relocation tendencies have been welcomed and even introduced in higher 
parts of the fashion pyramid. Bringing production back closer to consumers by near- and 
onshoring offers the opportunity for reducing the lead time.  According to their survey, 
however, fashion brands are more likely to take action by 2025. Garment production in Central 
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and Eastern European is fragmented (SMEs dominate), with volatility in quality and labor 
productivity in some countries where companies carry own environmental and social 
compliance risks. One of the main challenges is the sourcing of raw materials – which are 
dominantly sourced from Asia. European fabric and yarn production focuses on premium 
products and luxury customers. 
5. Promise or devastation? The effect of the (ongoing) coronavirus 
pandemic 
5. 1. Characteristics of the Hungarian fashion industry 
The labor-intensive garment industry is a significant employer in rural areas of 
underprivileged women, ethnic minorities, migrants and people with disabilities (MOLNÁR 
2017). The 6600 companies of the Hungarian textile and garment industry employs more than 
30 thousand people, according to the Central Statistical Office. Companies on average employ 
around 10-25 people, mainly to produce foreign fashion brands for export. They are not only 
capable of producing big series (1500-2500 pieces in an order) and for high category fashion 
brands like Stella McCartney, Nina Ricci, Saint Laurent, Dolce & Gabbana, Valentino and 
Carven, but are able to create haute couture garments with high craftmanship as well. The 
leather industry (foot, bags, belts) ‘enjoys’ the highest rate of export, followed by the textile 
industry.  The export rate for the garment industry (undergarments like lingerie, bathing suits 
and outerwear like coats, trousers, dresses, etc.) is around 80% (DOBOS-NAGY 2021b). Even 
though the Hungarian fashion industry is relatively smaller in size, compared to neighboring 
Romania (employs around 400 thousand people), Hungary stands ‘in midfield’ in Central-
Eastern-Europe’s fashion industry. 
I want to emphasize the fact that we cannot entirely rely on official statistics in terms of 
numbers of companies and employed. There are companies that operate under different TEÁOR 
(Classification of Economic Activities) categories in terms of activities that identifies them with 
garment production, and there are companies that operate as ‘zugvarroda’ (corner sewing 
shops): the term refers to fashion companies who work illegally without providing social 
security or granting minimum wages for the workers. 
As I have written previously, Eastern-Central Europe is called the semi-periphery of the 
world economy in world literature - a reference to its intermediate and dependent position. 
According to ARRIGHI and DRANGEL, revenue from the core countries is able to block the 
periphery’s interests and they provide low income for them to stay in that position (MOLNÁR 
2017). This theory holds validity in terms of the region’s fashion production, as to this day 
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companies do not make enough profit from contract work to move towards significantly higher 
value-added processes or releasing their own products (this section has been stated earlier). 
A joint survey carried out among Hungarian fashion companies in March 2020 by the 
Hungarian Society of Textile Technology and Science (TMTE) and the Association of 
Hungarian Light Industry (MKSZ) reported that three quarters of the companies are preparing 
for a more than 50% loss in their yearly production in 2020, and 60% had to lay off half of their 
employees (TMTE – MKSZ 2020). This result is in parallel with the conclusion of the European 
prognosis and the results of The European Apparel and Textile Confederation (EURATEX) 
survey, which reported that companies expect a 50% drop in sales and production and 80% of 
them are already laying off workers. Finally, the confederation forecasted the shutdown of 
every fourth European fashion company (EURATEX 2020). 
Hungarian companies were negatively affected as Italy and France faced serious 
pandemic-related lockdowns because of their heavy dependence on Western-European contract 
work.  These two countries represent a significant number of clients and an important retail 
destination for Hungarian made fashion products. Fashion production companies which offered 
very low costs for clients were more likely to face a financially challenging situation amid the 
pandemic. A few months later (after a spring shock) companies reported increasing orders and 
the comeback of clients. Furthermore, the local fashion industry envisions reduced seasons and 
collections, smaller orders, and more sustainable consumption within the industry in a long term 
(DOBOS 2020). 
In the following, I will highlight the main points and arguments of the unstructured 
extensive interviews worth considering in terms of labor and social sustainability, relocation 
tendencies and capital and automation. 
5.2.  Relocation promises 
The Hungarian Fashion & Design Agency (HFDA) was established as a subsidiary of the 
Hungarian Tourism Agency in 2018, with the aim of providing structured and efficient 
professional assistance to all players in the industry. The HFDA prognoses how the retreating 
role of the Far East in the region’s fashion industry and relocation tendencies can help reduce 
fashion’s carbon footprint and foster sustainability. From their point of view, relocation is 
significant within German companies.  “The region’s countries are a favorable production 
partner for Western-European brands because of the low labor cost and tax burden (compared 
to the home country) as they are willing to pay more for good quality and reliable solutions 
since they have been disappointed in Asian production” (DOBOS-NAGY 2021b). They also 
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urge and consider collaboration, strategic partnership among the region’s countries. They 
established a mentor program in August 2020 for fashion companies with the aim of developing 
their management, operational, sales and technology skills to improve their position in the 
region and in the international market. “As competition is very tense among the highest 
category fashion brands, everyone wants to work with the best producers who offer the best 
quality. The small Hungarian companies are in a great position as they are flexible and can 
work as an atelier, offering high handcraft skills and making complex products as well” 
(DOBOS-NAGY 2021b). 
According to Anna HANNAUERNÉ SZABÓ, head of the Textile and Garments Section 
of the National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (VOSZ), several fashion 
companies are seeking work contracts now and would greatly benefit if the procurement of 
contracts for vestments were produced by Hungarian companies. The fashion companies 
suffered a 13% loss in production last year and the rate is even bigger within companies that 
apply contract work. From her experience, relocation is not happening now. ‘We have seen 
positive displacement tendencies 2 years ago, around 2019. But one of the biggest clients of 
Hungarian fashion companies- German clients - are ‘sitting on the floor’ right now.” Fashion 
companies which can produce overalls for medical use are in a good position at the moment. 
“The production of home and car industry textiles helps fashion companies; it improves their 
statistics in a wild way” (DOBOS-NAGY 2021c). She also emphasized a tendency within local 
companies of moving towards other segments, like specializing and working with functional 
textiles as garment production is decreasingly beneficial. She sees the role of intermediate 
agents (mentioned above) decreasing, as it makes the whole production process more 
expensive, but points to the fact that without distributors, working for several, significant big 
companies is nearly impossible. 
Elegant Design Ltd. operates as an upgraded company since they act as intermediaries 
and subcontract assembly activity to 12 local and 20 Romanian factories, specializing in product 
development and logistics as well, working with 25 brands and welcoming new ones during the 
pandemic. I interviewed the director of the company, Ildikó MEDGYESSY. “We are getting 
enough (orders), but the prices are lower, by 10-20% or even by 30% and clients are paying 
later than the average.”  The director sees contract work as a chance for survival as most of the 
Hungarian companies do not have time and capital for developing own products (the financial 
return on own products is around 1 year, and contract work pays after 4-6 months). As one of 
the biggest fashion companies in Hungary (employing more than 100 people), her company 
finds itself in a very difficult situation with not enough orders for the season since one of its 
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biggest clients, an Austrian company, just closed operations. According to her, the worst 
scenario is that the local industry will shrink and bigger companies (employing around 50 
people, of which there are only a few) will disappear and small, atelier-type companies will 
work with anyone who can produce smaller quantities and is not in rivalry with Chinese  ‘vállfás 
áru’ (higher market category garments) (DOBOS-NAGY 2021a). 
One of the biggest garment factories, the successor of ‘Vörös Október Ruhagyár’ (Red 
October Garment Factory) and former Berwin Ruhagyár Zrt. (Private Limited Company), now 
ARJ Ruhagyár Zrt. (Private Limited Company) in Vásárosnamény left its 530 workers ‘in the 
lurch’ in 2020. The company is a rare example of foreign brand ownership: the putative British 
owner, Edinburg Wollen Mills retail group neither fired nor paid the workers of its Hungarian 
suppliers. The workers at Vásárosnamény, who earned 120-130 thousand forints a month (that 
is less than the settled national minimum wage), had sewn male suits for mainly the Baumler, 
Paul Costelloe and Ted Baker brands. There are no other employment opportunities close to the 
Ukrainian border and with the closing of the company, livelihoods of entire families working 
at the factory has been threatened. The probable causes of the closure were reduced orders and 
bad management, while the COVID-19 pandemic was another body blow for the loss-making 
company (NAGY 2020). 
The joint KÉZMŰ, ERFO and FŐKEFE nonprofit company is the biggest employer of 
workers with reduced work capacity and people with disabilities. On 140 manufacturing sites 
with 10 thousand employees, 83% are workers with reduced work capacity. The company has 
clients with whom they have been working for 5-10 years. Currently, 20% of their partners are 
‘new’ (started working with them during the past 1-2 years) and they are experiencing a ‘day-
to-day’ growth in new clients. In their experience, those fashion brands who offer smaller series 
were not likely to outsource their production to the Far-East. They also confirm the increasing 
occurrence of fashion brands’ relocation of production from Asia, according to their numbers 
from the past 3 years, and even brands offering bigger quantities want to find partners in the 
region. It has been their experience that it is primarily German, Austrian and Italian fashion 
brands that are relocating their production and offering confections, home textiles, bags and 
leather goods. “The process has also begun with the sourcing of raw materials. China offers 
overall favorable prices for the finished products, but these textiles are relatively expensive 
when compared to cheap production cost. Those (fashion brands) that want to run production 
closer to home, find better prices for textiles in the Near East” (DOBOS-NAGY 2021c). 
According to this joint nonprofit company, flexibility is one of the most important attributes for 
fashion brands who are suffering from shrinking markets and a challenging marketing 
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landscape for which they cannot give a ‘long-term prognosis’. To counter this challenge, they 
will need to adhere to very strict deadlines (DOBOS-NAGY 2021d). 
5.3. Labor and social sustainability 
The comparative advantage of Hungarian fashion companies lies in quality contract work, 
of which labor cost is a crucial element. After the regime change, the vocational training system 
collapsed in Hungary and most of the workers employed in sewing operatives were often low-
skilled and trained on the job. The wages of fashion workers closely follow the minimum 
guaranteed salaries and wages. Earning the minimum wage is not attractive for the (younger) 
workforce as low wages do not reflect the complexity and exactitude required in garment 
sewing, moreover, being employed in cheap public work also has a stigmatizing effect. From 
the perspective of an aging workforce Hungary is in a terrible position, according to Anna 
HANNAUERNÉ SZABÓ. “There is no education. Only bigger fashion companies are able to 
organize trainings.” In her experience, the only three factors that matter to clients are quality, 
time and cost (DOBOS-NAGY 2021c). Hungary has received ‘good press’ regarding the 
respect and enforcement of (labor) laws.  It has become increasingly important to Hungarian 
fashion brands that health and safety at work is guaranteed at companies where their products 
are made, which have proven to deliver better quality than Romanian, Bulgarian and Ukrainian 
companies (DOBOS-NAGY 2021e). 
During the past few years, minimum wages were raised by the Hungarian government by 
8-10% on a yearly basis. But according to Eurostat, this is still the second lowest wage (442 
euros) in 2021 in Europe and just ahead of Bulgaria (EUROSTAT 2021). From the social 
sustainability point of view, it is a welcome sign that workers are receiving higher and higher 
wages every year, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, because of the seasonal rhythm of fashion 
and since local governments announce the actual wage increase at the end of the year (being 
introduced from January of 2022), companies agree with clients on prices for the following year 
because collection pieces start being produced more than half a year before hitting the retail 
segment. It is challenging for companies to economize an 8-10 percent higher salary for their 
workers when they operate with smaller and smaller margins each year. Through their agent 
and sourcing representative fashion brands can decide on moving production to a cheaper 
neighboring country, like Bulgaria or Ukraine. Secondly, having a national, settled minimum 
wage does not mean that workers are getting that amount of money. There are companies where 
employee wages are attached to the competition of ‘daily norms’: if they complete 80 percent 
of the norm, they get 80 percent of the minimum wage. Hungarian labor rights are decreasingly 
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serving the interests of workers. Overtime is often not paid as the overtime law sets a ‘working 
hours framework’, which in practice means that overtime work in mean, as times is ‘slipped 
down’ during ‘dead seasons’ (DOBOS 2019). Nowadays, according to the Trade Union of 
Mining, Energy and Industrial Workers, there is no company where workers do not get the 
minimum wage – daily norms are set to be completed (DOBOS-NAGY 2021e). 
“Since the textile and garment industry is labor-intensive in nature, it is a big employer 
especially in the segment of labor-intensive confection production. Furthermore, in knowledge-
intensive technologies, the use of modern communication tools can be attractive for the younger 
generation as well. Poland, Romania, and Ukraine have slightly lower labor costs than Hungary. 
Local companies can benefit from the emigration of skilled labor from neighboring countries. 
Customers are interested in fewer, but better quality and more expensive clothes offered by 
brands” (DOBOS-NAGY 2021b). 
The operation of KÉZMŰ, ERFO and FŐKEFE demonstrates that workers with 
disabilities are perfectly able to fulfill every step of fashion production, from cutting to sewing. 
The only difference between normal workers and workers with disabilities is the amount of 
time required to complete tasks, not quality. Reduced work capacity also entails increased 
precision in their work, focused attention and in some cases increased tolerance of 
monotony. ‘More and more (fashion) companies are talking about social responsibility, and 
when they can point to employing workers with disabilities the perception of their value in the 
public eye also improves’. (DOBOS-NAGY 2021d). This tendency to support social 
sustainability and inclusive employment is highly favorable for them.  
Promoting the employment of people with disabilities by law can also have a negative 
effect. Law No CXCI. of 2011 declares that companies employing more than 25 people must 
ensure that 5% of their employees are people with disabilities. If this condition is not met, the 
company is required to pay a rehabilitation contribution amount of 1,449,000 Hungarian 
forints/person/year in 2021 (where the amount is nine times the minimum wage, as set in each 
case, and the company must pay the compulsory rate of employment for the missing number of 
disabled employees). Not surprisingly, the (favorable) tax paid by the state system on behalf of 
people with disabilities has reportedly led to an unjustified rivalry between garment companies 
(TMTE 2017). As Rozália SULYOKNÉ KRUSPÁN, representative of the Trade Union of the 
Mining, Energy and Industrial Workers points out, several companies have considered 
employing people with disabilities in the interests of reducing the tax burden for the company. 
Nevertheless, by doing so the integration of these workers into the larger community along with 
facing different working conditions can lead to conflicts as well (DOBOS-NAGY 2021e). It is 
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hard to say exactly how many fashion companies are paying the rehabilitation contribution as 
the Central Statistics Office registers only the number of companies by branch of economic 
activity (not by persons employed).  The CSO counted 7 454 registered (2020) and 4 954 
operating (2019) companies dealing in textile, garment, leather and leather goods. 
There is also an unexpressed tension between the workers, the company and fashion 
brands because of the difference between the prime cost of the garment (the price that the 
producer receives after each piece) and the final retail price of the garment, which can be 5-8 
times higher than the workers’ monthly salary.  Previously this cost difference was a multiplier 
of around 2-2.5, and there is a reported tendency that this is growing. But as Hungarian fashion 
companies are relying on foreign fashion brands, we cannot consider this tension as a threat to 
relocation tendencies.72 
The interviewees identified the diminishing prestige of fashion work and low wages as a 
primary cause of the reduced workforce. Furthermore, public opinion looks at fashion 
production as being old-fashioned. It will be crucial to raise the level of education and 
vocational training, with a focus on integrating practical skills for the 21st century. The 
development of education in terms of connecting ‘theory and practice’ will be key in winning 
the younger generation. 
5.4. Technology and capital 
From the point of view of the interviewees, the beneficial factors of Hungarian production 
are the following: geographical proximity; cost-effectiveness in transport; long-standing 
tradition in manufacturing; easy, effective and fast communication; the opportunity of 
collaboration from the design process to product development and final product; keeping 
deadlines; fast and easy correction of problems and misunderstandings; high work capacity; 
and a work mentality that they described as being ‘we love to meet challenges’. 
According to the head of the Textile and Garment Section at VOSZ, the technology 
facilities at companies that export for ‘big brands’ are modern and appropriate. “There are 
several small companies who are actually not able to invest in new technologies. They can only 
maintain a good position through building stable relationships with clients and contractors” 
(DOBOS-NAGY 2021a). 
 
72 Note: The prime cost depends mainly on the details and complexity of the garments and the difficulty of handling 
the designated material. In practice, the garment price is often set by clients based on former estimates and their 
willingness to pay. 
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Ildikó MEDGYESSY also underscored the point that virtually every fashion company 
has tried to come up with own collections and create an own product line with the aim of 
upgrading, but she described this tendency as a ‘stumbling effort’. She does not see the available 
technology as posing a threat to human labor. 
Nonetheless, interviewees also identified various obstacles to the Hungarian fashion 
industry, such as: the constantly declining number of skilled workforce; the acceptance of 
higher prices by customers and the market;  the offering of favorable prices (labor costs) by 
neighboring countries (like Serbia and Croatia); the inability of companies to invest in 
automation even if the technology was available; fluctuating market demand; and the lockup of 
production capacity, which is hard to plan for most of the time. 
6. Conclusion 
Companies offering premium or high-end products are more likely to re-shore their 
production. That tendency can be beneficial for Hungarian fashion companies who are 
specialized in high quality contract work. Longstanding traditions are respected by Western 
European fashion brands and Hungarian fashion production companies meet the requirement 
of the high quality, even luxury segment. Several factors that shape relocation decisions (listed 
above as geographical proximity, cost-effectiveness in transport, long-standing tradition in 
manufacturing, easy, effective and fast communication, the opportunity of collaboration from 
design processes to product development and final products, etc.) is favorable for Hungarian 
fashion production companies. As Hungarian fashion companies offers slightly higher prices 
for products compared to neighboring countries, the effect of the pandemic and the ceasing of 
orders can be beneficial for them. It is important to point out the co-dependence between 
production and retail. On the one hand, some fashion companies reported an increase in clients 
(fashion brands) and growing orders but on the other hand, others suffered and reported 
devastating consequences as fashion brands, their main clients, went bankrupt and closed 
operation. The results of the interviews show divided and opposing results in terms of growing 
relocation tendencies and the promise of ongoing nearshoring, backshoring and onshoring 
tendencies.  
Labor-intense fashion production is a significant employer, especially in rural areas, of 
people with disabilities who are fully able to handle every step of fashion production, so in 
terms of inclusive employment as defined by the 8th goal of the United Nations Sustainable 
Development (“Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and 
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productive employment and decent work for all”), these companies are providing decent jobs 
in fashion as required. 
In consequence of the tensions between social and economic sustainability, my 
hypothesis is that some sacrifice has to be made at one level. Furthermore, the possibilities of 
upgrading options for technology development is limited as most fashion companies suffer from 
a lack of capital. 
Automation and new technologies would make Hungarian fashion companies more 
attractive and that would mean increased productivity and shorter lead times. But this is 
challenging since local companies suffer from a lack of capital and small orders (tens or 
hundreds of pieces per model). The need for investment into new technology also came at the 
worst possible time as companies are suffering from the effect of the ongoing pandemic and 
uncertainty of the market, while being heavily dependent on foreign fashion brands orders. 
Even if almost every company tried to upgrade their activity, only a few could move to higher 
levels of collaboration in terms of OEM, ODM and OBM because of the lack of capital as they 
are trapped in subcontracting, which is less profitable. 
Even if relocation tendencies are boosted by the ongoing pandemic and the crisis, there 
are several factors that challenge Hungarian fashion companies. One of the most important is 
the growing lack of workforce and the aging of employees with no possible second generation 
of workers, since jobs are attached to minimum wages. Working in fashion production is 
considered to be ‘old-fashioned’ and not attractive in terms of the complex and precise nature 
of fashion production. As several interviewees emphasized, one of the most important 
advantages of Hungarian fashion companies is the experienced workforce who meet the 
demands of producing even the highest, luxury brands. A second-generation workforce – with 
less experience – could possibly threaten the established relationships between companies and 
fashion brands in terms of excellent quality or it could lead to reduced productivity.  
Development of the vocational training system and investment into retraining would be needed 
as well. 
Another factor worth considering in terms of (re)location of production is the 
geographical change in the main market of the fashion brands. After receiving feedback from 
one of her clients, one company’s representative (director) turned the spotlight on the growing 
share of the Asian market (momentarily fashion companies are relying on the re-opened Asian 
market more than on the European market) by saying: ‘there is still a status in buying and 
wearing clothes that are European’ (DOBOS-NAGY 2021a). A switch in market destination 
can shape (and undermine) relocation tendencies. 
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As I have indicated above, relocation came primarily from Western-European fashion 
companies (especially German) which are suffering from the economic effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic. A total rebound of the fashion market is unpredictable, and it is really hard to 
prognose anything concerning changing customer demand. For this reason, stability and the 
search for new opportunities for fashion companies (home textiles, other industrial segments, 
functional garments) are needed. 
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Social sustainability as a synonym for social flexibility in 
the international context - The case study of Ireland 
Katalin NÁDAS-NAGY73 
Abstract 
The research seeks to revisit the relevance of social sustainability in the international context. It explores 
the concept’s theoretical and practical impacts from the perspective of analysing nation-states' international 
position by investigating the states’ competitiveness. Social factors are most often used to be applied as a 
measuring tool of development level or competitiveness of a country, while partially different social goals are 
declared by sustainability perspective. The paper focuses on these two policy-shaping goals of nation states and 
finds out their overlapping and altering social impacts on states’ international position and behaviour.   
Social relating factors of social sustainability and competitiveness are compared as the determinant factor to 
adapt nation states themselves to the given global context and to become a successful global economic actor by 
enforcing their own national interest. This approach motivates the macro level research focus on social 
sustainability while considering the fluidity of the international system as a complex exogen factor.  
The Celtic Tiger's unexpected economic performance and international position-change from the near past are 
used as examples and analysed from the perspective of social sustainability. 
 
Keywords: social sustainability, international social flexibility, Ireland, sustainable competitiveness, international 
relations, social conditions of competitiveness, GSDI, GCI, SPI 
1. Introduction  
The modern nation-states' social features play an increasingly important role in their 
international position in political and economic terms as well. The current world economic 
system (CALHOUN – DERLUGUIAN 2011) generated fundamental changes in national 
economies' main pillars and mechanisms in the last few decades. Consequently, national 
economies became mostly market- and competitiveness-driven and built up through the 
requirements of the current meaning of competitiveness (POPESCU et al. 2017). In the 21st 
century, these factors determine and mainly cover the local social policies in the developed part 
of the world as instruments for achieving a stable and safe position globally. Deep globalization 
and the explosion of digitalization has re-shaped the global supply chains (UM 2021) and 
generated new challenges regarding the natural environmental and long-term sustainability in 
any sense. However, instead of the widening debate on sustainable development, the concept 
of social sustainability seems to still lack a widely accepted, unified definition (HOPWOOD et 
al. 2005; DEMPSEY et al. 2016; EU POLICY DEPARTMENT FOR ECONOMIC, 
SCIENTIFIC AND QUALITY OF LIFE POLICIES DIRECTORATE 2020). This fact 
illustrates the complexity of the topic and the deep interconnection between the policies’ effects 
in other fields. Preferences determine the policy-making processes, but every decision has a 
 




clear impact on the other dimensions of the life and makes significant impacts on the society as 
the basis of every national performance. 
As Marcuse illustrates, sustainability as a goal means the preservation of the current 
status quo of the state’s and community’s situation (MARCUSE 1998). Following this idea, the 
paper aims to explore these overlapping impacts on society from the competitiveness and social 
sustainability perspectives/goals in parallel, by implementing the hypothesis on the direct 
correlation between the determining success of competitiveness on social sustainability and 
back and forth. If their social conditions are the same and their correlation is quite evident, the 
substantive state sustainability policies are in theory easy to design. But if their social factors 
are differing, the countries find themselves in a difficult position to decide if they want to be 
socially sustainable or economically successful. The second scenario should create a 
particularly uncomfortable position for states, but also a really bad news for the global 
environment. The hypothesis is challenged with the case of Ireland and the society’s 
sustainability behind its economic success. 
Competitiveness provides the research context as a complex and well-defined indicator 
containing numerous social indicators. Social conditions of being competitive are more and 
more included and discussed in the competitiveness indices since 2011, when the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) redesigned its Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and implemented 
certain sustainability indicators to the original index design (SCHWAB – WEF 2011-2019). As 
an alternative methodology, the Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index (GSCI) was 
launched in 2013 based on more sustainability factors and less economic ones (SOLABILITY 
2013) to realise the complex and multidisciplinary approach on states’ global economic 
performances and their sustainability conditions. Mentioning only the included indices, the 
sustainable progress index (SPI) from 2019 is created by the EU based on the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals from 2015 (UN SDGs 2015). The latter one represents the pure social 
sustainability goals in the current paper. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) (SEN 1994) ranking position of a state seems to 
become obsolete and can only explain partially the states’ real conditions but can easily mislead 
the investigation (KELLEY 1991; RAVALLION 1997; NEUMAYER 2001, 2010). For 
instance, the role of the democratic values, as the HDI and former competitiveness analysis's 
key pillars, seems to lose its influence on the states' success (f.i. economic success of China and 
Singapore). Consequently, the research analyses the society-relating factors of (sustainable) 
competitiveness of GSCI and GCI, and compares them with the indicators of Sustainable 
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Progress Index (SPI) as a control group of factors in social sustainability in order to explore the 
similarities and altering points of competitiveness and pure social sustainability. 
First, the paper discusses the relevant literature on social sustainability, demonstrating 
the key role of social indicators of any national actions and clarifies the current understanding 
and meaning of the social factors of competitiveness and the sustainability conditions of 
societies. In the research chapter, the analysed and compared indicators and indices are 
introduced. Continuing with the comparison of the indices, the overlapping and altering 
conditions are collected and analysed. The next chapter discusses the Irish case study 
specifically to illustrate the relationship of the economic and social policy goals’ results on 
competitiveness, as one of the most remarkable examples in economic and development success 
during the last few decades. Finally, the last phase sums up the findings and conclusions of the 
research. The analysis is made from a state perspective and discussing the state-level impacts 
of the analysed research fields in every sub-chapter of the paper with special focus on the Irish 
case. 
The conclusion of the research offers the need for a switch in the approach toward the 
challenge of sustaining states' communities in themselves and the policies behind countries' 
sustainable global performances. By using Ireland as case study, the research explores the 
correlation of sustainable competitiveness and sustainable progress based on social factors and 
their relationship, exploring the sustainability of the society behind them. 
2. Society as the common source of everything 
2.1. Approaches on social factors of the sustainability debate 
Society is the base resource of everything. Hence, society deserves a highlighted 
position in sustainability research, meaning it gets a special investigation separated from the 
general sustainability and competitiveness debate (GRIESSLER – LITTIG 2005; CUTHILL 
2009). especially because the new global economic system generated serious social trends 
internationally. For instance, the national boundaries lost their relevance, the diaspora policies 
and properly educated workforce importing strategies of states to fill up the possible lack of 
workforce run on higher intensity (IRISH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
TRADE 2015). Because of these kinds of reasons, this research deals with society not only as 
set of surrounded indicators in the sustainability and competitiveness debate, but as a core factor 
of national performances in any terms, which means social policies with social development 
goals are a core generator of every other policy. However, some researchers force the policy-
based investigation of social sustainability (MURPHY 2012). Although, because of the 
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limitations of the paper, specific policies are only mentioned in this research, instead their 
results are analysed through the implemented indices. 
Every activity of a state is built up on the members of the community. Beyond the proper 
workplaces for qualified workforces and the available quality of life, society exists as a unit, as 
an organization of people and such, reflecting and influencing all the circumstances around 
itself. The sustainability debate, including the social sustainability dimension, seeks to catch 
this interconnection of social, economic and environmental dimensions of our life, however, 
during the evolution of the concept it is implemented in different ways and weights the three 
pillars (FOLADORI 2005). As the researchers tend to underline, the concept has no clear, 
widely accepted definition, but all the research evaluates special definitions and meanings of 
the notion (BOSTRÖM 2012; DESPOTOVIC et al. 2016; EU POLICY DEPARTMENT FOR 
ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND QUALITY OF LIFE POLICIES DIRECTORATE 2020). 
The multidimensional approach dominates the literature, while the one-pillar model used to 
refer to society as the cause of ecological and other sustainability problems (Figure 12 and 
Figure 13). Also, more and more researchers highlight the fact that social sustainability has to 
be discussed in itself, as a unique and individual topic, such as economic development for 
instance. This research represents a kind of crossover between these approaches as focusing on 
the society’s sustainability but investigating it from a multidimensional point of view of the 
applied indices. 
The social sustainability pillar’s factors refer to different issues than societal 
sustainability does. In the first case, society is part of a complex interaction as a pillar, while 
the second approach emphasizes the sustainability of the community itself in the given 
environmental and economic context. During the research, the Irish competitiveness 
performance is utilized to illustrate the relation between economic and societal sustainability 
behind a successful economy. As GRIESSLER and LITTIG (2005) discuss, the sustainability 
level of society suggests the quality of the available lifestyle and level of life for the members. 
As such, the two mentioned approach on sustainability with society relations are 
undistinguished and unseparated. 
Certain researchers handle social sustainability as analytical tool, while others investigate 
it as individual research field. Instrumental approach is found in the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals, while analytical perspective is demonstrated mostly in urban sustainability 
research (DEMPSEY et al. 2011), where the goals and needs of the community are also 
included to the debate. Based on BOYER et al.’s work (2016), the current research deals with 
social sustainability in the way where social sustainability plays a key role in the economic and 
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environmental sustainability of the country. From this perspective, society is a foundation and 
number one resource of being sustainable in the two other fields – especially because the case 
country’s story suggests this kind of correlation behind the Irish economic miracle as well.  By 
the hypothesis, the determining role of SS is also mentioned, as the social changes generate 
directly and visibly changes in the economic and environment field as well. 
 
Figure 12: Social Sustainability as a Pre-Condition for Environmental and Economic Sustainability. 
Source: BOYER et al. 2016, p.7. 
 
 
Figure 13: Social Sustainability as the Casual Mechanism of Economic and Environmental Change.  
Source: BOYER et al. 2016, p.8. 
 
As THORE and TARVERDYAN (2016) emphasize in their research, one of the most 
doable ways to measure the effectiveness of sustainability goals are policies and their 
measurable results in indicators. This approach is crucial in exploring the connection between 
practical and theoretical faces of sustainability-driven policies. This point of view has relevance 
in the Irish case as well, especially because while the direct correlation between their social and 
education policy reforms (IRISH NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 1981; 
O’CONNOR 2014) and the Celtic Tiger’s miracle (BATTEL 2003; MURPHY – OESCH 2018; 
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JOHNSTON et al. 2019) is discussed from competitiveness and economic perspective, and the 
sustainability relevance of these policies are mostly neglected. 
Current research focuses on social sustainability with the meaning of sustainable 
communities in themselves. Such as the sustainable city and community studies, this fraction 
of social sustainability stresses the specific social factors of making a community sustainable 
as a group of members with different demographic and lifestyle features but with many similar 
challenges, living at the same area and circumstances. (DEMPSEY et al. 2011; DESPOTOVIC 
et al. 2016; HALE et al. 2019). If a community is not sustainable in itself, all the other pillars 
of sustainability are out of the debate and the mission is unrealizable. Probably this condition 
is valuable in all the three pillars of sustainability. 
As current literature keeps emphasizing, sustainability needs creativity and alternative 
solutions, while the number one motivator and generator of the current global economy is 
innovation as well. This means that if a nation state’s society bears these features and the 
necessary infrastructural and institutional environment is available, this community is 
sustainable and competitive by definition. But as reality demonstrates, the formula is not that 
simple, although the SGCI tries to cover the whole set of these issues at the same time, the 
existence of creativity and having a sustainable economy do not necessarily overlap each other. 
2.2. The idea of social flexibility 
As the researcher comes from the field of international relations, the social sustainability 
debate is complemented with international context, such as the international position of states 
or their abilities and capabilities to act in certain ways. The Irish case illustrates the close 
interaction of the economic development and the international position of the country. Based 
on this link, the research suggests that if a country’s economic performance is sustainable, then 
its international position is as well. Also, the social conditions of being competitive covers 
partially the same conditions of being sustainable and socially developed by definition. These 
interconnections of the fields suggest a deeper meaning of social indicators in the sustainability 
debate. Beyond the already discussed social indicators and their roles in sustainability, this 
feature of a society means more. Namely, the more sustainable society can react more easily to 
outside effects and can adapt in the new circumstances. That is the meaning of social flexibility. 
It is staying somewhere between social conditions of sustainability and competitiveness. It is 
more than only servicing factor of the sustainability goals. Basically, the overlapping social 
indicators of sustainability and competitiveness and the infrastructural and institutional 
environment for their realization. 
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The research seeks to find evidence to the suggested notion and prove the existence of 
this adaptation ability of nation states by assuming that if a nation state’s competitiveness and 
social sustainability level is high, the flexibility has to be high and to mean a stable and strong 
international position as well. 
3. Research – social sustainability or/and economic success 
3.1. Research methodology 
The current research aims to explore the relationship between the conditions of social 
sustainability and competitiveness, especially because some previous, statistical research finds 
that at certain points and indicators, the two goals are in serious contradiction. BOSTRÖM’s 
research (2012) on the conceptualisation and analysation of social development and 
sustainability demonstrates the unclear features of the theory. Also, he underlines the good 
increments of this flexibility of the concept. The other significant part of the social sustainability 
literature is focusing on the direct links between society and economic performance, as 
emphasizing the kind obvious interconnection between the two main systems of a country 
(KAHN 1995; SACHS 1999; KETSCHAU 2017). 
H0: Based on the referred research above and the well-known negative 
consequences/effects of economic competitiveness on environment and on the minimum 
conditions of social sustainability, as a goal is in serious contradiction with competitiveness. 
The GCI’s new version completed with sustainability indicators obviously shows kind of 
harmony with social sustainability goals of the UN SDGs, but showing significant alterations 
in the ranking regarding GSCI ranks. 
H1: If a country is socially sustainable it means that its competitiveness is in proportion 
and in parallel, it follows this sustainability feature and is based on the already developed social 
conditions The state is able to reach a high level of competitiveness. Also, the converse scenario 
has to be true: the higher level of competitiveness means the higher level of social sustainability.  
During the research, the original indicator set of GCI and GSCI are compared and 
understood in the context of the sustainability of societies. 
Measuring and benchmarking in sustainability is a difficult task to do. (EU POLICY 
DEPARTMENT FOR ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND QUALITY OF LIFE POLICIES 
DIRECTORATE 2020). Firstly, because the conditions and circumstances are constantly 
changing around us, while for many issues we have no proper and available data. Hence, the 
current research narrows the research field to economic success and its social conditions to 
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understand the connection between development sustainability and sustainability of the society 
in the case of Ireland. 
Following the aim of the research, the analysis focuses on the similarities and alterations 
of GSCI’ social indicators and the GCI’s ones. Moreover, these indicators are compared with 
the pure social sustainability factors without the competitiveness goals. The theoretical analysis 
focuses on the different indices’ socially relating indicators by their contents and their 
measuring factors as well. Sustainable Progress Index serves as a counter-, or reverence point 
in the research, representing the “societal sustainability”, or the pure sustainable society’s 
conditions. 
The social indicators of GCI and GSCI indices are filtered and compared. The analysis 
of each index is justified by their same research focus (competitiveness) and their different 
research methods. A kind of objective factor set is created to understand the sustainability of a 
society in itself. The analysis focuses on the similarities and alteration in order to declare the 
direction and strength of correlation between social conditions of sustainable competitiveness 
and social sustainability. 
3.2. Social impacts and factors of sustainable progress index (SPI) 
Sustainable Progress Index is launched by the EU policy-making department, as a 
measurement tool in the sustainability debate, focusing on 15 EU member countries, based on 
the UN 17 sustainable development goals from 2015 (the social pillar indicators can be seen in 
Table 6). The analysis is based on mostly Eurostat and OECD data, which makes the countries 
comparable. Also, the speciality of the index is including the most developed countries of the 
EU only. Hence, the index seeks to illustrate the fact that even in the developed countries, the 
sustainable development goals need more attention and more direct policies to reach them. This 
hidden message of the index can be interpreted as a significant and real gap between economic 
success and sustainability. However, in the top ranked countries’ overlaps are remarkable. 
As the following table contains, many of the social sustainability conditions belong to 
specific requirements of economic success. Among the others, the poverty rate, the GINI Index, 
or the level of corruption and the stability of the political environment play key role in analysing 
the competitiveness performance of nation states too. Meaning in theory that social and societal 









Poverty rate after taxes and transfers; poverty line 50% (% of 
population), 
Share of severely deprived people 
People living in households with low work intensity,  
People living in a dwelling with leaky roof, damp walls, floors or 
foundation, etc. (% of population) 
 
 
Prevalence of obesity, BMI>30 (% of adult population) 
Cereal yield (kg/ha) 
Ammonia emissions from agriculture  
Gross nutrient balance on agricultural land 
Area under organic farming (% of UAA) 
 
 
Life expectancy at birth, total, years, 
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1000, age15-19) 
Subjective wellbeing (average ladder score) 
Smoking prevalence (%, aged 15+)  
Road traffic deaths (per 100,000) 
Self-reported unmet health needs (% of population) 
Deaths from NCDs (per 100,000) 
Suicide Rate 
Alcohol Consumption (litres per capita, age 15+) 
 
 
Tertiary education (% of population, age 30-34) 
PISA Score 
Employment rate of recent graduates 
Adult participation in learning (%) 
Early leavers from education and training 
 
 
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) 
Proportion of women in senior management positions (%) 
Gender pay gap in unadjusted form (% of male hourly wages) 
Women who feel safe walking in their area alone at night 
Gender employment gap (5) 
Rate of female years of education to male mean years (% of males), 




Household debt, % NDI 
Palma index 






Homicides per 100,000 population 
Population reporting occurrence of crime, violence or vandalism in 
their area (%) 
Perceived independence of the justice system (%) 
Feel safe walking at night (%) 
Unsentenced detainees (% of prison population) 
 
 
Overseas Development Assistance (% of GNI) 
Environmental taxes as % of tax revenue 
General government gross debt 
 
Table 6: List of SPI’s social pillar indicators.  
Source: Edited by the author based on the SPI report (SOCIAL JUSTICE IRELAND 2020). 
 
3.3. Social indicators of (sustainable) competitiveness 
Sustainability refers primarily to the relationship between society, economy and the 
natural environment. However, the concept is extended continuously by novel approaches 
coming from different fields. As a sub-topic of sustainability research, social sustainability has 
gathered increasing attention in the last few decades and took numberless critics and comments 
on the meaning and methods of the concept. 
Competitiveness is one of the key notions of the 21st century’s economy. In the deeply 
globalized and digitalized economic environment, the main feature of a national economy refers 
to the conditions of being able to keep the race and making sure the constant development. 
Concretely, the jobs and workforce with high added values, the language skills and managerial 
skill means the main foundations of a national economy’s competitiveness. As it is noticed 
many times, the innovation and creativity capacities play crucial role in connecting to the global 
economic system in a competitiveness and successful level – based on the currently applied 
indices. 
The indices with a competitiveness focus were launched during the Cold War. Two 
competitiveness schools exist, with quite the opposite approaches. While the American school 
(based on Michael PORTER’s main concepts) builds up its arguments to the outputs, the World 
Economic Forum’s approach tends to focus on the conditions of being competitive (THORE – 
TARVERDYAN 2016). A third school was started recently as the alternative measuring tool 
of global competitiveness in the institute of SOLABILITY (2020). 
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GCI was revisited in 2011 and later 2013. During these re-shapings, new indicators were 
included to the data set as the factors and measuring tools of sustainability. The current index 
contains the social focus indicators listed in Table 7. The indicators were selected based on their 
relevance to the social sustainability indicators stemming from SPI. 











Checks and balances Freedom of the press 
Transparency Incidence of corruption 
Property rights Property rights 
Intellectual property protection 
Future orientation of government Government’s responsiveness to change 




Exposure to unsafe drinking water % of population 
Reliability of water supply 
HEALTH 
Healthy life expectancy  
 




Mean years of schooling 
Skills of current workforce Extent of staff training 
Quality of vocational training 
Skillset of graduates 
Digital skills among active population 
Ease of finding skilled employees 
Future workforce School life expectancy 
Skills of future workforce Critical thinking 




Active labour market policies 
Workers’ rights 
Ease of hiring foreign labour 
INNOVATION CAPACITY 
Interaction and diversity 
 
Diversity of workforce 
State of cluster development 
Research and development Scientific publications 
Patent applications 
R&D expenditures % GDP 
Research institutions prominence 
Table 7: The social related indicators of Global Competitiveness Index.  
Source: GCI 2019 
 
The Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index (GSCI) were launched in 2013 as the most 
complex tool for measuring competitiveness and sustainability at the same time. Like this, the 
two indices are seemingly focusing on the same topic, but because of their methodology and 
indicator set, they can be seen as the two sides of the same coin or the two ending points of the 
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same scale, such as the GCI, which is analysed as the economic, GSCI as the sustainability part 
of the sustainable economic success debate.  
GSCI is built up five pillars and covering the main competitiveness conditions, while 
including the three main pillars of sustainability. As the following tables illustrate, there are 
significant overlaps between the two indices, but GSCI contain more sustainability elements, 
especially considering the social factors of sustainability and competitiveness. Consequently, 
in GSCI, the social capital, the intellectual capital and innovation, and the governance efficiency 
pillars of the index covers social sustainability indicators (see Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10). 
 
 
Table 8: The social indicator set of Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index.  
Source: GSCI 2020 
 
Table 9: The intellectual capital and innovation indicators of Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index.  





Table 10: The governance efficiency indicators of Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index.  
Source: GSCI 2020 
 
3.4. Meeting points and differing factors 
The meaning of social sustainability and sustainable competitiveness can be described 
with the help of their indicator sets. As the above detailed indices illustrate, every school and 
research manage different approaches and data set to explore sustainability of nation states. 
Competitiveness is analysed in GCI mostly from an economic and financial perspective, albeit 
the significant intention to harmonize the index with sustainability studies. Also, GCI designed 
up to mostly subjective data and opinions of experts and leaders. However, the GSCI index 
seeks to build up almost 100% on qualitative data and analysed them in the same weight.  
Both indices have truth and both of them could be criticised in many ways. At the same 
time, it seems that their indicators differ much less than it seems at first glance, but the data 
collection and analysis methodology realise a different output in the ranking of nation states. 
Hence, the hypothesis has right, in indicator level, social sustainability goals and 
competitiveness goals need so similar social basis to be realised. 
Although, instead of all the criticisms and faults of the indices, these global indicators 
can suggest rightly the trends and positions of states from the given perspectives. 
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4. Ireland - case study 
4.1. Why Ireland? 
Ireland is one of the few so-called small and vulnerable states, which was able to manage 
an unexpected economic development and achieve a high level of international position in the 
last two decades. However, the last financial crisis hit the Celtic Tiger as well, still it remains a 
relatively stable and competitive actor of the global system. Many researchers discuss the 
reasons behind its success, mentioning the education and social policy reforms starting from 
the 1970s to attributing to luck that the country started on the digitalization trend on the right 
time. Effectively, both of these statements have truth and both of these factors played crucial 
role in the success. In general, the core of the Irish miracle was the ability to stop the path-
dependency circle and to break out from the previous, economically weak and politically 
dependent position by re-shaping the society of the country. Researchers concur on the fact that 
the social reforms provided the basis for the following economic reforms launched in the Irish 
national economy. 
The current paper seeks to find out the sustainability of this extraordinary performance of 
Ireland from the following reasons: if the Irish recipe seems sustainable, it could provide a good 
example and good practice for other so-called small and vulnerable states to break out from the 
path-dependency circle; if the Irish case can prove the direct and positive correlation between 
social sustainability and competitiveness, then the mutual interaction of these policy-shaping 
fields should be harmonized more worldwide; if the correlations doesn’t exist or negative, it 
means that nation states’ governments have to decide between being competitive or being 
sustainable – in social terms firstly. 
4.2. The Irish performance in the reflection of GCI, SGCI and SPI 
Ireland changed its position radically on the GCI ranking around the 2000s. The so-called 
Irish miracle achieved a visible and measurable point in economic perspective. However, to 
make the indices comparable, the state’s ranking is showed here mostly after the crisis. 1999-
2001 are illustrated as counter point from the era before the financial crisis. This data selection 
is also justified with the fact of the GSCI index has been started in 2012, so the comparison is 
possible only from this year.  
As the blue line shows in Figure 14, the GCI ranking of Ireland, the orange one sign the 
GSCI position of the country. The data and the positions show no parallel, neither any 




Figure 14: Irish rankings on GCI 1999-2020. (blue line) Source: GCI REPORTS 1999-2020 
Irish rankings on GSCI 2012-2020. (orange line) Source: GSCI REPORTS 2012-2020 
 
The Sustainable Progress Index represent the UN SDGs in the EU context. The measuring 
probe tries to design a statistical basis for investigating the nation states’ performance regarding 
the 17 SDGs. This index plays important role in the current research firstly with its indicators, 
instead of its ranking. Especially because this index contains only EU countries. Albeit, stay 
here the ranking of Ireland among the most developed EU countries. 
 
 
Figure 15: Irish rankings on SPI in 2020.  
Source: SPI report 2020 
 
In Figure 15 the numbers in the rows represent the social goals of UN in sustainability, 
while the columns sign the place of Ireland in SPI ranking. As it can be seen, Ireland belongs 













to the middle group of the developed EU member-states. This performance could be explained 
in partially with the lack of history in regarding the institutions with sustainability goals and 
infrastructural capacities. 
5. Findings - How and to what extent the sustainable competitiveness and 
the sustainable progress is correlating 
5.1. Findings in general 
The parallel of competitiveness and social sustainability is assumed with strong reason. 
It seems that both of them stand on the same social indicators at first glance. The more 
developed social indicators mean the more sustainable society by definition. However, the 
results and rankings of Ireland on GCI, GSCI and SPI show much less correlation than it was 
assumed. In order to find the currently hidden causes of the lack of the parallel should be 
investigated with deeper statistical analysis. Although, it has to be emphasized that instead of 
competitiveness index covers numerous factors of sustainability, also contains conditions and 
consequences which directly and indirectly, but hurt deeply the environmental and even certain 
social goals of sustainability efforts. Albeit the strong intentions to make a complex measuring 
tool for sustainability in economic terms as well, it seems that neither of the currently available 
indices is able to forecast or even measure the reality.  
Ireland’s economic performance in competitiveness terms is proved by the GCI, while 
the sustainability perspective signs partially worth future perspective for the country. Also, the 
SGCI tends to overestimate certain sustainability indicators which can be easily compensated 
by advantages on other indicators.  
5.2. The Irish case 
In the case of Ireland, the social reform-based competitiveness is proved, while these 
indicators and required conditions of other types of sustainability seem to melt into the 
environmental sustainability conditions of SGCI. Based on the implemented indices, Ireland 
stays in a good position globally as placing in the first and top countries of the world.  
Obviously, Ireland bears crucial environmental and social challenges, but currently it 
seems that the country can countervail these issues by its economic success. Like in other cases 
of successful small states, the social conditions show extreme positions and numbers regarding 
the sub-pillars and special social relating indicators of the indices. This means that the deep and 
long-term social policy reforms, based on the requirements of the current and assumed future 
definition of competitiveness are one of an effective way of becoming competitive and 
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sustainable in the 21st century. As the GSCI puts Ireland to the top 15 with the strong focus on 
sustainability perspective, and the GCI ranking of the country is also stable globally in the top 
30., suggests that the Irish economic miracle is sustainable and socially founded. This 
conclusion is ensured also by the lack of the correlation between the two indices’ lists. Within 
two different data set and analysis methodology Ireland performed in a good place. Regarding 
the SPI ranking, as the global rankings illustrate, the majority of the developed EU member-
states take top places in the world. Meaning that being average among the goods means a good 
position globally as well. 
Another crucial conclusion of the Irish case is that path-dependency circle can be broken 
through fundamental social policy reforms, in parallel with similarly basic strategic change in 
national economy. As all the sustainability debate emphasizes, the harmonised actions of 
different policy fields mean the long-term solution of being sustainable in any terms. 
6. Conclusion 
As the challenge is noticed on many forums, the conditions of competitiveness, economic 
success and the indicators of social sustainability collide in many points. These tensions 
between the two basic and typical policy-making goals of national governments have to be 
harmonized and moreover, have to be calculated within the global indicators (global 
environmental footprint of the Scandinavian oil industries, global supply chains etc.). Without 
the harmonization of these different goals, the declared sustainability goals are only empty 
promises and unreal visions. Also, because the most competitiveness part and countries of the 
world are firstly competitive and by the way sustainable – seemingly-, if their interest let them 
happen. If sustainability is the first motivation of policy making, the whole global economic 
system and the policy-making strategies have to be re-designed. 
The implied indices of competitiveness show the two ends of the sustainable economic 
performance scale. While the GCI tend to focus mostly on the pure economic conditions of 
competitiveness, the GSCI data set is built up on sustainability indicators in majority. Though, 
both of them measure competitiveness and try to catch the essence of the main conditions of 
economic success, their results differ significantly. While this phenomenon needs more 
statistical analysis and proof, in the Irish case it means good news for the country. Despite the 
endogen duplications of indicators and other questionable methodological details of the indices, 




Based on the indices and the analysed indicators, if a country is sustainably competitive, 
then it is most likely socially sustainable. But this correlation seems really weak and false from 
many perspectives. As the controversies of the three main sustainability pillars show, the whole 
sustainability mission can hardly occur totally, only in partial. (DESPOTOVIC et al. 2016) 
Sustainability is a complex and difficult topic; however, it determines the future of our 
world. No doubt that we cannot deal with it enough, but the scientific and policy-making 
approaches must become more realistic and less western-oriented considering values of 
competitiveness and meaning of sustainability in any terms. 
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Analysis of the youth labor market in the EEU countries 
Bauyrzhan URAZYMBETOV74 
Abstract 
One of the goals of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) from 05/29/2014 "The desire to 
form a single market for goods, services, capital and labor resources within the EEU" provides in the future 
significant opportunities to meet the needs of young people in the common labor market. The relevance of the topic 
is determined by the fact that the high level of youth unemployment and the growth of passive human capital is a 
macroeconomic problem in many countries, including the EEU countries.  In this work, the following research 
methods were used: universal, general scientific, private, causal, systemic and structural, as well as economic, 
statistical and comparative analysis.  The article discusses the results of research and analysis of the main 
indicators of the labor market of youth (from 15 to 29 years old) in the EEU countries for the period 2015-2019 
years. A comparative analysis of the level of unemployment and education of youth, employment by industry. The 
main problems are identified and systematized labor market in the EEU: an increase in the category of youth 
NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training), inconsistency in vocational and qualification skills of 
graduates with the demands of the labor market, informal employment of young people and emigration of highly 
skilled frames. The main programs that contribute to the formation of youth in the labor market within the 
framework of Eurasian integration. Conclusions are drawn regarding measures which could improve the situation 
in the general youth labor market. 
 
Keywords: labor market, EEU, employment, youth unemployment, youth NEET. 
1. Introduction 
Since 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union began to function. The participating countries 
today include the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Armenia. The 
EEU, as the youngest integration association, from the very beginning took an active position 
in the implementation of sustainable development goals. For sustainable development is based 
on mutually reinforcing links between economic growth, environmental protection and 
employment. 
As one of the main goals of the formation of the EEU, the desire to form a single labor 
market aimed at strengthening and expanding interaction in various economic spheres was 
identified, which implies using the labor resources available to the Union for the benefit of 
realizing the economic potential of each EEU member state. Within the EEU, citizens can find 
employment without additional permits. This is an additional opportunity for employment, 
career development, business for young people. The progressive development of integration 
depends on young people, their academic and professional training, the ability of specialists to 
understand their colleagues from neighboring countries (SAMOKHINA, E. A. 2011). 
The labor market is a fundamental element of the economy of any country. In the system 
of regional integration in the context of globalization, changes are taking place in the world of 
work. These are changes in the process of labor activity, in the organization of labor, in the 
 




structure of employment, etc. As a rule, changes entail the emergence of some difficulties that 
are more strongly reflected in the more vulnerable category of the labor market - youth. Young 
people with difficulties integrating into the world of work suffer throughout their lives from 
scarring effects that reduce their resilience and ability to survive in a dynamic and demanding 
labor market. The solution to the problems of youth employment and unemployment, which 
cannot be called new, largely depends on the formation of legal conditions in the sphere of the 
functioning of the common labor market within the EEU and the effectiveness of the 
employment policy. Building a sustainable future means empowering youth in employment. 
Thus, the Strategic Directions for the Development of Eurasian Economic Integration until 
2025 (EEC. Eurasian Economic Commission. 2020: Strategic Directions For Developing 
Eurasian Economic Integration Until 2025) laid down measures for the sustainable and 
inclusive development of each EEU member state, which also provide for increased 
employment and decent work for all social groups of the population. 
The fundamental provision of the Treaty on the EEU is to provide labor migrants - citizens 
of the EEU countries with a national legal regime in the field of their labor rights. Restrictions 
of such a regime can be established only to ensure the highest national interests of the state. 
2. Integration aspects of the formation of a single labor market 
The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of May 29, 2014 consolidated the rules that 
created conditions for the free movement of labor resources throughout the territory of the 
integration association. One of the fundamental freedoms of the single labor market is, in 
accordance with paragraph 1. Article 98 of the Treaty on the EEU granting the right to engage 
in professional activities in accordance with the specialty and qualifications. This makes it 
possible for employers to involve workers of the EEU countries in the implementation of labor 
activities without taking into account the restrictions on the protection of the national labor 
market. Employees are not required to obtain a work permit in the country of employment. The 
EEU countries have concluded an agreement on the recognition of educational documents 
issued by educational organizations of the participating countries without carrying out the 
procedures for recognizing educational documents established by the legislation of the state of 
employment. In accordance with clause 2. Article 97, the exception is the sphere of activity 
related to the interests of national security. 
A positive point for workers from the EEU member states is that the right to offset the 
length of service in the total length of service (insurance) for the purposes of social security 
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(social insurance), in addition to pension, is an important aspect of the formation of a single 
labor market. 
Despite the fact that in the EEU countries there are different pension systems, the issue 
of pension provision, the formation, preservation and implementation of workers' pension rights 
on the same conditions as citizens of the state of employment is settled in accordance with the 
Agreement on Pension Provision, signed by the heads of the EEU states on December 20, 2019 
in St. Petersburg at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. The agreement 
defines the procedure and mechanism for exporting pensions from one country of the Union to 
another, provides for the summation of the length of service in the EEU states to determine the 
right to a pension. In addition, the issue of medical examination of a worker, including an 
absentee medical examination when assigning a disability pension, has been resolved, and 
transitional provisions have been fixed that determine the procedure for the appointment and 
payment of pensions for periods of work before and after the entry into force of the Agreement. 
The Treaty on the EEU provides for the taxation of income from employment of a migrant 
worker from one state of the Union on the territory of another member state at the tax rates 
provided for such income for residents of this state from the first day of their receipt. According 
to clause 2.3 of Article 98 of the Treaty on the EEU, a worker of a member state of the EEU 
has the right to an unhindered transfer of funds. In accordance with clause 6, clause 7 of Article 
98 of the Treaty on the EEU, workers of the EEU member states are granted the right to receive 
information or documents (certificates) from the state bodies of the state of employment and / 
or the employer (customer of work (services)) regarding the procedure stay, conditions of 
employment, as well as other rights and obligations stipulated by the legislation of the state of 
employment. 
Summarizing the norms of the Treaty on the EEU, we can conclude that the formation of a 
common labor market of the EEU countries is one of the most important factors in the economic 
recovery of the union states and an additional impetus to strive for sustainable development. 
The main directions of regulation of its labor market include: the fight against a further decline 
in production, prevention of mass unemployment, the adoption of measures to improve the 
standard of living of the population, etc. 
3. Analysis of the youth labor market in the EEU 
In 2019, the resident population of the EEU countries was about 184.3 million people 
(Figure 16). The economically active population was 93.6 million people. The able-bodied 
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population of the EEU countries was about 70% of the total population, and the level of general 
unemployment was at 4.8% (EEC documents, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). 
 
Figure 16: Permanent population and unemployment rate  
of the EEU countries 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of EEC. Eurasian Economic Commission. 2020: 
Statistical YEARBOOK of The Eurasian Economic Union. Moscow. p. 445.  
 
Modern youth of the 21st century in the context of globalization is very different from the 
previous generation in other landmarks and value orientations, characteristic of rational 
economic behavior. There is no universally accepted international definition of the age group 
of young people. However, for statistical purposes of the United Nations, according to the 
international definition, young people are considered to be persons aged 15 to 24 years, in the 
countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, people whose age ranges lie in the range from 15 
to 29 years old are referred to as youth (EMPLOYMENT 2015: Analysis of The Youth Labor 
Market: A Package of Educational and Informational Materials on The Youth Labor Market - 
p 147. ). And this is largely determined by ethnic characteristics, national traditions, 
characteristics of social status and socio-psychological qualities of people in this age group. 
According to United Nations information, today there are about 1.2 billion young people 
living in the world, which is 16% of the world population. According to the Department of 
Statistics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the number of youths in the EEU 
countries in 2019 was 31.9 thousand people, or 17.3% of the total population (Table 11). Most 
of the young population of the EEU lives in Russia (76.2%), followed by Kazakhstan (12.2%), 
Kyrgyzstan (5.0%), Belarus (4.8%) and Armenia (1.8%) (EEC 2020). 
At the same time, it is necessary to note the downward trend in youth growth rates in the 
EEU countries. So, from 2015 to 2019, the number of young people of the Union aged 15 to 29 
years decreased by 5.4 thousand people. Moreover, this trend is observed in all EEU countries. 
In Armenia, the share of young people decreased over the period under review from 22.9% in 
2015 to 19.5% in 2019; in Belarus - from 19.8% to 16.0%; in Kazakhstan - from 24.6% to 
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21.2%; in Kyrgyzstan - from 28.3% to 25.2%; in Russia - from 19.7% to 16.5%, respectively. 
The definition of the dominant part of the youth labor market within the EEU was influenced 
by the indicator of migration growth (outflow (EEC documents, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020) 
Years Indicators Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia EEU 
2015 
Number of young 
people, thousand people 
690 1 873 4 287 1 671 28 742 37263 
in % of the total 
population 
22,9 19,8 24,6 28,3 19,7 20,5 
2016 
Number of young 
people, thousand people 
656 1 814 4 182 1 663 27 588 35903 
in % of the total 
population 
21,9 19,1 23,7 27,6 18,8 19,6 
2017 
Number of young 
people, thousand people 
626 1 745 4 092 1 644 26 397 34504 
in % of the total 
population 
21,0 18,4 22,8 26,8 18,0 18,8 
2018 
Number of young 
people, thousand people 
601 1 680 3 990 1 624 25 272 33167 
in % of the total 
population 
20,2 17,7 22,0 26,0 17,2 18,0 
2019 
Number of young 
people, thousand people 
578 1 520 3 893 1 608 24 283 31882 
in % of the total 
population 
19,5 16,0 21,2 25,2 16,5 17,3 
 
Table 11: Number of young people (15-29 years old) in the EEU countries 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of FEDERAL STATE STATISTICS SERVICE OF THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2019: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Statistical Handbook. Rosstat. 
p. 252. Retrieved from: https://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B19_16/Main.htm (downloaded 24. 02. 2021). 
 
Today, only Russia and Belarus have a positive migration balance. Statistics on the 
increase in the flow of labor migration from the EEU member states to Russia: in 2019, 701.2 
thousand people arrived in the Russian Federation, including 230.5 thousand people from the 
EEU countries. In 2015-2019, 904.8 thousand people arrived in Russia from other EEU 
countries (EEC documents, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). 
According to the official data of the EEC Department of Statistics, the flow of workers 
attracted to the economy of the EEU member states from other countries in 2019 grew by 29.0% 
in Belarus compared to 2018 and amounted to 20.9 thousand people, in Russia - by 1,4% 
(1,793.7 thousand people) and in Kazakhstan decreased by 1.0% (25.9 thousand people) (EEC. 
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Eurasian Economic Commission. 11/30/2020: On the Labor Market in The Eurasian Economic 
Union 2019. Analytical Review. ). Compared to 2015, in 2019 the flow of workers attracted to 
the economy of the EEU member states from other countries in Belarus decreased by 34%, in 
Kazakhstan - by 31.7%, in Russia - by 4% (Table 12) (EEC documents, 2016, 2020). 
  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Armenia … … … … … 
Belarus 31,8 20,8 15,8 16,2 20,9 
Kazakhstan 37,9 39,8 28,1 26,2 25,9 
Kyrgyzstan … … … … … 
Russia 1868,6 1686,3 1773,9 1768,6 1793,7 
 
Table 12: The number of employees attracted to the economy from other countries (according to the migration 
services; thousand people). 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of EEC documents, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020. 
 
According to the Department of Statistics of the Eurasian Economic Commission for the 
period from 2015 to 2019 the number of persons who emigrated from Armenia abroad and 
registered with the internal affairs bodies upon changing their permanent place of residence was 
14,767 (an increase of 3.5% in 2019 compared to 2015) (Table 13). The number of people who 
immigrated to Armenia is 16,260 (an increase of 2.2 times in 2019 compared to 2015). 
However, according to the assessment of the results of the Integrated Survey of Living 
Conditions of Households in Armenia, there is a significant negative balance of international 
migration (- 108.3 thousand people). 
 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Armenia -881 -93 286 480 1 701 
Armenia* -25 906 -24 792 -23 962 -18 286 -15 400 
Belarus 18 494 7 940 3 874 9 362 13 870 
Kazakhstan - 13 466 - 21 145 - 22 130 - 29 121 - 32 970 
Kyrgyzstan - 4 229 -3 965 -3 925 -5 390 - 6 160 
Russia 245 384 261 948 211 878 124 854 285 103 
EEU 219396 219893 166021 81899 246144 
*Assessment based on the results of the Integrated Survey of Living Conditions of Households 
 
Table 13: Net migration of young people in the EEU countries (persons) 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of EEC. Eurasian Economic Commission. 2020: 




In 2015-2019, the negative balance of the migration outflow of the population from 
Kazakhstan amounted to about 119 thousand people, from Kyrgyzstan about 24 thousand 
people. The resulting negative migration balance indicates an increase in the outflow of labor 
resources, creates a shortage of qualified personnel in the donor country. 
The competitiveness of young people in the labor market largely depends on the level of 
education. High-quality education provides an opportunity for self-realization of young people, 
increases labor productivity, promotes career growth, material well-being and a healthy 
lifestyle. In terms of education, a significant part of the employed youth of the EEU countries 
have higher education. So, according to the national statistical services, in 2019 in Armenia 
51.9% of employed young people aged 25-29 had higher professional education to the total 
number of employed young people of the corresponding age, in Kazakhstan - 46.7%, in Belarus 
- 44.1 %, in Russia - 41.1% (EEC. Eurasian Economic Commission. 11/30/2020: On the Labor 
Market in The Eurasian Economic Union 2019. Analytical Review. ). 
In Kyrgyzstan, as a result of an integrated sample survey of household budgets and labor 
force in 2019, organized by the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, it was 
recorded that 27.6% of employed youth aged 25-29 had a higher professional education, and 
7.1% had a secondary vocational education, primary vocational education - 8.0% and 46.2% of 
employed young people had only secondary (complete) education (NATIONAL 
STATISTICAL COMMITTEE OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 2020: Employment and 
Unemployment. Results of The Integrated Sample Survey of Household Budgets and Labor 
Force In 2019. ). This is due to the fact that the labor market in Kyrgyzstan is not economically 
and socially stable. In addition to unemployment, an acute problem in the republic is a parallel 
shortage of skilled labor. The supply of labor exceeds the demand for it and for one job, there 
are 17 people for one declared vacancy in the state employment service, and it is not possible 
to provide jobs for all those who applied to the employment service (EUROPEAN Foundation 
for Education. 2020: Kyrgyzstan National Report/ Turin Process 2018-2020. p 41. ). Despite 
the fact that the youth of the EEU countries is characterized by a high degree of learning ability, 
they still do not have the necessary professional skills to compete in the skilled labor market. 
As practice shows, it is young people who are more affected by informal labor relations. 
In the EEU countries, informal employment has become widespread during the period of 
socio-economic transformations; since the beginning of the 90s, its active growth has been 
observed, directly related to the level of socio-economic development of countries and with 
limited employment opportunities in the real sector. The development of the informal sector is 
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a forced reaction of young people to the socio-economic situation, which forced people to adapt 
to new economic conditions. Globally, the share of the informal sector of the economy is 
estimated at 5-10% of GDP, its marginal threshold is 45-50%, but this is rather rough data, 
since it is necessary to determine the scale of shadow employment and the number of those 
employed in the formal sector with additional informal employment. Unfortunately, informal 
employment does not lend itself to accurate statistics and therefore affects the distortion of data 
on the real state of the labor market and employment. Currently, informal employment has 
become an independent and stable segment of the labor market. It allows employees to carry 
out labor activities without legal registration of labor relations and is reflected in the efficiency 
of the use of labor, the quality of working life of the population. To analyze the youth labor 
market, we present the official data of the national statistical services of the EEU member states. 
Thus, in Armenia, the share of informal employment in non-agricultural sectors in 2018 
amounted to 20.8% of total employment in non-agricultural sectors. According to the 
Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the level of youth employment in the 
informal sector decreased by 9.3% and amounted to 13.7% in 2019 (COMMITTEE on 
STATISTICS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN. 2020: Indicators of Decent Work of 
The Republic of Kazakhstan). In 2019, 532 thousand young people worked informally in 
Kyrgyzstan, including in the age groups: 18-24 years old - 259.4 thousand people, 25-29 years 
old - 240.5 thousand people (NATIONAL STATISTICAL COMMITTEE OF THE KYRGYZ 
REPUBLIC 2020: Employment and Unemployment. Results of The Integrated Sample Survey 
of Household Budgets and Labor Force In 2019. ). In Russia, according to Rosstat, in 2019, 
3110 thousand people aged 15-29 worked in the informal sector of the economy, including 168 
thousand people aged 15-19 years old, 2,942 thousand people aged 20-29 years old.  The level 
of informal employment of the population of Belarus was 8.0% in 2019, and in 2018 8.2% of 
the total employment in non-agricultural sectors (NATIONAL STATISTICAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS. 2020: Indicators for Achieving Sustainable Development 
in The Republic of Belarus 2020). 
Among the most common reasons for difficulties in finding a job for graduates are: lack 
of demand for a profession, lack of seniority (experience) of work, insufficient wages, lack of 
vacancies. The main reasons for youth unemployment are indicated: lack of work after 
graduation, dismissal due to liquidation (bankruptcy) of the organization, staff reductions, 
dismissal due to the expiration of the term of the agreement (agreement, contract). 
Overcoming unemployment is one of the important socio-economic problems of the EEU 
countries. Thanks to the implementation of national programs to stabilize the situation on the 
235 
 
labor market, according to the official statistics of the EEC, in 2019 the number of unemployed 
in the Union among young people aged 15-24 decreased to 900.5 thousand people, while in 
2017 their number exceeded 1057 thousand people (Table 14). In parallel, there was a gradual 
decrease in the share of the number of unemployed youth in the total number of unemployed. 
In all EEU countries in 2019, with the exception of Kazakhstan, the unemployment rate 
among young people aged 15-24 was higher than the national average. The problem of 
unemployment among young people in Armenia is especially critical today. According to the 
official statistics of the EEC, in the period under review in Armenia, the unemployment rate 
among young people aged 15-29 reaches more than 52%. According to the methodology of the 
International Labor Organization, the peak of growth in the level of unemployment among 
young people for the period under review was in Armenia in 2017, Belarus in 2016 and 2018, 
Kazakhstan in 2015, Kyrgyzstan in 2016, Russia in 2018 (Figure 17 and Figure18) (EEC 2020). 
 
























































































































































































































Armenia 52,4 21,5 45,8 20,8 46,7 21,3 45,5 18,5 43,0 17,9 
Belarus … … 53,9 17,9 47,4 16,1 47,3 19,3 43,0 20,2 
Kazakhstan 53,8 11,9 44,1 9,9 38,6 8,7 37,0 8,3 39,0 8,9 
Kyrgyzstan 71,0 36,9 69,7 37,9 61,9 35,6 51,6 33,0 49,4 35,0 
Russia 1041,2 24,4 989,5 23,3 862,8 21,8 818,5 22,4 726,1 21,0 
 
Table 14: The number of unemployed persons between the ages of 15 and 24 (according to the ILO criteria). 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of Committee on Statistics of The Republic of 
Kazakhstan. 2020: Employment FEDERAL STATE STATISTICS SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 2020: Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment in Russia (Based on The Results of Sample 




Figure 17: Youth unemployment rate (15-29 years) in 2019, as percentage 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of EEC. Eurasian Economic Commission. 11/30/2020: 
On the Labor Market in The Eurasian Economic Union 2019. Analytical Review.  
 
Practically in all EEU member states in 2019, there was a positive downward trend in the 
level of youth unemployment compared to 2018, except for Kyrgyzstan: the unemployment rate 
among young people aged 15-24 increased by 0.4 percentage points. In 2019 alone, 6,721 
people left Kyrgyzstan for the EEU countries from 2015 to 2019, more than 32.8 thousand 
citizens left. 
For the period from 2015 to 2019, the level of youth unemployment in accordance with 
the ILO criteria in Kazakhstan decreased by 0.5% to 3.6%, in Kyrgyzstan it decreased by 2.7%, 
in Russia - by 0.5%. In absolute terms, the number of unemployed youth from 2015 to 2019 in 
Kazakhstan decreased by 14.8 thousand people, in Kyrgyzstan - by 21.6 thousand people, in 
Russia - by 315.1 thousand people. In Armenia, on the contrary, the number of unemployed in 




Figure 18: Youth unemployment rate between the ages of 15 and 24 (according to the ILO criteria) (as 
a percentage) 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of EEC documents, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020. 
 
In almost all EEU member states, according to the results of sample surveys of national 
statistical services in 2019, the highest level of youth unemployment is characteristic of young 
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with vocational education (Table 15). The exceptions are Kazakhstan and Russia, where the 
share of unemployed persons aged 25 to 29 with higher professional education is much higher. 
Most likely, this is due to the mismatch between supply and demand in the labor market 
for various professions, which in turn due to insufficient information about modern relevant 
specialties in various sectors of the economy. Moreover, the lack of an effective assessment and 
forecast of the required specialties leads to a discrepancy between the specialties produced and 
the modern needs of the labor market. For example, more than 66% of the population of the 
EEU countries is employed in the service sector; more than 19% are employed in agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries (Figure 19). 
So, according to official statistics, the number of youth employed in the service sector of 
Kazakhstan aged 15-28 years in 2019 amounted to 5307.4 thousand people or 68.1%. 
In Kyrgyzstan, young people aged 15-29 are employed in the service sector 348.1 
thousand people or 53.3% of the total number of employed people in accordance with age, in 
Belarus - 63.2%, respectively. 
Recently, the problem of a high level of NEET youth, youth who do not want to work or 
study, has become relevant for all EEU member states, which is explained by the degradation 
of youth values in the world of work, the predominance of material values in the perception of 
young people, high expectations, especially among people with higher education. According to 
the official data of the EEC, in 2018 Armenia is the leader in terms of NEET of youth (35.8% 
percentage of the total youth) (Figure 20). The lowest rates in the same year were recorded in 




75 Note: Since 2018 the concepts of "Resolution concerning statistics of work, employment and labor 
























15-19 100,0 0,0 0,0 15,1 8,6 56,3 20,0 0,0 
20-24 100,0 19,5 0,0 21,2 24,5 34,0 0,8 0,0 
25-29 100,0 24,8 0,0 19,2 33,7 20,4 1,9 0,0 
Kazakhstan 
16-19 100,0 0,0 0,0 48,3 6,9 31,0 13,8 0,0 
20-24 100,0 32,1 7,0 42,2 3,1 14,8 0,8 0,0 
25-29 100,0 44,8 1,6 38,0 2,5 12,4 0,5 0,2 
Kyrgyzstan 
16-19 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 12,5 78,1 9,4 
20-24 100,0 17,1 1,7 27,1 2,8 41,0 10,3 0,0 
25-29 100,0 39,3 3,4 5,6 5,6 39,7 6,0 0,4 
Russiа   
15-19 100,0 0,0 0,0 7,2 7,7 49,1 31,9 4,1 
20-24 100,0 21,6 0,0 21,8 12,8 35,8 7,4 0,6 
25-29 100,0 31,3 0,0 19,1 16,7 24,2 8,1 0,6 
 
Table 15: Structure of unemployed youth by education and age group in the EEU countries 2019 (according to 
sample surveys; as a percentage) 






Figure 19: Distribution of the employed population as a whole in the EEU by field of activity in 2019 (as a 
percentage of the total) 




Figure 20: Proportion of youth (aged 15-24 years) not in education, employment and training (NEET) 
(percentage of the total youth) 
Source: Edition of the author based on the data of EEC documents, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Summarizing the above analysis of the youth labor market in the EEU countries, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
• Young people face two interrelated problems - sustainable development and their 
professional prospects; 
• It is necessary to introduce professional programs, according to which highly qualified 
personnel can stay in the country for a longer period (for example, such programs are 
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• Increasing the quality of the workforce, jobs, and specialties in demand through active 
interaction between educational institutions, the state and companies. Assistance in 
further employment of graduates of educational institutions; 
• It is recommended to create a common information base on employment and vacancies 
in the EEU countries, reflecting the need for labor in each country, broken down by 
regions, industries and specialties, qualifications (in host countries), as well as labor 
supply (in countries of origin); 
• Employment outside the specialty and unproductive self-employment of young people 
lead to a decrease in the level of human capital and losses of the state budget due to the 
"potentially lost" benefits from employment of young people and their payment of taxes 
• Promotion of youth employment ensures sustainable development, which includes 
aspects such as employment policy formulation, safe working conditions, social 
protection, normal labor relations and human resource development strategies. 
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